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Summary 
This thesis aims to recover the central importance of the deliberative aspect of 
democracy which recent liberal theorising has neglected, and to capture common 
intuitions about the foundational nature of democratic institutions. The fundamental 
problem of political philosophy is that of justifying principles or institutions which can 
reconcile individuals and the political community on a moral basis. The use of political 
authority is morally legitimate when it is grounded upon such a reconciliation. Attempts 
to justify as legitimate a liberal constitutional framework are shown to fail, whether carried 
out on the basis of membership of a community, or as given by principles of justice, or on 
the grounds of utilitarianism or a perfectionist ideal. All these approaches must rely 
ultimately on a claim that there is or can be a consensus around some conception of 
morality or the good. However, none of them is entitled to claim that such a consensus 
can be reached without there already being in place a political process through which we 
can discover or construct a consensus, or find a way to go on when disagreement 
persists. 
The question then arises of how such a ground-level political framework can be 
justified and precisely what form it takes. The starting point is a notion of agents each 
with their own views about social and political issues. An argument is constructed from 
the logic of having such views to the conclusion that each agent has obligations to be 
prepared to participate in public discussion, and to accept democratic political decisions 
which are based upon such discussions. Failure to do so is self-undermining. Political 
legitimacy resides in the achievement of reconciling individuals to collective decisions. 
The practical implications of this notion of deliberative democracy for institutions and for 
individuals are drawn out. 
(Total length: 74,939 words) 
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INTRODUCTION 
Chapter One 
Justifying political authority: the project of reconciliation 
1.1 THE CENTRAL THEME 
The values of democracy and individual liberty have never before had so wide an 
allegiance throughout the world, nor formed the basis of so many political societies. Yet 
at the same time the health of those political systems which have longest had these 
values at their heart is in decline. Distrust of politicians and political solutions, the 
seeming persistence of large-scale social problems, the globalisation of the economy 
which renders domestic politics apparently impotent, simplistic and even infantile political 
debate, apathy, and alienation from the system especially on the part of the young, 
combine to create an impression of political structures in serious trouble, if not yet in 
crisis. 
It is my contention in this thesis that political philosophy can make a contribution 
to reversing these trends, and to building viable and flourishing political structures for the 
next century, but only if we move beyond the currently dominant versions of liberalism 
presented within the discipline. These reinforce the tendency to downplay the 
importance of politics and political debate by seeking to remove key questions of 
principle from the arena of political conflict, thereby trivialising the political process. The 
apparent emphasis in much current political philosophy on the need to found political 
structures on settled notions of justice and individual freedom leads to a remoteness 
from actual political debates, to which philosophers seem to have nothing to say. Such 
statements are of course impressionistic generalisations, but they nevertheless reflect, I 
believe, an underlying truth. This is that our political difficulties are not to be resolved by 
seeking a liberal constitutional settlement. 
My aim is to demonstrate the need for, and to justify, the insertion of a much 
greater degree of public deliberation into our political processes. This, I will argue, is the 
key to reversing the decay of our political systems. At present, due to faulty theoretical 
misunderstandings, these systems are failing to achieve a vital function, that of giving 
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moral legitimacy to the political activities of states and governments. It is not that the 
latter are acting illegitimately, but that the process of legitimisation Is not being carried 
out adequately. The relationship between the political structures and individual citizens 
is therefore being weakened. This has a number of consequences. The political 
structures are coarsened, and gradually lose their ability to reflect, and politically resolve, 
conflict within society. At the same time, the ability of individuals, groups, and their 
representatives to adequately articulate these conflicts becomes lessened, as politics 
becomes more a matter of the assertion of interests than reasoned debate. Our own 
capacities as rational beings are thereby damaged. Our ability to grapple with and 
influence the social, economic, and natural forces facing us is lessened. And as 
individuals no longer recognise politics as an essential part of living a human life social 
cohesion and civility begin to dissolve. As these tendencies mutually reinforce each 
other, we embark on a vicious spiral of decline. 
It may appear that these problems, if they do indeed exist, are not ones of moral 
legitimacy so much as questions of building good enough institutions and leading good 
enough lives. In a weak sense, the state acts with moral legitimacy as long as what it 
does is morally permissible. But that is too weak. The question of the moral legitimacy 
of political institutions is one of the moral relationship between individuals and these 
institutions. It affects the character of both sides of this relationship. Moral legitimacy 
can fail by being specified both too strongly, where too much is assigned to politics, and 
too weakly, by not assigning enough. The basic problem is that of reconciling the 
aspirations of individuals with the necessity for social relationships and institutions which 
mediate social conflicts. Moral legitimacy is achieved when individuals see the basic 
institutions of society as in some sense theirs, as not being in conflict with their interests 
and desires and as ultimately, even if not immediately, contributing towards meeting 
them. So the task is not to specify the best conceivable form of society or of life. It is 
rather to say how the basic social institutions can or could allow conflicts to be resolved 
within a fundamentally unifying framework, so that individuals do not see themselves in 
conflict with that framework. 
It is my view, which I will seek to justify in this work, that the leading 
contemporary philosophies of liberalism are involved in this project of seeking grounds 
8 
for the moral legitimacy of certain political structures. I will argue that they fail to achieve 
their aim, for reasons which point towards the need to move beyond constitutional 
liberalism and develop a conception which gives greater weight and prominence to 
processes of public deliberation and democratic decision making. Indeed, if I were to 
sum up my argument in a single sentence it would be that if we are to restore our political 
relationships and structures, and the foundations for social cohesion, we need above all 
to develop a richer and stronger public debate about political issues. My task will be to 
show why this is a requirement for the moral legitimacy of basic political structures, the 
significance it has for our lives, and why it does not require unfeasible notions of direct 
participative democracy. 
1.2 THE PROJECT OF MORAL RECONCILIATION 
The task, therefore, is to bring about a moral reconciliation between individuals 
and the political community in which they live, a reconciliation which can lay the basis for 
a moral community. Why is such a moral reconciliation important, and what is the 
significance of calling it moral? Because the question is why it is right for political 
authority to be used, and the circumstances in which it is right. To look for what is 
morally right is not just to say what people should do and should accept, but to show that 
what is justified as right is something people can accept as theirs. The point of a moral 
justification is not merely to show that people have good reason to accept or do what is 
being justified, but that in some sense they cannot rationally accept or do otherwise, that 
what is morally justified does not involve a compromise or a diminution of the self or its 
aims, but expresses what individuals are. Underlying this conception is a vision of what 
it is to be fully human, that it is to be free in the sense that we can see the world as 
congruent with our will. Expanding upon and justifying this vision is beyond the scope of 
this essay, but it is a common ideal behind the traditions of political philosophy inspired 
by both Kant and Hegel. 
Still, someone might say that for a society to be mine, for me to be able to feel at 
home in it, it needs to be created in my own image. Hence the right course for me to 
take in politics is to strive by any means possible to realise my own particular beliefs or 
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doctrines about the form the state should take or the policies it should pursue. Of 
course, I may have to compromise with other views, and accept the use of political 
authority to enforce policies which are not my own. But my reason for agreeing is purely 
a prudential one, simply because the compromise is the best I can do. So if I am at 
home in such a compromise society it is because I recognise the rational necessity of 
compromise; alternatively, I may remain restless in such a position, continually seeking 
to swing the balance of power further in my favour so that I can, by any means I judge 
right or justified, bring society closer to the way I think it should go. The prudential view 
is therefore that I want a society I can feel at home in. The moral point of view in 
political philosophy is wanting a society in which all can feel at home. The prudential 
argument can lead to something like the moral point of view if there is shown to be a 
rational necessity for compromise; but what keeps it prudential is that still I am only 
interested in my feeling at home - but I recognise that I must reconcile myself to a society 
which likely falls short of my whole ideal. Still I am only living in a society which is the 
best I can do, and I can conceive of a world in which I would be more at home. In a fully 
moral justification, however, I can only be at home in a society in which all feel at home. 
The desire for a fully moral justification for political authority is therefore a desire to live in 
a society which is not simply the best we can do in the prevailing circumstances, but 
rather one which is in a fundamental way the best that there could be. Why we should 
want that -a proof that this is indeed something which we should want - must await the 
second, positive, half of my argument. In brief, it is because it is necessary to live in a 
society in which all can feel at home if we are to be fully agents. So the moral point of 
view in political philosophy is necessary for each of us to be fully an agent. 
Should we be worried if, however, convincing arguments can only be found for a 
prudential view? There might be a worry about stability, since the longevity of any 
society based upon compromise depends upon there being a rough equality of power 
which makes compromise rational. And worries about stability are of moral concern, if 
living in a society in which I can be reasonably assured of its stability is necessary, or at 
least desirable, for leading a full moral life. Still, it can be argued that this is indeed how 
it is in modern society - there is no likelihood of the partisans of one particular doctrine 
being powerful enough to impose their views on the rest. Others may find this view 
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complacent. However, there is a deeper objection to the prudential view. Let us accept 
for a moment that we do live in a society which is characterised by a rough equality of 
power. In other words adherents to no one view are going to gain sufficient power to 
impose their views on the rest. Still we are never fully at home - we are haunted by the 
vision of a better society, more congenial to us. We accept the society we have as best 
for now - the now may even be for a very long time, for as far as we can see into the 
future and beyond. But in a moral justification we already have the best society we 
could have - the society which allows us to be fully an agent. If we think a society which 
conforms fully to our particular views would be better this is a mistake, unless that 
society is achieved through the legitimate means provided in the society we already 
have, and nothing bars us pursuing those means in order to realise our vision. But 
using other means to try to come closer to the ideal in fact moves us further from it, 
because it undercuts the agency we need to have the ideal in the first place. So in the 
most fundamental way we cannot improve the basis of society, even if we think it could 
pursue better policies. 
Another way of bringing out this point about the need for a moral justification of 
political authority is to consider the problem which needs to be addressed as arising from 
the need to resolve the political paradox. This paradox (although the term may strictly 
be a misnomer) arises from the contrast, and seeming conflict, between the views and 
beliefs a person may have about a matter of public policy, and the use of political 
authority to enforce one particular way of going on in respect of that issue, one specific 
policy. The task is to reconcile this conflict, by justifying the use of political authority to 
enforce positions with which individuals are in disagreement. The point is to show that 
to accept political authority is not to accept something that is or may be in conflict with 
one's other beliefs. Various resolutions of the political paradox have been proposed but 
it is in my view a mistake to regard it is a particular, isolated problem. Rather it is a way 
of stating the fundamental problem of the justification of political authority. The need is 
to reconcile individuals to the fundamental basis of the social structure in which they live. 
So it is not a matter of saying how people can both hold their beliefs and accept the 
authority of the state, but showing that they are right to do so. 
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1.3 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I suggested above that our contemporary political malaise cannot be addressed 
by the main doctrines current in political philosophy, which largely seek to justify some 
form of constitutional liberalism. In part one of this thesis I criticise the three main 
contemporary strategies which attempt to carry out his justification. They are united in 
that they see a constitutional liberalism as the political system which reconciles the 
individual and the political community. They differ, however, in how they see this 
reconciliation being carried out: through membership of a community which happens, as 
a matter of historical contingency, to be liberal; through basing the constitution upon 
basic moral values about which there is consensual agreement; and through a 
conception of the human good. In my view, none of these strategies succeed in 
showing why we have an obligation to accept a liberal political association. The claims 
of membership and goodness just cannot lead to a unitary conception of what values 
constitute the basis of a legitimate political association, while the consensual approach 
presumes to a knowledge of an agreement upon values to which it is not entitled. Thus 
I conclude that we cannot base political legitimacy upon any particular set of values. 
Conceptions of the good or of justice cannot settle the problem of the moral justification 
of political authority. 
This mandates the turn in the second part of this thesis to the justification of 
democratic institutions and processes of a certain sort, giving a central place to public 
deliberation, as the way in which political legitimacy is to be brought about. Note that on 
this view legitimacy, the moral reconciliation between individual and community, is an 
achievement of politics and not its precondition. I call this conception one of 
'deliberative democracy'. Using this term has certain dangers since it is generally 
associated with the doctrines of Jurgen Habermas and his followers. There are 
similarities in terms of institutional consequences between my view and that of 
Habermas, although there are also some crucial differences, which I mention in chapter 
five. More fundamentally, the justification I use for deliberative democracy is very far 
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away from the strong claims on which Habermas' system is based. So, although the 
term 'deliberative democracy' is most appropriate for the sort of political conception I 
develop, it should not be thought of as a version of a Habermassian approach. 
I said that in part two of this thesis I attempt to justify a deliberative democracy, 
and although in a sense that is true, it is also a little misleading. What I attempt to do in 
part two is work from a conception of human agents who confront each other as bearers 
of views, but who have to find out whether they hold views in common or not, to an 
account of political commitments which I will argue arise inescapably from being what I 
dub 'agents with views'. Taking this conception of agents as a starting point flows from 
the analysis of part one, where I argue, particularly against John Rawls, that a consensus 
is a possible and fragile outcome of a public process, and so cannot be used as the 
Archimedean foundation of politics. The conception of agents with views corresponds to 
this idea that we enter politics not knowing whether or not a consensus of views exists. 
The political commitments which arise, I argue, from being agents with views turn out to 
be to a deliberative democracy. Thus although I end up justifying this form of political 
system that is not, in a sense, my initial intention. 
Still, in ending up justifying a form of democracy I think I am doing justice to 
some intuitions which we commonly have but which liberal political theory tends to 
neglect. One such intuition is that democratic processes legitimate political decisions. 
While we may think that there are limits upon what the state can legitimately do - and it is 
these limits which liberalism attempts to set and account for, although as I shall argue in 
chapter eight I do not think we need to adopt liberalism to set the limits we need - we 
also think that when there is a political decision to be made between competing courses 
of action then we should accept whatever is democratically decided. Normally this is 
taken to mean accepting the outcome of a majority vote, but this is not the only way 
democracy can be conceived. In particular, there is a common understanding that 
discussion is also a necessary part of democracy, and that the lack of proper discussion 
can undermine the legitimacy of decisions made by properly elected governments if it 
means that the options have not been properly considered. This idea of the legitimising 
function of democracy does not only extend to day-to-day government, either. It can 
also cover basic constitutional questions - we may put procedural safeguards in place to 
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guard against hasty decisions on such matters but still we regard these as democratically 
revisable. In that sense liberal constitutionalism seems both deeply anti-democratic and 
also a little puzzling - for if the constitution is not ultimately democratically controlled, then 
where does power really lie in a liberal society? 
Furthermore, there is a popular view that the ultimate guarantee of our freedom 
Is not the constitutional enshrinement of individual liberty, if this exists, but the 
democratic institutions which are seen to underpin freedom. This is reflected in the way 
we characterise our societies: we talk about them as democracies, and much more 
rarely as liberal societies, even if we are liberal in our particular political views. This 
understanding, which some would say reflects our republican rather than our liberal 
heritage, puts the institutions of freedom before any particular constitutional values. 
This is only logical, if constitutions themselves are to be democratic creations. Hence in 
emphasising the institutions of deliberative democracy as the key to political legitimacy, 
rather than an agreement about certain values, I take myself to be more faithful to the 
intuitive way we understand the best features of our actual political systems. My project 
is to provide these institutions with a firm foundation, and above all to show that if they 
are really to do their job then we must recapture the understanding that public 
deliberation, and not voting, is at the heart of democracy. That is the case I seek to 
make in what follows. 
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PART ONE 
INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITY, AND THE FAILURE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERALISM 
15 
Chapter Two 
Community, history, and identity 
One way of approaching the project of reconciling the individual and the community is 
by claiming that the conditions for that reconciliation already exist, and that all that blocks it is 
our inability to perceive it. But there are two ways of following this approach. One way, 
which will be considered in the next chapter, is that of trying to show that principles for the 
basic social structure can be grounded in beliefs we already share. In this chapter, however, I 
will consider an alternative approach, which involves not shared beliefs but a shared identity. 
2.1 MEMBERSHIP AND OBLIGATION 
The fundamental thought underlying the approach I am considering in this chapter is 
that our obligations derive from our membership of a community. ' When are we members of 
a community? Well, this is not just a matter of deciding to join, like we might decide to join a 
club. The standard way of being a member is through birth and continued residence. There 
are of course many non-standard cases, but this is the paradigm one. How does this give 
rise to obligations? Well, the comparison is with being born into a family. We acquire certain 
obligations to our parents simply in virtue of their being our parents and we being their 
children. It is not a matter of belief or voluntary promise. The natural relationship of parent 
child is sufficient to explain our relationship. And, the claim is, that our moral obligations to 
the political community arise in the same way. 2 
This claim is combined with a second one. We are not simply members of the 
community into which we are born and continue to live, but we are related to that community in 
a certain way. The community is to a considerable extent (how much is usually rather vague) 
what determines our personal identity, our character and our sense of who we are. Again this 
is like how it is with being a member of a family. ' But there are of course substantial 
differences between families and political communities, not least that the latter involves a 
claim of coercive authority over individuals which is not intrinsically part of familial 
' The best recent account of political obligation in these terms is to be found in John Horton, Political Obligation (London, 1992), pp. 
137-71. 
2Ibid., pp. 145-50. 
Ibid., pp. 150-51. 
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relationships. (Even if the family is perceived in terms of power relationships between adults 
and children, and perhaps also between male and female partners, the obligations persist into 
the maturity of the children when any coercive power of one or both parents has certainly 
weakened. The justification of any attempt to continue such power can certainly be called 
into question in a way which the existence of a moral obligation cannot. But the situation is 
not the same with the coercive power of the state). So how does membership and this social 
constitution of individual identity give rise to political obligations? 
Firstly, having political obligations is simply part of what it means to be a member of a 
political community. Secondly, we think about that political community which is ours in ways 
different from how we think about other such communities. The relationship involved in both 
these ideas is that we belong to our political community in such a way that we cannot 
fundamentally disown the connection. We can of course distance ourselves in various ways 
from our community, either psychologically or geographically. But the ties of culture and 
emotion remain. And, as long as one remains physically part of the community, one remains 
a member with a member's obligations even if one attempts to disavow them-4 
This leads communitarian theorists to make two characteristic claims. One is that we 
have an obligation to uphold the community of which we are a member. Secondly, the cost of 
not upholding that community, or attempting to separate from it, is damage to ourselves, since 
we are denying what gives us our very identity as the individuals we are with the characters we 
have. I now turn to consider and assess how these claims are worked out by contemporary 
communitarian theorists. 
2.2 TWO FORMS OF COMMUNITARIANISM 
Now, this communitarian claim in detail takes a variety of forms in the hands of 
different writers, and this is not the place for a comprehensive survey. However, we need to 
distinguish two forms of communitarianism. On the one hand, there is the position, 
exemplified by Alisdair Maclntyre, that community has been destroyed in modern liberal 
society. 5 We no longer have a basic shared moral consensus within which we can rationally 
discuss and resolve our particular differences. We need to reconstruct communal life, 
4 Ibid., pp. 159-60. 
I The key work is Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue, 2nd. ed. (London, 1985). 
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although at present this can only be done locally, not at the level of the political community as 
a whole. ° 
One problem with MacIntyre's position is how his claims about the social constitution 
of the self can be combined with the view that modern society has become what liberal theory, 
in Maclntyre's eyes, portrays it is - highly individualistic with no shared values or sense of 
moral belonging. If the self is a social being then this sort of atomistic theory must be a false 
picture of human life and social relations, and then the task is to try to develop a more 
adequate account which reveals the communal foundations of liberal society. Since our lives 
are correctly characterised by communitarianism, the resources already exist for developing a 
more accurate self-understanding. Macintyre rather seems to imply that we need to rebuild 
our lives upon a new basis, not just understand our existing lives better. No doubt a better 
understanding of the communal foundations of our lives would lead to the development of new 
institutions and forms of civility which better expressed and reflected that understanding, but 
this would not be the sort of root and branch rebuilding which Maclntyre envisages as being 
necessary and about the possibility of which he is so gloomy. If liberal society itself, whatever 
its self-image, is already a collective practice, then we do not need to retreat from that society 
in order to rebuild a collective life. Maclntyre's political position, then, is that we need to build 
a new moral consensus based upon a shared notion of the common good. But he thinks this 
involves building new societies and forms of political association. There is for him no 
principled way of reconciling individuals with existing or modified political societies. 
The alternative communitarian view is that the problem with the liberal understanding 
of societies is that it doesn't portray accurately the communal roots of our lives. Hence 
although our self-understanding serves to undermine the strength of our social bonds and the 
way we conduct flourishing lives, it is on this version of communitarianism an exaggeration to 
say, as Macintyre does, that we have become the creatures liberal theory is said to portray us 
as being. Rather our inaccurate self-understanding leads us into practices which damage our 
lives precisely because they are at odds with the social nature of our being. The need 
therefore is to correct our understanding of the sort of beings we are, and to bring our political 
and moral lives into line with that truth about our being, in order that we may fare better in our 
" See ibid., p. 263: 'What matters at this stage is the construction of local forms of community within which civility and the intellectual 
and moral life can be sustained through the new dark ages which are already upon us'. 
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lives. On this view, as Michael Walzer puts it, "the deep structure even of liberal society is in 
fact communitarian. Liberal society distorts this reality and, insofar as we adopt the theory, 
deprives us of any ready access to our own experience of communal embeddedness...... The 
liberal ideology of separatism cannot take personhood and bondedness away from us. What 
it does take away is our sense of our personhood and bondedness, and this deprivation is 
then reflected in liberal politics. It explains our inability to form cohesive solidarities, stable 
movements and parties, that might make our deep convictions visible and effective In the 
world". 7 
Walzer himself partially endorses this view. He argues, however, that the community 
that we have is, after all, a liberal one, characterised above all by an attachment to free 
association: "It would be an odd enterprise to argue in the name of communitarianism for an 
alternative state, for that would be to argue against our own political traditions and to repudiate 
whatever community we already have". 8 So, he says, there is no alternative form of society 
with which communitarians should wish to replace liberal society: the selves which our society 
(Walzer takes the USA as his primary point of reference) creates are liberal selves, attached 
to voluntary association, free speech and the like. But "it would be a good thing, though, if we 
could teach those selves to know themselves as social beings, the historical products of, and 
in part the embodiments of, liberal values. For the communitarian correction of liberalism 
cannot be anything other than a selective reinforcement of those same values .... ". 
° 
On this view, then, the point is not to overthrow liberal society but to give it a 
communitarian justification. That justification may in turn lead to social and political practices 
which better reflect the communal nature of our being - in particular, it may lead to policies to 
shield communities from the disruptive impact of the untrammelled operation of the free 
market. On Walzer's own account this would be justified because the free market results in 
the dominance of money as a principle of distribution in spheres where our shared meanings 
make distribution according to wealth inappropriate. Thus letting the market operate without 
restriction would not reflect the communal determinations of what constitutes justice-10 In 
political terms, then, our obligations are to uphold and maintain that form of society, and the 
' Michael Walzer, The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism' Political Theory, 18 (February 1990): 10. Emphasis in the original. 
' lbid., p. 18. His characterisation of liberalism In terms of voluntary association Is most clearly stated on p. 21. ' Ibid., p. 15. 
10 See Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (Oxford, 1983). 
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Institutions and practices which underpin it, which makes us the beings we are. In modern 
liberal society those will be liberal institutions and practices but 'corrected', as Walzer puts it, 
by an understanding of the communitarian roots of liberal society. 
A position similar in this respect is advanced too by Charles Taylor: "I am arguing that 
the free individual of the West is only what he is by virtue of the whole society and civilisation 
which brought him to be and which nourishes him; that our families can only form us up to this 
capacity and these aspirations because they are set in this civilisation ...... And I want to claim 
finally that all this creates a significant obligation to belong for whoever would affirm the value 
of this freedom... ". " Thus Taylor, like Walzer, argues that the modern, liberal, social order 
has communitarian roots, and that because our form of community is a liberal one it is a liberal 
social order which we must seek to maintain. The communitarian correction of liberalism is 
therefore to point out that sustaining a liberal political system requires sustaining a range of 
liberal social institutions which are necessary for individual freedom. But, Taylor also argues, 
there is a second correction of prevailing forms of liberalism to be made, for freedom is, he 
says, not the only value we hold dear. We also have other higher-order goods, what Taylor 
calls 'hypergoods', which can come into conflict with the good of individual liberty, such as the 
survival of minority languages and cultures, participation in democratic institutions of self- 
government, and conflicts between the good of self-fulfilment for parents and that of the well- 
being of children. Thus we need structures which aren't centred around the single principle of 
freedom but which allow us to work out conflicts between various higher-order goods and 
come to a shared judgement. '2 
2.3 THE VALUE OF COMMUNAL MEMBERSHIP 
The viewpoint of this second form of communitarianism is therefore that we have an 
obligation to maintain and uphold those forms of institutions and practices which reflect and 
form the basis of the sort of individuals we are. In modern liberal society that means 
upholding liberal institutions but also modifying them to better reflect our communal natures. 
But why do we have that obligation? There are two answers to that: firstly because of what it 
means to future generations, and secondly because of what it means to ourselves. 
" Charles Taylor, 'Atomism, ' Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2 (Cambridge, 1985), p. 206. '2 For these examples and characterisation of Taylor's position see his 'Reply and re-articulation', Philosophy In an Age of Pluralism, 
ed. James Tully (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 250-53. 
20 
(a) Future generations 
The point about future generations is raised by Taylor in order to answer the objection 
that it does not follow from the facts of the social basis of my upbringing and character 
formation that I am not now, as an adult, free to act as I choose and to help the society and 
tradition either to flourish or to wither, as I see fit. Taylor sees that even if this makes sense 
for ourselves, which he doubts, still if we find this freedom worthwhile for ourselves, and it is 
grounded upon the social conditions we found, then we have an obligation for ensuring that 
future generations also have the conditions to realise the same worth in their lives. 13 But this 
argument will not work: even if we accept that if we find a characteristic valuable in our lives 
this imposes an obligation to help others achieve it too, as far as we are able, still it does not 
follow that we must therefore keep in place the conditions which led to our acquiring the 
characteristic. What would follow is simply an obligation to maintain some conditions which 
could lead to the characteristic in question continuing to be fostered, but these need not 
necessarily be the conditions we found. If we believe some other conditions will do the job 
better then we should on this argument be in favour of destroying current social conditions and 
bringing in the improved arrangements - indeed, we would have an obligation to do so. 
Of 
course there are arguments about the risks involved in such large-scale social engineering but 
if these can be overcome then Taylor can on his argument have no objection to undertaking it. 
(b) Harm to ourselves 
The same objection which I just made to the argument from future generations can be 
made to the claim that I have an obligation to the social institutions which formed me. But 
here the communitarian Is saying something stronger. It is not just that we have an obligation 
to maintain the conditions which have made us the people we are, which as I have suggested 
is false, because there might be other conditions we could bring about which would be even 
more favourable to the aspects of our character which we value most; the communitarian 
however goes on to suggest that harm results to ourselves if we attempt to leave or alter the 
social background and cultural tradition in which we are raised. 
"Taylor, 'Atomism', p. 206. 
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There are various ways in which this harm is envisaged to come about. For Taylor, to 
be a human agent is to have a framework and language for making those strong evaluations, 
those qualitative distinctions of worth 14, which orient us in life, which express our identity and 
our moral stance. '5 But the language of strong evaluation cannot be an Individual creation. 
Like all languages it must exist within a language community. And I must necessarily be part 
of such a community in order to define who I am and where I stand, for such definition 
requires membership of a community in order to have others against whom myself can be 
defined. So in shaping my self I take and use resources from my linguistic community. 
Without or outside that community I must be disorientated, I must lose any clear sense of my 
own identity. That original membership of a linguistic and cultural community cannot be 
replaced forme by any substitute, even if potentially for other people it might produce at least 
as valuable human characters. So I cannot step outside my social and cultural background in 
any decisive way without undermining myself, without leaving behind the very conditions which 
make it possible for me to act in any worthwhile way, including the action of trying to step 
outside my formative community: "... the claim is that living within such strongly qualified 
horizons is constitutive of human agency, that stepping outside these limits would be 
tantamount to stepping outside what we recognise as integral, that is, undamaged human 
personhood". 1e That doesn't mean that criticism and reform of traditions and cultures is not 
possible. It is, but always from within the framework within which the critic was raised. So 
the obligation I have to maintain the culture and traditions in which I was raised is grounded 
upon the need to do so in order to maintain my human personhood, that is my ability to make 
sense of my life through making strong evaluations. I can never shrug off this necessary 
background, and attempting to do so damages my human personhood. 
This claim about the impossibility of stepping outside our formative cultural and moral 
frameworks, and the costs of trying to do so, has attracted three main criticisms. The first is 
that it renders significant criticism and reform of those frameworks seemingly impossible, 
since there can be no standpoint from outside the framework from which to assess and 
"The concept of strong evaluation, and Its importance for our conception of ourselves, Is developed In Taylor's essays 'Responsibility 
for Self, ' free Will, ed. Gary Watson (Oxford, 1992), pp. 111.126, and 'What Is Human Agency, ' Human Agency and Language: 
Philosophical Papers I (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 15-44. 
15 Taylor stresses the Importance of language to our nature as self-interpreting beings In 'Self-interpreting Animals, ' Human Agency 
and Language: Philosophical Papers f (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 68-75. 
'° Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self (Cambridge, 1989), p. 27. 
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evaluate whether any change is an improvement. The communitarian position seems to lead 
to relativism, with no standards for comparing cultures and traditions. " The second criticism 
is that it ignores the fact that, in modern economically developed countries at least, we are 
each heir to a variety of Intellectual and moral inheritances, we each already inhabit a number 
of frameworks, so that the communitarian position of having to uphold our traditions in order to 
sustain our personhood leads to the question of which tradition to uphold -a particularly 
pointed question if, as is usually suggested, some of the traditions we inherit tend to conflict. 
A third criticism is that in the modern world with rapid technological change and the 
globalisation of the economy traditions and loyalties are being swept away whether we like it or 
not. The task, therefore, is not to resist such changes but to find a way of being a human 
person amidst such constant and uncontrolled change. This leads on to the post-modernist 
agenda of embracing change and uncertainty and forming a conception of the self which 
positively affirms these aspects of the contemporary situation - treat our cultural inheritance as 
a playground and take the experiences of channel-hopping on television or surfing the Internet 
as definitive of what it is to be a person today. 
The possibility of social criticism 
As to the first of these criticisms, what is its bearing upon the question of political 
obligation? Communitarian theorists need to show that they can allow the possibility of valid 
social criticism in order to avoid an unacceptable relativism. Unless social practices can be 
criticised then it would appear that on the communitarian account we have an obligation to 
uphold whatever political and social arrangements which happen to exist in the society into 
which we are born. There would be no way of getting any critical purchase on these 
arrangements, no way of saying what we might want to say - that a particular society, say a 
fascist society, is unacceptable in some way. The impact of communitarian theory itself 
would then be merely to point out how we cannot validly criticise actual political societies, 
criticising our wayward social understanding, if necessary, rather than society itself. On the 
other hand, if communitarians are to allow the possibility of social criticism they must provide 
"This is one crucial way the communitarians differ from the position of Hegel, who Is normally taken to be the main historical source of 
their position. For Hegel was not a relativist: while he held it to be a rational necessity that different times and places had different 
norms, he nevertheless thought that there was a universally valid standard by which the norms of each society could be assessed. The 
communitarian view, however, in rejecting the notion of such a universal objective ethical standard, struggles to avoid the charge that it 
makes different viewpoints incommensurable. See Allen Wood, Hegel's Ethical Thought (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 195-208. 
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an account of how it is possible which does not invoke universal moral standards. If they 
admitted such standards then they would not be able to sustain the argument that we cannot 
step outside our social background and moral and cultural frameworks. To invoke universal 
moral standards would be precisely to undertake such a stepping outside. So resolving this 
dilemma for communitarians of accounting for the validity of social criticism is crucial to 
sustaining the argument they mount for political obligation. 
Can a communitarian account of social criticism be given? This is a highly debatable 
issue. The task is to give an account which makes criticism possible and intelligible while still 
being internal to particular traditions of thought and culture. Maclntyre argues that where rival 
traditions confront each other it is possible from within one of the traditions to appreciate how 
the other deals with issues and problems which both traditions have identified as such, to 
come to the view that the rival deals with some or all of these better - by the standards of 
one's own tradition - than one's own tradition is able to do, and hence to have good reasons 
for importing these views into what will then be a revision of one's own tradition or even to 
desert to the rival view. 18 Taylor has a similar view: when we deliberate between rival moral 
conceptions, he says, we are "reasoning in transitions". We look to see which view is 
superior to the other, in the sense of reducing error caused by confusion or oversight and 
improving our understanding of an issue. We move from one view to another when such a 
move constitutes a gain in our moral knowledge. 19 
These positions go some way towards resolving the communitarian dilemma about 
social criticism. But they do not go far enough. They render intelligible social criticism which 
addresses problems which members of a tradition have identified from within that tradition, 
and the use of resources from outside the tradition to address those problems. But what of 
problems to which the tradition is blind? On this view of social criticism a problem only 
becomes a problem if it is identified as such from within the tradition. But a vital aspect of 
social criticism is the identification of problems which may never occur as such within some 
traditions. The treatment of women, or of particular racial and ethnic groups, are pertinent 
examples of this. Is purely internal criticism of Nazism or apartheid sufficient? If a system of 
thought denies the equal moral status of all biological human beings, it becomes difficult to 
t° Macintyre, op. cN., pp. 276-7. 
19 Taylor, Sources of the Sell, pp. 72-3. 
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see what purchase there can be from within that system to move to a more Inclusive one. 
Say the denial of equality is based upon an authoritative (within the tradition) Interpretation of 
the Bible. Then it is no good looking for a contradiction between this denial and other, more 
egalitarian beliefs. It may be possible to find a way in for criticism here, but on the other hand 
it may not. Thus there would be no basis for denying the political legitimacy of such regimes. 
If criticism was possible then legitimacy could be put into question, as the regime may not be 
living up to the best possible understandings of morality within the tradition. But if it is living 
up to them, no matter what they might be, then legitimacy seems assured. 
Michael Walzer has attempted to respond to this problem by arguing that the social 
critic can do more than interpret the understandings within a community. On his recent 
accounts, not all morality is embedded in thick contexts of a substantive tradition. 20 There is 
also a minimal thin morality of negative injunctions - "rules against murder, deceit, oppression, 
and tyranny"21 - which is nearly universal, in that it defends our shared basic common 
humanity which is instantiated in many different particular societies. The basis of such a 
minimal morality is not, however, any trans-cultural universal standard of morality which acts 
as a foundation for particular local thick moral systems. Rather its basis is that these features 
are found in very many thick contextual moralities. It is this iteration which gives minimal 
morality its near-universal character. Thick local moralities are the foundation for a thin 
international morality. 
Walzer argues that we can criticise other societies to a limited extent by invoking this 
shared minimal morality, although we do so from within our thick moral tradition and cannot 
progress very far in criticism without invoking aspects of our tradition. And from within a 
society we can appeal to the minimal notions even if our own tradition lacks the resources to 
see the infringements of minimal morality it claims to license as a problem. But it is not clear 
that Walzer's conception of minimal morality works. If it is not truly universal then how can we 
account for the power and purpose of appealing to it? Merely saying that many people have 
found these rules appealing may not be very persuasive against a tradition which claims to be 
based upon the truth - the appeal to individual rights, if it doesn't have some universal 
objective force, has no claim against a communist ideology, say, which denies the primacy of 
m Most noticeably In Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (Notre Dame, 1994), but also foreshadowed 
In his Interpretation and Social Criticism (Cambridge, Mass., 1967) pp. 23-5. 2' Walzer, Thick and Thin, p. 10. 
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the individual. Moreover, it seems impossible to account for the content of the minimal 
morality just on the basis of iteration. What about other norms which many, perhaps most, 
societies have been based upon - norms of social hierarchy and the inferior status of women? 
Why pick out, as Walzer does, just the norms of modern liberal individualism if not on the 
basis that they are justified regardless of how many societies have actually recognised them? 
It thus seems at least doubtful whether communitarians can give an account of social 
criticism which avoids rendering all societies politically legitimate without invoking universal 
moral standards and so contradicting the communitarian claim that we cannot step outside our 
particular intellectual and moral traditions. If it cannot, then communitarianism is incoherent. 
But supposing the problem with social criticism can be overcome. Is the communitarian 
account of political obligation therefore justified? 
Pluralism and constitutive communities 
Answering this leads to the second and third objections mentioned above, the 
pluralism of traditions and the pace and extent of change in the modern world. The 
communitarian claim is that we cannot step outside our formative traditions and that 
attempting to do so damages our human personhood. This gives rise to an obligation to 
maintain those traditions. Both objections deny this claim by rejecting the notion that there is 
any clear sense which can be given to the notion of formative traditions which are essential to 
our personhood. The communitarian response to this must be to give an account of what in 
substance the communitarian vision is, in order to justify the claim and to stake out a positive 
vision of communitarian politics in the modern world. Part of this project has been 
undertaken in great depth by Taylor in his Sources of the Self, which sets out an account of 
the formation and main elements of the modern identity. But the political implications of this 
account are unclear. Moreover, part of Taylor's purpose is to bring out the conflicts which 
exist within the modern identity and he gives no response to the criticism that it is the very 
existence of those conflicts which makes communitarianism unsustainable. 
The clearest attempt to give a positive account of communitarianism is that of Daniel 
Bell. 22 He admits that in modern advanced societies we identify with many communities. But 
22 In Daniel Belt, Communitarianism and Its Critics (Oxford, 1993). Bell's book is unusual in that it is substantively written in the form of 
a dialogue between a cultured communitarian and a rather oafish liberal, set in a French cafe. The success of this is limited, however, 
as a great deal of philosophical work is done in the extensive footnotes. 
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what we must single out if a communitarian political vision is to be viable are those 
communities which together constitute our identity, rather than more superficial associations 
we may have. This singling out can be done, according to Bell, according to three criteria. 
Constitutive communities are those which define our sense of who we are, which form the 
background to the whole of our lives in a deep way which can never be completely articulated, 
and which we can never fully escape from. 23 If we try to pursue the project of escaping from 
such constitutive communities then we will suffer acute moral and even psychological 
disorientation, 'damaged human personhood'. 24 Bell argues that if we consult our intuitive 
responses to these criteria then we will see that for us in modern Western societies there are 
three sorts of constitutive community: (1) communities of place, the locality we call home; (2) 
communities of memory, primarily nations but also religions and linguistic communities, and 
perhaps others such as the gay community; (3) psychological communities, primarily families 
but also church groups and civic associations. 25 Recognising specific forms of these 
communities is to value them highly as intrinsic to one's life and sense of one's self. Political 
policies, therefore, should aim to uphold and sustain these communities. Thus Bell's account 
serves not only to answer the question of how we distinguish between the plurality of 
communities to which we belong, it also provides an answer to the post-modernist critic who 
says we should embrace the dissolution of traditions and communities - on the contrary, says 
Bell, we need to find ways of sustaining constitutive communities in the face of contemporary 
pressures upon them. 
Bell moves from identifying those communities which constitute our identity, to valuing 
them because they are constitutive, to policies designed to sustain them. We cannot step 
outside these communities without, per impossible, stepping outside our identities, and 
attempting to do so leads to damaged human personhood, which appears to mean some sort 
of psychological harm to ourselves. Now, the claims about constitutive communities are 
highly speculative and not always persuasive. Take the claims about the importance of 
having an locality one can call home, for example. Bell has some interesting points to make 
about the special attachment we tend to have to the place where we spend our early childhood 
years. But what of those whose family moves from place to place, say because they are in 
23 Ibid., pp. 94-103. 
N Ibid., pp. 100-101. 
25 These three constitutive communities are introduced In ibid., p. 14, and significantly expanded upon in pp. 103.189. 
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diplomatic service? Bell just has to insist that they must be damaged psychologically, will feel 
something missing in their lives, be unable to form deep relationships, be perpetually restless 
and unable to settle, and so on. 28 But it is not clear how such a claim can be sustained. How 
can we determine whether it is true or not? 
Moreover, even if it is true, why does it follow that we must value such communities 
and thus design policies designed to sustain them? We can recognise the importance of the 
locality in which we received our early upbringing to the development of our Identity without 
thereby attaching value to maintaining that community. Our evaluation of this community may 
be partly or even largely negative - perhaps it was a constricting small town community with 
narrow values and prejudices, or consisted of an ugly urban environment. We may feel that 
although this community helped to constitute what we became, nevertheless we can and 
should do better both for ourselves and for others. Thus we may think it right not to especially 
value sustaining the existence of that local community. 
Similar points could be made about the other forms of community Bell identifies as 
constitutive of our identity. Even if he can sustain the highly speculative claims made about 
their necessary role in human development, it does not follow that we must positively value 
their continuation. We can recognise the constitutive role played by communities and 
traditions while remaining free to make of that inheritance what we judge right. Take another 
of his constitutive communities, that of religion. I can recognise that religion formed part of 
my upbringing and thus helped constitute my identity, and I can even accept that denying that 
part of my mental inheritance would be damaging to myself. But I can incorporate that 
recognition into my life in different ways. I do not have to carry on believing in the doctrines 
and following the practices I did when I was a child. Being brought up Jewish, I will always 
feel a special attachment to the Jewish community and to certain forms of food and music. 
But I do not therefore for my own mental health have to continue being a practising Jew. I 
can make a variety of things from my Jewish inheritance, without thereby having to continue to 
uphold Jewish religious practices. I may even think it better if religions withered away. But 
then even if Bell's claims about constitutive communities are right they do not provide a basis 
'° leid., pp. 103-8. He is clear that his claims are meant to be true of Individuals In general: for example, he insists that'people who 
lack a place they can call 'home' almost always recognise that there's something missing in their lives... ' (p. 107, emphasis added). 
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for a communitarian account of political obligation. No particular value commitments or 
obligations follow from those claims. 
2.4 THE LIMITATIONS OF COMMUNITARIANISM 
I have been arguing against communitarian theories which base a moral obligation - 
to uphold, or (in Maclntyre's case) rebuild, communal forms of life - upon an account of how 
we are constituted as individuals within society. What makes Maclntyre's position puzzling, 
but gives credence to the views of Walzer and Taylor, is that if their claims about the social 
constitution of individuality are right then we, as the individuals that we are right now, in 
modern democratic cultures with widespread support for many liberal rights, have also been 
socially constituted. Thus to use the theory to set oneself against the modern world is to deny 
that, if we are individualists in the liberal mode, we are so because that is what our society 
makes us - that is, to deny that our modern form of life has a communal basis too. Thus the 
political implications of communitarian theory, if the latter could be justified, is that our modern 
self-understanding and social and political practices need communitarian correction rather 
than wholesale rejection. Indeed, that is all the theory could mean for political action, since if 
the price of not upholding our formative traditions and communities is damage to our 
personhood then we must be unwilling to abandon even our liberal tradition for a more 
collective alternative. 
Communitarianism, then, was meant to give an account of our political obligations as 
arising from our membership of a community which constitutes our identity as individuals. 
What I have argued is that even if we can settle problems about how our identity is constituted 
in a world of plural and changing communities, that is still not sufficient to ground a political 
obligation. Whether we are talking of future generations or ourselves, it does not follow from 
the fact of the social constitution of our identity, if it is one, that we have an obligation to 
sustain those formative communities. 
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2.5 RORTY'S HISTORICIST DEFENCE OF LIBERALISM 
The notion that we are inescapably the heirs of an historical inheritance and cannot 
step outside of that history is put to other uses in contemporary political philosophy. It 
features in some perfectionist justifications of the use of political authority to support and 
promote autonomous ways of life, on the grounds that autonomy is necessary to live a 
successful modern life. I shall discuss this view in Chapter Four below. But I want now to 
briefly consider another position. This is that we cannot step outside our history, not, as 
Taylor and Bell suggest, because we have some sort of obligation not to do so to ourselves or 
to future generations, or that doing so means harming ourselves, but because there is no 
where else to go. Our historical position is all there is. So it is not a question of obligation. 
Nor is there, on the other hand, any question of justifying our contemporary forms of society as 
the best for human beings as such. That we live in democratic and liberal societies is just a 
matter of contingent historical fact. Yet despite that we should defend these societies and 
even seek to extend the influence of their best features. This view is best associated with 
Richard Rorty. 
If modern liberal and democratic societies are merely chance historical products why 
should we be concerned to defend them or feel justified in advocating them against opponents 
at home and abroad? Not, for Rorty, because of any obligation based upon a theory of the 
constitution of the self, as the communitarians want. Rorty argues that this view of the self is 
the one which best sits with modern society, but we are not thereby rationally compelled to 
hold such a view, nor does the defence of that society rest upon any such theory. 27 Those 
who do hold this view will be philosophically reconciled to modern society, but it is possible to 
hold a different view of the self - one based on nature or divinity, say, rather than history - and 
still be reconciled to modern society on pragmatic grounds. 28 This is because Rorty holds 
that, as he says, we should treat "everything - our language, our conscience, our community - 
as a product of time and chance". 29 The irony of our position is that we must, according to 
Rorty, recognise the contingency of our values and hopes while still trying to realise them in 
r Richard Rorty, The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, ' Reading Rorty, ed. Alan Malachowski (Oxford, 1990), p. 283. 26 Ibid.. p. 292. 
29 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge, 1989), p. 22, emphasis in original. 
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our lives and in the world: we should be people who ideally "combined commitment with a 
sense of the contingency of (our] own commitment". 30 
Philosophical accounts of our moral obligations based upon universal values or 
metaphysical claims - including the communitarian account discussed above - are therefore 
just stories. The core values of modern liberal democratic societies do not depend upon any 
such external truths, since there are no such things. Societies are ways of living together, 
and what characterises these modern societies is that they live together in certain ways, ways 
which we value but which have no universal or transcendental foundation. So, Rorty says, 
they are committed to collective deliberation to resolve social problems and conflicts 
peacefully: "... social policy needs no more authority than successful accommodation among 
individuals, individuals who find themselves heir to the same historical traditions and faced 
with the same problems. "31 But the core value seems to be this: we recognise ourselves as 
having obligations to fellow members of our own society. As for the communitarians, one's 
identity as a member of society gives rise to obligations. But whereas for them these 
obligations were based upon the social nature of the self, for Rorty they are not based upon 
anything beyond the fact of shared membership of the same community. They arise simply 
because we identify with others as belonging to the same group as us. But for us as liberals, 
the form this identity takes is that of the need above all to avoid the suffering of those we 
identify with: "liberals are the people who think that cruelty is the worst thing we do". 32 The 
core value for liberals is thus solidarity with our fellows. And part of what it also means to be 
a liberal is to be willing to be inclusive rather than exclusive in who forms the group with which 
we identify. 33 
Hence Rorty attaches great importance to writing which enlarges our range of human 
sympathies, since such enlargement is what it means to be a liberal. This means novels and 
poetry, but also philosophy if conceived in the right spirit (that is, if it isn't trying to find 
universal grounds for what Rorty believes to be contingent facts). Such writing constitutes a 
"sentimental education" whose goal is "to expand the reference of the terms 'our kind of 
people' and people like us', to expand our sympathies with others even if they are different 
10 Ibid., p. 61. 
" Rorty, 'The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy', p. 288. 
32 Rorty. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. xv. Rorty acknowledges Judith Shklar as the source for this definition. "Ibid., p. 198: 'What takes the curse off this ethnocentrism Is.... that It Is the ethnocentrism of a 'we' ('we liberals') which is dedicated 
to enlarging itself, to creating an ever larger and more variegated ethnos'. 
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from us (and so Rorty opposes those who think that moral progress is made by seeing human 
beings as all fundamentally similar: the point rather is to see that all can suffer). On this basis 
Rorty defends the modern fact that we are a human rights culture, not because he thinks that 
there are such things as rights, in any metaphysical sense, or because he thinks rights have a 
rational foundation. Rather he doesn't think that human rights need any foundation. They are 
the form which the liberal culture of solidarity currently takes. They make the world better in 
that they help reduce the amount of cruelty that there is. And although there is no universal 
basis for this claim of moral solidarity to other cultures it is nevertheless one that Rorty feels 
able to make from within his historically contingent perspective. 34 
On Rorty's account, then we have obligations arising out of the communities of which 
we are a part and with which we identify. They are obligations to promote liberal values, 
principally of opposing cruelty and settling social conflicts peacefully. But no deeper account 
can be given justifying these obligations. This avoidance of a deeper justification makes it 
difficult to advance certain criticisms of Rorty's views, since he always has the response that 
our commitments and obligations are just contingent and so cannot be defended in any 
traditional philosophical sense. Nevertheless, there are a number of things which can be said 
about his account without (I am glad to say) having to tackle his larger background view of the 
non-foundationalist nature of truth and value and thus of the tasks of philosophy. 
I do not think that Rorty's position is sustainable, for two reasons: firstly, it appears to 
be incoherent; and secondly, it is arbitrary. Taking the question of coherence first: Rorty 
sees our obligations as arising from our identifications with those we take to be similar to us. 
But, he says, this is a specific identification with fellow members of a community, not 
identification with humans as such: 
"Consider... the attitude of contemporary American liberals to the unending 
hopelessness and misery of the lives of the young blacks in American cities. Do we 
say that these people must be helped because they are our fellow human beings? 
We may, but it is much more persuasive, morally as well as politically, to describe 
them as our fellow Americans - to insist that it is outrageous that an American should 
live without hope. The point of [this] example is that our sense of solidarity is 
"Rorty embraces human rights In his 'Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality, ' On Human Rights, eds. Stephen Shute and 
Susan Hurley (New York, 1993), pp. 111-134. The claim about moral superiority Is on p. 118. 
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strongest when those with whom solidarity is expressed are thought of as 'one of us', 
where 'us' means something smaller and more local than the human race. That is 
why'because she is a human being' is a weak, unconvincing explanation of a 
generous action". 35 (emphases in original). 
Rorty goes on to say that there is such a thing as moral progress, which consists in 
extending the scope of our solidarity, 36 but that this extension is a creative act rather than the 
recognition of a common human nature. 37 It is accomplished by extending the reach of our 
sympathy, rather than by recognising our common humanity, and hence novels are more 
important for morality than philosophy. How can Rorty square this with his subsequent 
welcome to the notion of human rights? This notion does indeed seem to involve solidarity 
with the whole human race. Rorty doesn't give us an answer. The human rights culture, the 
extension of our sympathy to all who are human, is possible for Rorty because we can 
progressively "see the similarities between ourselves and people very unlike us outweighing 
the differences..... The relevant similarities are not a matter of sharing a deep true self which 
instantiates true humanity, but are such little, superficial similarities as cherishing our parents 
and our children - similarities that do not interestingly distinguish us from many nonhuman 
animals". 38 So it may be that what makes global human solidarity possible is not that we are 
members of the same race, but that we are all similar in small, emotional and affective ways. 
This does not make this later position compatible with the earlier one that only local 
sympathies are possible, but it does seem to suggest how it may be possible to extend one's 
sympathies across the world on the same sentimental basis. 
There is, however, a deeper problem of coherence in Rorty's position. If our prime 
moral commitment is opposition to cruelty, and sympathy with those who suffer pain, that 
seems to imply at least one universal human characteristic, the ability to suffer from pain. 39 
This appears to contradict statements from Rorty about the malleability of human beings, our 
ability to "make ourselves into whatever we are clever and courageous enough to imagine 
'° Rorty, Contingency. Irony, and Solidarity, p. 191. 
30 Ibid., p. 192. 
n Ibid., p. 198. 
36 Rorty, 'Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality, ' p. 129. 
10 This Inconsistency Is pointed out by Norman Geras, Solidarity In the Conversation of Humankind., the Ungroundable Liberalism of 
Richard Rorty (London, 1995), pp. Soft. 
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ourselves becoming" 4° Perhaps, though, Rorty's view is that while this must be a universal 
truth about human beings for his liberalism to be relevant and sustainable, nevertheless it 
does not function as a foundation for liberalism because there is no obligatory move from the 
fact of the capacity to suffer to the negative valuation of this suffering; and nor is this fact 
about human unique to just our species " it is true of many animals too. So for both reasons 
he could say that while there must be this universal truth about human beings that truth does 
not constitute a foundation for moral or political commitments. 
Yet still Rorty has to reconcile this notion that liberals are opposed to cruelty with his 
claims that we feel sympathy on the basis of identification with fellow members of our 
community - as in the claim above about sympathising with fellow Americans rather than 
fellow human beings. The point is that Rorty wants to say that liberals oppose cruelty to those 
they identify with. But the notion of cruelty and that of identification with our fellows within a 
community are not, so to speak, at the same level. We can identify those suffering pain 
without having to feel that we identify with them in any substantial way. When watching 
pictures of starvation in Africa on television we in more fortunate parts of the world can be 
moved to sympathise and to do what we can to help, while feeling how very different and alien 
the experience of those suffering is from our own more affluent lives. Perhaps we recognise 
a common human experience, perhaps we just are moved by seeing the pain, but in any case 
we do not feel those suffering are 'one of us' where this means anything less than fellow 
human beings. The notions of cruelty, pain, and suffering are much thinner notions that those 
of identification with a 'we' in a community, and it is because they are thinner that we are 
moved by the fates of those who live in cultures which in most respects may seem very 
foreign to us. 
Rorty cannot have it both ways: if liberalism is based upon opposition to cruelty then it 
is not a matter of communal identification. His instincts seem to lead him to say that 
liberalism does extend to sympathy with the whole of humanity. But then he needs to revise 
his view that our moral obligations arise from shared membership of the same community. 
They seem rather to arise from a recognition of something common about humanity. 
40 Rorty, 'Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality, ' pp. 122-3. Geras gives a startling quote from a Rorty essay ('Trotsky and the 
Wild Orchids') of 1992, that we should hold "a picture of human beings as children of their time and place, without any significant 
metaphysical or biological limits on their plasticity' (Geras, op. cit., p. 89). 
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As to the charge of arbitrariness, this arises in several ways. His insistence in the 
above quote that appealing to the concept of fellow Americans rather than fellow human 
beings is more effective is a good example - it raises the question, how does he know? Might 
not we just as well feel that no human being should be asked to live that way? It is not clear 
why nationality makes the difference except if one is gripped by the idea that moral feelings 
can only arise from narrow communal identifications. Moreover, his whole characterisation of 
our societies and their beliefs seems arbitrary. He defines liberalism in terms of opposition to 
cruelty but it equally takes other forms, such as the promotion of personal autonomy. In 
taking the definition he does Rorty is not just describing our societies, he is taking sides in a 
debate about what sort of liberals we should be. 
And is it so clear that our societies are just identified with liberal commitments? In 
America, for instance, there is a widespread and growing support for Christian 
fundamentalism. The point of liberal political theory is to attempt to defend and justify 
liberalism against attacks from such sources. That is what John Rawls is trying to do, 
notwithstanding Rorty's attempt to take Rawls as engaged in the same project as himself. 
Rorty has no grounds for singling out the particular threads of our culture which he highlights 
while ignoring the others. The trouble is that without something like a communitarian theory 
of the self, which he eschews, he has no grounds for making the discriminations which he 
nevertheless takes himself to be warranted in making. 
Rorty's advocacy of liberalism therefore falls apart. His communitarianism does not 
support his liberal claims, and his liberalism turns out to depend upon a common feature of 
humanity which transcends communal boundaries. As with the communitarian writers 
discussed earlier, although in different ways, there is not the tie between communal identities 
and moral commitments to sustain an account of political legitimacy and obligation. The 
social unity of individual and political community cannot be based upon notions of community 
identity and membership. 
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Chapter Three 
Consensual arguments for liberalism 
In the last chapter I argued that there was no way to reconcile the individual to the 
political community from the internal relation of membership between individuals and the 
society of which they are part. I now turn, in this and the next chapter, to attempts to effect 
this reconciliation through arriving at beliefs or principles we all can share. This strategy can 
take two forms. One, which is the subject for the next chapter, affirms that certain principles 
are in the interests of every member of society. The use of political authority is justified when 
it serves these interests. In this chapter I will consider another move, which is to hold that 
political authority is morally legitimate when it is based upon principles everyone can accept, 
not because they recognise them as objectively in their interests as in the former position, but 
because they recognise them as principles which they can affirm, after due consideration, as 
already part of their moral conception. Legitimate political authority, on this account, must be 
based upon a consensus, and a consensus can be achieved because society already contains 
a shared stock of basic moral ideas. These shared ideas can be elaborated into foundational 
principles for political authority which all can then endorse. There is thus a two stage process 
of justification, showing that there are principles which can be based upon beliefs which are 
already shared, and then demonstrating that everyone has good reason to accept these 
principles as regulating political authority. 
3.1 JOHN RAWLS: A UNIVERSAL BASIS FOR CONTEXTUAL PRINCIPLES 
OF JUSTICE? 
The major body of work associated with this strategy is that of John Rawls, and I shall 
focus on him in this chapter. I shall, however, mention some other accounts at the end. In 
relation to Rawls I have two major concerns: one is to show that this is indeed his strategy, 
and that he follows it consistently in all his major writings. This is an issue because it is 
commonly thought that over the last quarter century Rawls has turned from a concern with 
finding universally valid principles of justice to a rather more localised, pragmatic, and 
therefore less philosophically interesting project, directed simply at societies whose political 
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culture is already congenial to the principles he advances. I will argue that thus view Is a 
mistake: although features of Rawls arguments have Indeed altered over this period, the basic 
project is recognisably the same, and never was the universalistic one some have read into A 
Theory of Justice. Or, more accurately, throughout his writings Rawls' project is both 
universalistic and contextual. Demonstrating this will lay the foundation for my second 
concern here, which is to argue that this strategy cannot solve the basic problem of political 
reconciliation. The reason for this failure is not that a consensus cannot justify political 
authority, nor that, as is sometimes claimed, as a matter of fact a consensus is a utopian 
dream. Rather it lies in the conditions necessary if a suitable consensus is to be achieved, 
and, importantly, if it is to be known to be achieved - and what follows if a consensus is not 
possible. This opens up the need for a conception which sees the moral legitimacy of political 
authority arising from a process of public debate, a conception which I seek to justify in the 
second part of this thesis. 
Other questions which may arise about this strategy will also be answered in my 
discussion of Rawls. One such question is whether it necessarily leads to a justification of 
liberalism, or whether it can justify other political conceptions. The answer to that turns out 
not to be totally straightforward. A second issue is why this strategy leads to a focus on 
questions of justice, rather than other moral ideas. The reason is to do with the fact of 
pluralism. Rawls's concern is both to provide us with an account of justice, and also to show 
that it is justice, rather than any other moral idea, which must form the moral foundation of 
basic social institutions. He wants to give us not merely a theory of the concept of justice but 
also of its role in justifying political authority. It would be a distortion of A Theory of Justice 
merely to see it as analysing or constructing a moral idea, and ignore the political dimension of 
the argument. 
Lastly, there is a question as to what makes Rawls' theory moral, rather than merely a 
prudential compromise. This worry arises because it appears that if all that is required for 
political legitimacy is a consensus, the content of the consensus seems irrelevant for 
legitimacy and could conceivably be around any set of principles, even Nazi ones. We shall 
see that Rawls has a number of things to say about this. But it is worth remarking here that 
Rawls' approach to moral theory is consistently that of bringing into equilibrium the everyday 
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judgements we make with a set of principles. He discusses this in A Theory of Justice where 
he refers to an article of his some twenty years earlier. He rejects deriving moral principles 
from self-evident first principles or from non-moral facts. One way of expressing this is that 
his conception of the subject is that its aim is indeed to provide a theory, just as natural 
science provides a theory of the natural world: 
"I wish to stress that a theory of justice is precisely that, namely a theory. It is a 
theory of the moral sentiments (to recall an eighteenth century title) setting out the 
principles governing our moral powers, or more specifically, our sense of justice. 
There is a definite if limited class of facts against which conjectured principles can be 
checked, namely, our considered judgements in reflective equilibrium. A theory of 
justice is subject to the same rules of method as other theories. "' 
His concern, then, is not to decide whether our everyday moral judgements are 
indeed moral, by some external criterion. Rather, he starts from our conception of what 
morality is, and while revisions to our everyday judgements may be required on grounds of 
consistency it is not possible to show that they are in some fundamental way not really moral 
judgements at all. The question he would put to those worried about the possibility of 
justifying horrible ideas in this way is whether Nazi ideas, or whatever, would stand up to this 
test of reflective consistency. The suspicion is that they would not, but he does not seek to 
prove this. The essential idea, however, is that human beings do have an idea of what it is to 
be moral, and there is no other idea against which to criticise our conception. Indeed, it is this 
view of the nature of moral theory which I think provides the foundation for the persistent 
universal element in Rawls' thinking. 
3.2 RAWLS: STANDARD INTERPRETATIONS AND CRITICISM 
One way of interpreting Rawls' project in A Theory of Justice (hereafter shortened to 
TJ) is that he is attempting to derive principles of justice which are of universal applicability. It 
is normally said that he thinks such principles are to be reached by considering what principles 
to govern the basic structure of society would be chosen in a choice position where individuals 
'John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford, 1972), pp. 50-51. The reference to his earlier article, 'Outline of a Procedure for Ethics'. Is 
in the footnote on p. 48. He explicitly rejects starting from self-evident principles or the non-moral when discussing the nature of moral 
theory again on pp. 577-8. 
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are deprived of knowledge of their specific beliefs and values and place in society. This 
position is seen by some 2 as being meant to represent the nature of human beings, or, by 
more sympathetic commentators, as being the appropriate way to conceive of how basic 
political principles should ideally be chosen. It is appropriate because principles chosen in the 
original position, being chosen by individuals ignorant of their ends, would therefore not be 
determined or biased by, or derived from, those ends. Such principles would therefore be 
independent from, and in this way neutral between, any particular conception of the good. 
It is commonly supposed that this argument does not work: in particular, because 
everything seems to depend upon what attributes individuals in the original position are 
allowed to retain, and Rawls is accused of fixing the outcome by building in specific attributes 
of western liberal conceptions. 3 It is also argued that the choice made in the original position 
would not necessarily be the one that Rawls supposes, since people might have different 
motivations than the self-interested prudential one that Rawls allegedly imputes to them; that 
one's conception of the good may be an ideal of the common good which would therefore not 
be morally irrelevant to determining principles of the right°; and that the original position fails 
because, in putting individuals under a veil of ignorance as to their own ends, it renders 
individuals indistinguishable from each other and makes the choice not the result of bargaining 
or negotiation but in effect the choice of one person5. For many critics of Rawls these failings 
in the theory fatally undermine the central argument of TJ, although Brian Barry at least 
argues that it contains other arguments for the principles of justice which do not rely upon the 
. original position argument and which can be made to work 
6 
These lines of interpreting Rawls sit well with the view that since around 1980, and 
largely in response to the critique from the communitarians, Rawls has abandoned the project 
of deriving universal principles of justice from postulates about human nature, or from 
2 For example, Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge, 1982): 'Rawls' solution (to the problem of avoiding a 
Kantian transcendent realm - IC) Is to restrict the description of the parties in the original position to those characteristics which all 
human beings share as free and equal rational beings. ' (p. 39). 
This charge surfaced early on in discussion of A Theory of Justice: see for Instance Thomas Nagel, 'Rawls on Justice, ' Reading 
Rawls, ed. Norman Daniels (Stanford, 1975), pp. 1-15. 
This claim Is made by both Sandel and Nagel. 
° This Is one of Sandel's main arguments. It Is also made by Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford, 1995), pp. 58-9. 
° Barry, op. cit., pp. 61-7 argues that you can get to the principles of justice simply from the starting point of the 'strains of commitment', 
which Rawls takes as a check upon the principles agreed upon In the original position. This is to achieve Rawls' objectives by a 
different method. He also believes that there Is a valid argument In Rawls for the principles not Involving the original position from 
considerations of equality of opportunity, an argument which Barry rejects however for Its unsoundness (he doesn't agree that all talents 
derive from luck): see Barry, Theories of Justice (London, 1989) the, and the comment In Justice as Impartiality, footnote to p. 95. 
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reasoning that any moral agent in any social context should follow. Rather he is said to have 
taken a communitarian turn himself, holding now that the principles only apply to western 
liberal democracies, indeed perhaps only to the society about which he specifically writes, his 
own society of the USA. He is now merely concerned with spelling out the views about justice 
already implicit in the public culture of that society. 
That move goes together with another one, the restriction of his theory strictly to the 
political realm. Whereas in the earlier work he was starting from assumptions about human 
nature or a universally true conception of the person, he now eschews any such controversial 
philosophical or metaphysical questions, just as he already wanted to rescind from specific 
conceptions of the good. He now, it is said, wants to avoid any controversial commitment to 
putatively universal truths, since disagreement on issues such as human nature and 
motivation is as reasonable as is disagreement over the good life. All he is concerned about, 
then, is what we need to agree upon in order to live together as citizens, in our shared public 
life, leaving individuals free to believe what they will about human nature and values in their 
private life. The slogan 'the right is prior to the good' in TJ, which meant both that principles 
of right are not derived from any particular conception of the good, and that conceptions of the 
good can be overridden by the right if the two conflict, has thus now become a priority of the 
political over the private (although there is no reason why the private should be identified with 
the individual: there is room in Rawls' view for communal associations based around 
substantive moral and metaphysical beliefs - religions, for example). 
I want to argue that it is misguided, or is at least a gross over-simplification, to 
interpret Rawls as shifting from a universal justification of liberalism in TJ to a contextual 
justification by the time he reaches Political Liberalism (hereafter referred to as PL). There are 
threads of universality and contextualism in Rawls' thought which have remained largely 
constant in both his earlier and later work. To see that means gaining a better understanding 
of what his fundamental project actually is, and what it means for his method of arguing as 
well as for his conclusions about the principles of justice and their priority. There is of course 
a shift in Rawls' views over the years, but it is not motivated by an abandonment of universality 
' Rawls himself denies that he has changed his position In response to the communitarians, In Political Liberalism (New York, 1993), 
footnote to p. xvii, and I do not wish to dispute this. Indeed my argument is that those aspects of Rawls' theory which are alleged to 
have changed between his two books in response to the communitarians in fact show a definite continuity. What changes there are 
cannot therefore have been caused by the communitarian critique. 
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In quite the way the above account has it. On this view Rawls can escape many of the 
criticisms which have been made against his work. However, I will then offer my own criticism 
of this interpretation of Rawls, arguing that it cannot fulfil the aims which Rawls sets for it. 
3.3 RAWLS' PROJECT: LEGITIMACY AND JUSTICE 
In my view Rawls' basic project has not changed in the twenty-odd years between TJ 
and PL, although the working out of the project has been modified. But the fundamental Idea 
remains unchanged. In some respects it is easier to see from the perspective of the later 
work, partly because of the encrustation of debate and interpretation which has grown up 
around TJ, and partly because the shift in perspective makes the underlying position more 
obvious. I will therefore have to devote considerable space to showing how the argument in 
TJ works on my interpretation. 
Rawls' fundamental project is what may somewhat paradoxically be called a universal 
contextualism. The appearance of paradox can be quickly dispelled, although spelling it out 
and justifying interpreting Rawls in this way will take considerably longer. His project is 
universal because it is grounded upon a moral claim about political legitimacy which is 
thoroughly liberal and which Rawls takes to be true in all circumstances. But this claim about 
legitimacy means that the substance of a legitimate political conception is contextually bound. 
The grounding moral claim is that political authority is only justified if it has the consent 
of those to whom it applies, or can be represented as having such consent. A number of 
things needs to be said about that claim, both to clarify it and also to see how it applies in 
Rawls. 
Consent theories of political legitimacy 
There is a long tradition which characterises the justification of political authority and 
the resulting obligation to obey justified political authority in terms of consent. It is a tradition 
which is fraught with difficulty. If legitimacy depends upon actual consent then it seems that 
political authority is rarely legitimate, since in fact there is normally no explicit act of consent. 
Some have argued that we therefore need to introduce such an act in order to create 
legitimacy, but it seems a bizarre idea that without some such act then governments are 
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always illegitimate and always have been. Something about what constitutes legitimacy 
seems to have been missed if the suggestion is that actual governments have nearly always 
been illegitimate. 8 Moreover, and even more tellingly, it seems mysterious why, if legitimacy 
can be bestowed by a simple avowal made upon reaching intellectual maturity leaving 
everything else unchanged, legitimacy then seems to matter. Solemnly declaring that we 
each agree to political authority which we are already disposed to accept seems a pointless 
act. Lastly, and most seriously, the point of concern about the moral legitimacy of political 
authority is that such authority is used to impose and enforce laws and regulations and to 
dispose of resources against the wishes of at least some people. It is a desire to morally 
legitimate the use of coercion. But on a voluntaristic account those whose wishes are being 
offended against can delegitimise governments by withholding or withdrawing their consent. 
Again the theory then seems to lose its cutting edge. 
Such thoughts about the voluntaristic theory of political legitimacy have led 
philosophers in two directions of enquiry, which however ultimately converge. One direction is 
to turn attention away from how individuals enter into relations of obligation with states to the 
character of states themselves. What seemed to matter is not what we might voluntarily 
consent to but what we would be right to consent to. The point then is that even if consent is 
required for legitimacy we should only consent to states based upon principles which are 
morally acceptable on grounds other than that they have in fact been consented to. 
The other approach is to hang on to the centrality of voluntary consent, since it is held 
that an obligation can only arise from individuals freely taking the obligation upon themselves, 
but seeking to capture the intuition that the lack of historical acts of actual consent needn't 
render all actual and past governments illegitimate. That leads firstly to theories of tacit 
consent, where we are said to have signalled our consent implicitly by such freely undertaken 
acts as continued residence within a polity, or by voting. But doubts arise about the truly free 
nature of continued residence, while the voting theory ignores the possibility that people can 
vote in order to bring about a lesser evil while actually holding the system as such to be 
illegitimate: and then what of those who do not vote? Tacit consent thus seems as illusory as 
An anarchist argument would be that government as such Is always morally illegitimate, because it constitutes an unacceptable 
Infringement of individual autonomy: see Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism (New York, 1970). But this claim is Intelligible, 
even if unfounded. What Is wrong with Wolfrs argument is that he over-dramatises the nature of Individual autonomy. This Is however 
completely distinct from the Idea that consent can establish legitimacy, but has factually never yet done so. 
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actual. The next step is into hypothetical consent when it is said Is that legitimacy arises when 
the polity Is such as people would ideally consent to it. As a voluntarist account this seems 
useless as the idea that obligations must be freely entered into has been lost. What 
hypothetical consent amounts to is a theory of good reasons for people to consent to political 
associations when they have the character specified in the theory; and then again we have the 
focus not on consent but on the character of the state. 
Consent and obligation in Rawls 
Now Rawls is sometimes characterised as holding a doctrine of hypothetical consent. 
There is a difficulty of interpretation here, however, since when we look at TJ we find Rawls 
rejecting the notion that the fundamental requirement for individuals in a just society is a 
principle of political obligation. Instead, he thinks that that requirement should be one of a 
natural duty to support just institutions and to further the bringing about of just arrangements. 9 
Moreover, this natural duty arises in the argument not, where you might expect, at its 
inception, as part of the idea of political legitimacy as acceptability to all, but once the 
principles of justice have been set up, as part of what is subsequently settled within the 
original position. How, then, does Rawls' account stand in relation to the voluntaristic 
justification of political authority? 
To answer this, we need to start from the fact that Rawls operates at two levels. The 
first level is that of the principle of political legitimacy, the universal principle that political 
authority is justified when it is acceptable to all. The second level is that of spelling out what 
principles are legitimate within any particular society, that is, what principles are contingently 
acceptable to all. Thus what Rawls is arguing is that the principles which emerge from this 
process of construction are those which carry with them moral legitimacy. They do so 
because they are the principles which are acceptable to all. In that sense they are principles 
to which we would hypothetically consent, in the sense that we would recognise them as being 
acceptable to us, in virtue, as we shall see, of more basic values we already accept. This, 
however, is different from the view that we consent to them in the sense of voluntarily 
choosing to be bound by them. Whether the remit of these principles within society is subject 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 115, and pp. 333-335. 
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to acts of voluntary consent or are unconditionally binding is itself dependent upon what is 
derived from the process of hypothetical construction. 
This is what Rawls says in this regard: 
"From the standpoint of justice as fairness, a fundamental natural duty is the duty of 
justice..... Thus if the basic structure of society is just, or as just as it is reasonable to 
expect in the circumstances, everyone has a natural duty to do his part in the existing 
scheme. Each is bound to these institutions independent of his voluntary acts, 
performative or otherwise. Thus even though the principles of natural duty are derived 
from a contractarian point of view, they do not presuppose an act of consent, express 
or tacit, or indeed any voluntary act, in order to apply. The principles that hold for 
individuals, just as the principles for institutions, are those that would be 
acknowledged in the original position. These principles are understood as the 
outcome of a hypothetical agreement. If their formulation shows that no binding 
action, consensual or otherwise, is a presupposition of their application, then they 
apply unconditionally. "o 
So the argument goes something like this: we realise that the principles of justice are 
legitimate because they emerge from a hypothetical construction which is grounded upon 
moral values which are acceptable to all, through a process of reflective equilibrium. Their 
legitimacy does not arise because we would consent to them, however, in a voluntary act of 
agreement. It arises because they are derivable, as we shall see, from values we already 
accept: our consent is a recognition rather than a voluntary act of assumption. And among 
these values we already accept in our society we find the idea that to say that a political 
system is just carries with it the implication that we have a duty to obey it. It is a duty and not 
an obligation because its remit is not dependent upon any act of voluntary assumption of the 
requirement. Everyone would recognise, the argument goes, that we have a duty to be just, 
and hence to obey and to seek to bring about just institutions. It is not something we could 
choose not to have, as we could choose not to enter into obligation by not promising, or by not 
signing a contract, or whatever. Thus it is not a question of voluntary political obligation. If it 
10 Ibid., p. 115. 
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were, we could choose whether or not to obey just institutions, and choose to obey institutions 
which were not just. Rather political requirements for individuals are unconditional: we have a 
duty to just Institutions, whatever voluntary promises we might or might not make. 
The role of the hypothetical agreement in Rawls, therefore, is not as a way of deriving 
our political obligations. Its role is a constructivist one, as a way of showing what the content 
of the principles of justice which are legitimate for us would be. And through that construction 
we will see that the principles which we would regard as legitimate for individuals include a 
political duty of justice, not dependent upon any voluntary assumption of obligation. So Rawls 
does not have a hypothetical consent theory of political obligation. He has a hypothetical 
theory of political legitimacy, in the sense that a hypothetical construction gives the content of 
what principles are legitimate within a particular society. What constitutes political obligation, 
however, will be part of this content, and, as Rawls suggests, they may not be dependent 
upon any notion of consent at all, and so strictly speaking will constitute an unconditional duty 
rather than an obligation. 
Liberalism in Rawls' theory 
My claim is that the constant governing idea of Rawls' work is that political principles 
must be acceptable to all. This principle of legitimacy constitutes the universal element in 
Rawls' thought. It is applicable to all times and places: it is a fundamental moral principle and 
in spirit it is a thoroughly liberal one. But it needs to be cashed out into substantive principles 
of political association. And these will vary with time and place, since what is acceptable to all 
will so vary. 
Hence while Rawls position is fundamentally liberal, it does not necessarily lead to 
liberal principles of justice. It will only do so in societies where liberal principles of justice are 
the principles which are acceptable to all. The contingency of liberal principles of justice is a 
clear element in PL, but the argument of PL depends upon the acceptance of the moral truth 
of the liberal principle of legitimacy. Only that explains why we should accept as justified the 
political liberal conception of justice he develops in PL. This two-level nature of Rawls' theory 
becomes clearer when we consider his essay on "The Law of Peoples"", where he entertains 
" John Rawls, 'The Law of Peoples', On Human Rights, eds. Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley (New York, 1993), pp. 41-82. 
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the idea that a well-ordered hierarchical society could be as legitimate as one based upon 
liberal justice. '2 What makes it legitimate is what makes it well-ordered, that it is governed by 
the conception of justice which is commonly accepted. Well-orderedness Involves everyone 
accepting the same principles of justice, these principles governing the basic social 
Institutions, and citizens generally obeying these institutions, with the satisfaction of all three 
conditions being a matter of public knowledge13. But these conditions can be met by any 
substantive principles of justice capable of meeting these conditions. There is no argument in 
Rawls that only liberal principles of justice can do so, and indeed the case of the well-ordered 
hierarchical society shows that he does not think that liberal principles of justice are the unique 
solution to the question of what principles of justice meet this liberal principle of legitimacy. 
Indeed, he says, this extension to cover non-liberal but legitimate societies is necessary 
because otherwise Na liberal conception of political justice would appear to be historicist and to 
apply only to societies whose political institutions and culture are liberal. In making the case 
for justice as fairness, and for similar more general liberal conceptions, it is essential to show 
that this is not so. "14 Thus this "constructivist liberal doctrine is universal in its reach once it is 
extended to give principles for all politically relevant subjects.. "15 Note that it is the basic 
procedure, the 'constructivist liberal doctrine', which is universal in scope, not the content of 
particular principles. 16 
So in PL we have an argument for liberal principles of justice which is relative to the 
context of what Rawls calls "western constitutional democracies", but which depends 
ultimately for its justification upon a non-relative principle of legitimacy. I will come back later 
to the question of why we should accept the supposed truth of this principle of legitimacy. I 
now want to go on to support my claim that this structure of Rawls' later theory, of a contingent 
argument for liberal principles of justice based upon a universal principle of legitimacy, is also 
true for the Rawls of TJ. 
'2 lbId., pp. 60-8. 
" Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 35 
" Rawls, 'Law of Peoples', p. 44. 
1e Ibid., p. 46. 
t0 Rawls draws the distinction between legitimacy and justice again in'Reply to Habermas', Journal of Philosophy, 92 (March 1995), pp. 
175.8. There, however, he is concerned to dispute Habermas's claim that legitimacy can be a completely procedural notion. As in the 
, Law of Peoples, Rawls argues that there will be substantive constraints upon any legitimate system, even though these will not be the 
constraints of a full liberal conception of justice. 
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3.4 WHAT CHANGES BETWEEN A THEORY OF JUSTICE AND 
POLITICAL LIBERALISM? 
I want to argue that the fundamental project in which John Rawls is engaged remains 
constant between his two major works of political philosophy. This view runs counter to the 
often expressed one that in TJ Rawls was making an argument for the universal truth of 
liberalism. 
A case similar to mine has been made, based upon pointing out that in TJ Rawls 
relies upon the method of reflective equilibrium which looks for coherence between principles 
of justice and the moral intuitions we have. On this view reflective equilibrium in TJ plays the 
role which in PL is played by "the public culture itself as the shared fund of implicitly 
recognised basic ideas and principles " ". But that is not quite correct. Reflective equilibrium 
in itself does not imply that our original intuitions are just contingently given in our society. 
Moreover it applies to the judgements of individual people, so in itself is not sufficient to 
establish a political conception. It is not a public conception in the required sense. 
What needs to be shown to establish a continuity between TJ and PL is that in TJ 
Rawls relies not only on the method of reflective equilibrium but also upon a conception of a 
grounding shared moral intuition, which happens to be that of fairness. The structure of the 
argument in TJ is that the legitimacy of political authority is given by principles of justice which 
each person can endorse within reflective equilibrium. The possibility of reaching a single set 
of principles of justice which satisfy that principle of legitimacy arises from a consensual 
agreement around an intuition of fairness. But that that intuition of fairness exists and is 
shared is a contingent fact. So we have the structure of a contingent argument for liberal 
principles of justice based upon a principle of legitimacy as acceptability to all which is not 
contingent. 
What then, on this account, changes between TJ and PL? Rawls himself sets out in 
the introduction of PL his view that what went wrong in TJ was the account of how each 
person could reconcile the principles of justice to their other moral conceptions. This essential 
part of the account of a well-ordered society as given in the third part of TJ was, he says, 
11 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. S. 
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based upon what he now calls a "comprehensive philosophical conception"18. The point of the 
third part of TJ was to show that a society regulated by the principles of justice was feasible, 
that the principles represented the basis for a stable society because they represented a 
congruence between justice and the wider ends people might have. The need was to "show 
that our nature is such as to allow the original choice [of principles of justice] to be carried 
through" 19 
Note that in the third part of TJ Rawls does not set out a comprehensive conception of 
the good in the sense of recommending ends which we should follow. His doctrine of the 
good there is a theory in the sense I discussed earlier, that is, trying to set out the principles 
which underlie the way we do conceive of our good, however we may determinately conceive 
of it. This theory is to be tested against our considered judgements in reflective equilibrium. 
Why, then, does Rawls now see this theory of the good as going wrong because it is a 
comprehensive conception, when it appears not to be such a conception in the sense of 
recommending to us how to live? In TJ Rawls himself states that "The definition of the good is 
purely formal. w20 He wants to allow individuals to follow their own conception of the good in 
their own ways. Yet he says enough substantively about the nature of the good to make his 
account, in his own eyes, a partially comprehensive doctrine: it covers some, but not all, non- 
political values. 21 He defines the good as being determined for a person by "the rational plan 
of life that he would choose with deliberative rationality from the maximal class of plans. "22 He 
defends the feasibility of his conception of justice on the basis of its congruence with this 
theory of the good. The practical possibility of the two principles of justice, their ability to 
provide the foundation for a morally legitimate and stable society, depends upon their 
consistency with goodness. 
But now Rawls holds that the feasibility of principles of justice as providing the 
foundational charter for a society cannot depend upon their fit with any single theory of the 
good. They must fit not just with a wide range of ends, as he already held in TJ, but with a 
range of principles of goodness, principles about how people should conceive of and 
Ibid., p. xvl. 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 580 (emphasis added). 
70 /bid., p. 424. 
21 The distinction between fully and partially comprehensive moral conceptions Is drawn In Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 13. 22 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 424. 
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determine their ends. So what he says in TJ about the theory of good becomes In PL a purely 
political conception, meant only to apply to how we view each other as citizens: we suppose 
that our fellows have more or less rational plans of life, so that we are led to "count human life 
and the fulfilment of basic human needs and purposes as in general good, and endorse 
rationality as a basic principle of political and social organisation. *23 But we need not endorse 
rationality, or any particular conception of rationality, as the principle on which we order our 
non-political lives. 
Hence in PL Rawls reconceives this part of his project as involving showing how the 
principles of justice are feasible without invoking any particular conception of human nature, 
and in a way compatible with a wider range of religious and philosophical conceptions than in 
TJ. Thus he shifts to a purely political conception which is intended to be compatible with a 
society characterised by a plurality of comprehensive doctrines. So what changes is that the 
principles of justice are meant to apply solely at the political level, compatible with people 
holding any comprehensive view they choose in non-political spheres, in their private lives or 
non-political associations. Now, this is a real change in Rawls' theory. But it does not 
constitute a shift from a universal to a contextual perspective. The arguments in part three of 
TJ did not affect the nature of the earlier argument in that work for liberal principles of justice. 
Nor do they show that the argument for those principles was meant to have universal force: 
they do not show that only these particular principles were congruent with any conception of 
wider ends. 
In other words the argument in part three of TJ is designed to show why the principles 
of justice would be acceptable to people with a full conception of the good. In PL the same 
task remains to be done. But whereas in TJ Rawls sets out a substantive full theory of the 
good, in PL each person is to find their own support for the principles of justice from within 
whatever full conception of the good they might hold. The structure of the argument therefore 
remains the same from TJ to PL: working within the liberal principle of legitimacy as universal 
acceptability of principles of justice, showing that the liberal principles of justice would be 
those that would be agreed to in certain contexts, which contingently are our contexts, which 
involves both spelling out our intuitions into a conception of justice and showing how that 
23 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 177. 
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conception is congruent with the remainder of our values and beliefs. It is only what is 
involved in performing the last step which changes from TJ to PL, although that also turns out 
to restrict in some ways the understanding of the scope of the principles of justice. 
The overall nature of Rawls' project thus remains the same between the two works: it 
could be summarised as showing that our culture already contains the elements of a moral 
vision of the just society, which in the first step of the procedure is articulated and developed 
through a process of reflective equilibrium; the second step is to show that this vision we 
already have in embryo, and which upon considered reflection we would each accept as 
embodying our views about justice, is indeed an ideal suitable to form the regulative 
framework for the society in which we live. What changes through the years Rawls has been 
developing this project is, at root, just how he conceives the second step should be performed, 
although there are, of course, other detailed changes too. Whereas in TJ he thought he could 
show that the principles of justice were suitable for our society by showing how they formed 
part of our good, by the time he gets to PL he takes the view that there is no one way in which 
the principles can be related to the good. Each person is thus to find their own reasons for 
affirming the principles as a suitable political conception, from within their own particular 
comprehensive moral doctrine, and thus contributing to an overlapping consensus. What 
Rawls did in the third part of TJ is now for each of us to do in our own way, according to our 
own conception of the good. So it is how the project is to be carried through that changes, not 
the essential character of the project itself. 
3.5 THE ARGUMENT OF A THEORY OF JUSTICE 
I have claimed that the fundamental character of Rawls' project remains unchanged 
between TJ and PL. I now have to show how this project is worked out in the earlier work, 
since it may be hard to accept that TJ does not contain greater claims to universal validity than 
I have suggested. Certainly many features of TJ suggest its universality. However on my 
view these turn out to relate to the principle of legitimacy, which is universal, rather than to the 
substantive principles of justice, which even in TJ are contextual. 
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Contextualism In A Theory of Justice 
Rawls never seems to address this contextual nature head-on within TJ. Yet 
constantly he takes himself to be developing a theory of justice which appeals to "our" 
considered judgements. Who exactly "we" are is not defined. Rawls says that his subject is 
the principles of justice that would regulate a well-ordered society"24 . He seems however to 
envisage that there could be a number of different well-ordered societies in the world 
"corresponding to the different conceptions of justice"25. What is revealing about the latter 
remark is not that there are different conceptions of justice, for after all the point of TJ is to 
argue that a particular conception of justice is superior to other accounts. Rather it is that 
there can be different well-ordered societies. 
A well-ordered society in TJ advances the good of its members and is regulated by a 
conception of justice which everyone accepts and knows that all others accept, and which the 
basic social institutions adhere to and are known to adhere to26. This is a very similar 
conception to that in PL. The question is whether Rawls in TJ takes his two principles of 
justice as constituting the only possible basis for a well-ordered society. He would have no 
grounds for doing so if the test of well-orderedness is universal acceptability, since what 
principles turn out to be acceptable is a contingent matter. And he does seem to accept that 
other conceptions of justice could found well-ordered societies. Clearly however what he is 
concerned to argue is that for the moral tradition he is addressing then his two principles will 
be the best conception. He may well at the time of TJ have believed this tradition to be more 
widespread than the later restriction to those characterised by the western tradition of 
constitutional democracy. But again there is no theoretical shift here so much as a realisation 
that there is more diversity in moral belief than he earlier thought, the same realisation that 
motivated his shift to a purely political liberalism. 
How then does the argument in TJ, with its universal and contextual elements, work? 
The universal element is the principle of liberal legitimacy. This is that basic social institutions 
should be grounded upon conceptions which are acceptable to all. This idea enters as we 
have seen into the basic conception which Rawls is after, that of a well-ordered society. What 
" Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. S. 
29 Ibid., p. 457. 
21 Ibid., pp. 4-5 and pp. 453-4. 
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he wants is "a society ... [which] comes as close as a society can to being a voluntary 
scheme... In this sense its members are autonomous and the obligations they recognise self- 
imposed" 27. A society which meets this condition will be morally legitimate. 
The method of reflective equilibrium is the method of justification which corresponds 
to this principle of legitimacy. To bring into coherence principles of justice, theory, and our 
considered convictions is to achieve acceptability to each individual to whom the equilibrium 
applies. The original position is the device for achieving this equilibrium28. The original 
position represents our considered convictions relevant to justice and shows how these 
convictions lead to certain principles of justice. 
The specification of the original position will, however, differ according to what our 
considered convictions are. That is why Rawls sets up the original position in TJ in the way he 
does, so as to achieve the results he wants. The accusation often made that the original 
position is rigged and not therefore a true choice situation is thus beside the point: the whole 
point of it is that it is not meant to be a real choice situation but to represent the position of 
reflective equilibrium. Hence when right at the end of TJ Rawls talks somewhat lyrically of the 
original position as the place from which we can view the world from the perspective of 
eternity, this is so that we "can arrive together at regulative principles that can be affirmed by 
everyone as he lives by them, each from his own standpoint. "29. Here again the universality of 
the original position is because it embodies the principle of legitimacy. For each individual it 
represents a reflective equilibrium; because it does so for each individual it can lead to a 
shared conception of justice. 
Justifving the liberal principle of legitimacy freedom and autonomy 
Why does Rawls hold this basic principle of legitimacy? It is a recognisably liberal 
principle but it is not itself a substantively liberal theory of justice, nor, as we shall shortly see, 
does it necessarily entail such a theory. His most fundamental belief seems to be in a 
conception of human freedom and autonomy, that the most important thing for human beings 
is that we act in accordance with laws and restrictions which we voluntarily impose on 
t? Ibid., p. 13. 
2' More precisely, what Rawls calls the 'initial situation' is the device at the level we are currently discussing. The term original position 
is the Interpretation of the initial situation Rawls develops to represent what he believes to be the position of reflective equilibrium for us. 
See ibid., pp. 120-121. 
"Ibid., P. 587. 
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ourselves. The liberal principle of political legitimacy embodies this basic value. Note that this 
does not itself entail a commitment to political liberty, even to the liberty principle which is 
Rawls' first principle of justice. It does not entail an equal right of individuals each to pursue 
their own ends. Those are principles which are only found within a substantive conception of 
justice. There might be a range of principles about liberty which we could impose upon 
ourselves. We might want to pursue our individual ends or those held in a shared conception 
of the good, depending upon which of these contingently commands general assent within our 
society. At the level of legitimacy, however, it is the wish to live in a society whose basic 
framework we can fundamentally accept which constitutes our liberty. 
What that framework might be belongs to the next stage of theory. At this higher level 
the meaning of autonomy is not that we reflectively endorse our ends, so that we can see our 
ends as given to us by our own reason rather than by faith, authority, or tradition. To say that 
it is would be to base his account upon a determinate conception of how we should live. 
Rather it is autonomy in the sense that we should be able to live in a society which is 
consistent with our own conception of ends, no matter what principles we may see as 
determining those ends. 
But then what of self-legislation, on this view of autonomy? Doesn't that require that 
people endorse their ends from the standpoint of their reason rather than from any other 
source? No, what Rawls holds we must rationally endorse is the principles of justice, but not 
necessarily the whole of our ends of life. We can see our non-political ends as imposed upon 
us, but we cannot live any conception of ends, whether we see these as deriving from reason 
or another source, in a society which is imposed on us from without. For to live in a society 
which we cannot endorse as consistent with our ends means living in a society in which we 
are not able to follow those ends to the fullest possible extent, and that is true whether we 
conceive society in a pluralist way or as being based upon a common good. So the autonomy 
which Rawls has in mind is that given by living in a society which we can regard as self- 
imposed, not living a life whose ends we can so regard. It is important to bear these different 
levels and stages in mind when assessing claims that Rawls assumes the truth of a liberal 
individualist conception of liberty. What is at the heart of his theory, what he takes to be a 
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universal truth, is not political liberty or negative liberty but this notion of autonomy, as acting 
from self-imposed laws. 
It is important to recognise, then, that by autonomy here Rawls does not have in mind 
a substantive liberal conception of personal autonomy as a way of life. To base his theory 
upon that would be to base it upon a conception of the good, which he certainly does not want 
to do. It is rather what in PL he calls political, and not ethical, autonomy. 30 He does not want 
to insist that everyone must or should form a conception of the good for themselves, or 
subject it to rational reflection. That would be ethical or personal autonomy. Rather what he 
means Is that each person can follow their own conception of the good, as they see it, whether 
singly or in conjunction with others, and whether based upon reason, faith, or whatever. It is 
leaving space for each person to follow their own good in their own way (which might be within 
collectives as well as individually), not insisting that each person must be in a certain relation 
to their conception of the good. 
Thus what Rawls is after, at bottom, is what I have characterised as the basic project 
of political philosophy, finding a conception of the basic structure of society which each 
individual can recognise as theirs, so that there is no fundamental conflict between what 
individuals want for themselves and others, and the basic social institutions in which they live. 
Hence Rawls is engaged in the project of reconciling the individual to the political community 
in which he or she lives. 
It is clear that Rawls has this same, political, conception of autonomy in mind in both 
TJ and PL. In TJ he defines autonomy as acting from the principles agreed upon in the 
original position, and while he believes that his conception is compatible with Kant's views 
about human nature, what actually drives his position is not the Kantian view but the situation 
of human beings in the world, the circumstances of material scarcity and human co-operation 
which give rise to the need for principles of justice. 31 it is clear", Rawls says, "that this 
interpretation of autonomy.... depends upon the theory of justice. " 32 (and not, note, upon the 
theory of goodness). He contrasts this position with the 'entirely different' view that "autonomy 
is the complete freedom to form our moral opinions and that the conscientious judgement of 
70 Ra As. Political Liberalism, pp. 77-8. 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 515-516. 
32 ibid., p. 5 16. 
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every moral agent ought absolutely to be respected", 33 which is just what he does not want to 
claim. So even in TJ Rawls does not rely upon an ethical conception of autonomy. 
The role of consensus 
Now in order for this principle of legitimacy to yield substantive results by way of 
principles of justice then each individual must be able to accept the same principles. In TJ this 
means that each person must be able to come to the same reflective equilibrium: it is this view 
which he later modifies to reach the position in PL where agreement over principles of justice 
can come about if people are in different reflective equilibria through reaching an overlapping 
consensus, where everyone agrees upon the same principles of justice but on the basis of 
their own comprehensive conception. This shift results from his rejection of the view held in 
TJ and developed in part three of that work where everyone in society is assumed to hold the 
same formal theory of the good as the rational plan of life a person would rationally choose 34 
So the shift from TJ to PL is in the depth of consensus which can be assumed to hold in our 
societies. The requirement that there be a consensus remains constant, however. 
In TJ the consensus which Rawls takes to constitute our most settled convictions 
about justice and which therefore serves as the basis for reaching a shared reflective 
equilibrium about justice is summed up in the term 'fairness'. The basic intuition we have 
about justice is that it must be fair. In Rawls' theory this means that the initial situation is one 
of fairness: the principles of justice are those which would result from a fair initial situation3s 
The constraints set up in the initial situation of the original position represent "widely accepted 
and reasonable constraints on the choice of principles"36 . What justifies selecting this 
conception of the initial situation, as representing the condition of fairness, rather than any 
other conception, is that it captures a consensus in society about what constraints there 
should be upon principles of justice: "I assume ... that there Is a broad measure of agreement 
that principles of justice should be chosen under certain conditions.... The Idea here is simply 
to make vivid to ourselves the restrictions that it seems reasonable to impose on arguments 
for principles of justice, and therefore on those principles themselves. " 37. It is clear from 
LOC. cit. 
" Ibid., P. 424. 
3$ See ibid., P. 12. 
"Ibid., p. 13. 
31 Ibid., P. 18. 
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these remarks that the underlying justification for Rawls' conception of justice as fairness is 
that it explicates, in a reflective equilibrium, a consensus we have about principles of Justice 
and what should govern them. 
The original position as representing fairness 
The original position therefore represents the requirement we have that the principles 
which should regulate our social interactions should above all else be fair ones. 38 The key 
feature of this requirement is that principles of justice should not be determined by any 
particular view of ends which individuals might have deriving from their social and economic 
circumstances or their religious or metaphysical beliefs. The basic intuition Rawls is appealing 
to is that principles of justice are to apply to everyone in society, to everyone, one might say, 
as citizens, regardless of what difference there might be in their circumstances and 
aspirations. A person's claim to justice does not change if their social position or beliefs 
change. Principles of justice are not to be tailored to individual circumstances but should 
apply equally to all. The original position is designed to capture this intuition and to present it 
in such a way that it is possible to see what principles of justice we would accept in this 
position, or - and this is meant to be equivalent - what principles of justice follow from our 
intuitions about the key features of a morally acceptable conception of justice. 
Hence Rawls sets up the original position in such a way as to reflect these constraints 
of fairness. All its features are to be understood as being designed to model fairness. They 
are not, as has often been thought 39, meant to represent a metaphysical view about our true 
nature. They are rather meant to capture such thoughts as that in determining principles of 
justice and their role, in entering the original position, we put aside or bracket off our 
conceptions of the good. We also put aside all other factors which may bias our choice of 
principles and so render the resulting conception unfair, factors such as our social position, 
and features of our character and abilities which we have only by the chance distribution of 
nature. 
"Rawls also makes this Interpretation of the original position clear in his artcle'Faimess to Goodness', Philosophical Review, 84 
(1075), p. 639, where he explains that the position Is not morally neutral. Rather, it takes up a particular moral stance: it is ja. 'if. 
For example, by Sandel. 
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What goes on in the original position, the arguments Rawls uses in order to show how 
his two principles of justice would be adopted by parties under the veil of ignorance, are also 
designed to represent the constraints of fairness. 
Rawls says that "it is useful as a heuristic device to think of the two principles as the 
maximin solution to the problem of social justice. There is an analogy between the two 
principles and the maximin rule for choice under uncertainty"40. Maximin is the rule in rational 
choice theory that we adopt the alternative with the least worst outcome. It has attracted 
much discussion and debate about whether the parties in the original position would not rather 
gamble than play safety first. But that misses the point. The original position is not a real 
choice situation in which what principle of choice is to be adopted is an open question. As 
Rawls says, "the original position has been defined so that it is a situation in which the 
maximin rule applies»41. Rawls argues that the maximin rule corresponds to fairness, whereas 
any other rule would not. The underlying thought is again thatjustice applies equally to all 
regardless of how they fare in society. We do not think that people who have better luck have 
a greater claim on justice. 42 
3.6 THE REQUIREMENT FOR CONSENSUS AND ITS POSSIBILITY 
I have argued that Rawls throughout his career is to be understood as arguing for the 
primacy of justice and his two principles on the basis of a deeper principle of political 
legitimacy which says that political authority is only morally justified when it is used in 
accordance with principles of action which are acceptable to all. Rawls' view is therefore 
liberal at both levels. It would be possible to hold the liberal principle of legitimacy and reach 
on that basis non-liberal principles of justice. 
Indeed, that is just what Rawls envisages when he discusses the idea of a well- 
ordered hierarchical society. The liberal principle of legitimacy will require that legitimate 
political arrangements embody some features which we might think of as liberal, but within an 
overall conception which might well not be liberal. Thus in his discussion of a well-ordered 
hierarchical society which is governed by a common good conception of justice and Is not 
40 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 152. 
" Ibid., p. 155, emphasis added. 
42 This view on maximin is suggested by de Mamuffe, 'Liberalism, Liberty, and Neutrality,, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19 (1990), PP. 
253-274. It Is endorsed by Barry, Justice as Impartiality, p. 273, fn. 29. 
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liberal, he argues that any such society will contain such features as equality before the law 
and some space for dissent. Even hierarchical societies, therefore, if they are well-ordered, 
will respect basic human rights to life, liberty (as freedom from slavery), and personal 
property43. These rights follow from the idea that such a society is well-ordered, that is, based 
upon the principle of political legitimacy as acceptability to all. For any society to be 
acceptable to all minimal conditions of inclusion, status and voice need to be satisfied. The 
reason for this seems to be that without such minimal conditions it would be impossible for the 
social arrangements to be freely accepted by all. If the price of social criticism is loss of 
liberty, livelihood, personal possessions, or even life, then consent cannot be said to be freely 
given. Recall that the liberal principle of legitimacy is to make political society as nearly as 
possible an association voluntarily entered into. So these basic human rights and institutional 
arrangements which embody them are necessary if the given political arrangements are to be 
freely acceptable to all. 
But these minimal conditions for any well-ordered society are not sufficient to create a 
liberal polity, as is shown by their compatibility with hierarchical arrangements. Liberal 
principles of justice cannot therefore be justified on the grounds of the liberal principle of 
legitimacy alone. For liberal justice more is needed, and for Rawls that more is given by a 
consensus around the idea that political arrangements must above all be fair. 
That serves to meet a possible objection to my interpretation of TJ, that in that work 
Rawls In fact identifies the condition of fairness with the principle of legitimacy. It might be 
argued that the idea of fairness represents the condition that political authority should be 
acceptable to all. Now certainly fairness must meet the test of legitimacy. It is possible to 
argue that fairness is a way, perhaps the best way, to satisfy the condition of acceptability to 
all. But why does it do so? There are two possible answers: it could be because if social 
arrangements are fair then everyone has reason to assent to them, or at least not to dissent 
from them: or it could be that fairness satisfies the condition because everyone does in fact 
accept it. 
Many people have taken Rawls in TJ to believe the former. But the argument from 
the original position assumes the latter position. Rawls believes that "justification proceeds 
43 Rawls. 'Law of Peoples, ' p. 62. 
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from what all parties to the discussion hold in common.... It is perfectly proper, then, that the 
argument for the principles of justice should proceed from some consensusn4'. He appeals to 
a consensus of views both as to the importance of fairness and in what fairness consists. If 
he appealed to the concept of fairness as being such that no-one can reasonably dissent from 
it then he must become embroiled in precisely the sort of discussion he wants to avoid, about 
what best serves the interests of human beings. He wants to avoid appeals to any such 
principles because like principles of utility or perfection they are not part of our shared 
conception of fairness. 
Now indeed in TJ it does appear that in talking of our consensus Rawls might well be 
talking about the consensus of all moral agents. That interpretation is bolstered by the third 
part of TJ where he argues for the congruence of the principles of justice with a full formal 
theory of the good. But people can hold other conceptions of the good and other 
interpretations of fairness. If the argument of the third part of TJ is put aside then fairness is 
purely a matter of putative consensus. If anyone wants to dissent from the importance of 
fairness or this interpretation of it then Rawls has no arguments to fall back upon unless he 
wants to argue that fairness is some sense right. He recognises this predicament in PL where 
he is working through the consequences of rejecting part three of TJ. If, he admits, someone 
wants to challenge the consensus in constitutional democracy by challenging the primacy of 
fairness, if someone, for example, wants to say that people should be treated differently 
according to their religious beliefs, then "we may eventually have to assert at least certain 
aspects of our own comprehensive religious or philosophical doctrine "45 
So in TJ Rawls' argument for his principles of justice as satisfying the requirement of 
political legitimacy is based upon a consensus about fairness. That consensus is what makes 
the principles of justice acceptable to all and hence legitimate. But legitimacy can be based 
upon other conceptions of justice than those Rawls directly argues for if these command 
consensus within a society46. Why should we adopt this understanding of legitimacy? 
Because living in a well-ordered, i. e. legitimate, society is part of our good, as set out in the 
third part of TJ. So the theory of the good, fairness, and the principles of justice come to 
" Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 580-581. 
a Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 152. 
By which he means national community: see A Theory of Justice, p. 457. 
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represent a reflective equilibrium which each person can freely adopt as theirs, that Is, as 
representing their reflective equilibrium. And thus at bottom Rawls' theory in TJ does indeed 
depend upon what people already believe, although their beliefs will be modified and brought 
into harmony through the process of reaching a reflective equilibrium. People who have a 
different understanding of fairness or of what justice should fundamentally consist in will reach 
equilibrium around a different set of principles and thus for them their well-ordered society will 
have a different conception of justice. In PL it is acknowledged that even within one society 
not everyone will hold even the formal theory of the good of TJ and hence their will be different 
reflective equilbria depending upon what conception of the good they hold. What Rawls 
believes in PL is that nevertheless this range of equilibria will, because of a shared culture of 
fairness, of conceiving citizens as free and equal, lead to an overlapping consensus within a 
society around principles of justice. 
Now Rawls' views can be criticised in a number of ways. Some common criticisms I 
have tried to defuse by my interpretation of Rawls. Thus any suggestions that the original 
position is supposed to represent the metaphysical nature of human beings or a real situation 
of social choice are misguided. To be valid criticisms must be addressed either to the 
principles of justice which Rawls argues for, or the underlying principle of legitimacy. I now 
want to suggest that basing legitimacy upon the principle of acceptability to all depends upon a 
notion of consensus which cannot be defended. 
It is often suggested that the consensus Rawls takes to hold around ideas of fairness 
Is in fact illusory. This need not be just an appeal to the facts of disagreement. It would 
certainly be possible to squabble about whether the constraints of fairness are really shared 
moral convictions we have. 47 However, the basic intuitive idea of fairness - that a person's 
claim to justice does not depend upon their social status or economic position, or upon what 
they happen to believe in - certainly seems a powerful one. Still, it is not unquestionable: for 
instance, there is a view that more is owed to the poor and disadvantaged than to the wealthy. 
Is this a claim about what fairness demands, or a claim for unfair treatment by the state? 
"Jean Hampton, in'Should Political Philosophy Be Done Without Metaphysics, ' Ethics 99 (July 1989), pp. 791-814, disputes Rawls 
consensual method on the grounds that 'the persistence of racial discrimination, sexism, and exploitation betrays a commitment by 
many to the second-class status of some of their fellows. ' (p. 813). There is thus no consensus to which Rawls can appeal. She 
therefore concludes that those who want all people to have the same rights and opportunities must base their arguments upon a 
metaphysical claim about human nature, which rules out such differentiations of human beings. 
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Rawls' account of justice seeks to show that unequal treatment, in line with the Difference 
Principle, is demanded by considerations of justice grounded upon fairness. But this issue 
about whether the use of political authority to help the least well-off is demanded by justice or 
a contravention of it is one found in society, and indeed the viewpoint that welfare policies are 
inconsistent with justice underpins the highly influential neo-liberal politics of many political 
leaders in the last twenty years. Of course, the point of Rawls' theory is to argue against such 
views and show that justice and welfare policies are consistent. But his argument depends 
upon being able to demonstrate that his theory of justice better articulates our underlying 
convictions than, say, that of Hayek. The difficulty in conducting the debate in these terms, 
however, is that it becomes very difficult to know whether the anti-welfare position arises 
because people have different intuitions about fairness or because of differences in 
interpreting and applying the same intuitions. 
Rawls' strategy in PL is to narrow the range of the consensus to which he must 
appeal. He hopes that people with widely differing comprehensive views can nevertheless 
agree on common principles for governing their political association. We find such principles 
in the first place by "looking to the public culture itself as the shared fund of implicitly 
recognised basic ideas and principles. We hope to formulate these ideas and principles 
clearly enough to be combined into a political conception of justice congenial to our most firmly 
held convictions"48. But this raises an added difficulty. Not only must he still appeal to the 
idea that we have a shared intuitive basis for political co-operation. He must also now show 
that each person, holding a wide range of comprehensive moral, religious, and metaphysical 
doctrines, can bring these intuitions and the political conception of justice Rawls argues they 
should support into a reflective equilibrium with their particular comprehensive beliefs. On the 
basis of the plurality of such reflective equilibria Rawls argues that it will be possible to 
construct an overlapping consensus around political liberalism. But this means that each 
person must also be prepared to agree that the truth of the comprehensive doctrines in which 
they believe should not determine the proper use of political authority. People must be 
~ Rawls. Political Liberalism, p. 8. 
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prepared to believe both that their comprehensive doctrine Is true and that it would be 
unreasonable to use the power of the state to enforce it 49 
Why should people believe this? It does not seem self-evidently part of the 'shared 
fund' of ideas in the public culture: indeed, it seems rather one of the more hotly disputed 
areas of contemporary politics, particularly in the United States. Rawls response is that the 
possibility of his conception depends upon the "great virtues" of political co-operation, which 
mean that the merits of political justice outweigh rival values which would "come into conflict 
with the very conditions that make fair social co-operation possible on a footing of mutual 
respect"50. But this answer assumes that'mutual respect' is taken to be of overriding 
importance and to involve not imposing comprehensive views, whereas many people are likely 
to see what constitutes respect for others as issuing from their comprehensive view, and as 
not necessarily leading to equality of respect. 
The possibility of reaching a reconciliation between comprehensive views and a 
political conception of liberal justice is also, Rawls says, demonstrated by the history of 
religious and other doctrines which have believed in values such as toleration and co- 
existence. It is reasonable to uphold such values, Rawls argues, and people should be 
reasonable because (a) it is a basic moral motivation to want to live on reciprocal terms of 
social co-operation with others5' and (b) because of the 'burdens of judgement' which mean 
that disagreement over fundamental issues is always reasonable52: "many of our most 
important judgements are made under conditions where it is not to be expected that 
conscientious persons with full powers of reason, even after free discussion, will all arrive at 
the same conclusion "53 
The problem with this notion of reasonableness is that it seems itself to be 
controversial". There are three problems with it: firstly, is it true that disagreement is 
inevitable? Take a judgement such as that about our treatment of animals: proponents of the 
Ibid., p. 138. 
a Ibid., p. 157. 
s" Ibid., pp. 49-50. 
"Ibid.. PP. 54-58. 
"Ibid., p. $8. See Charles Larmore, 'Pluralism and Reasonable Disagreement', Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge (Cambridge, 
1994), pp. 61-79, where he distinguishes this view of reasonable disagreement from that of pluralism with which it Is often confused. 
That we reasonably disagree over values doesn't imply that there exists a plurality of values. 
"See Jean Hampton, The Moral Commitments of Liberalism, ' The Idea of Democracy (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 308-309, and Paul 
Kelly, 'Justifying 'Justice': Contractarianism, Communitarianism and the Foundations of Contemporary Liberalism, ' The Social Contract 
from Hobbes to Rawls (London, 1994), pp. 239-240. 
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view that our moral treatment of animals should be more on a par with that of our fellow. 
humans believe that through reason we can make moral progress on this issue, just as we 
have on past issues of equal treatment of women and of different races. But perhaps such 
moral progress is only to be hoped for on a small range of cases. Secondly, why is it 
unreasonable to insist on one's religious conception being enforced by political authority? It is 
not unreasonable if one's concept of reason is determined by that conception. So the concept 
of reasonableness Rawls relies upon seems already to be a liberal one. That is not surprising. 
If his basic motivation is the liberal principle of legitimacy, then what is reasonable is to live 
together on terms which everyone can accept, understood as implying toleration of other 
conceptions. But that liberal principle is not going to automatically recommend itself to those 
with other comprehensive views. Indeed, point (a) above is an explicit appeal to this principle 
of legitimacy. Everything then hinges upon the universality of this principle. 
This leads to the third objection. What is reasonable is determined by the principle of 
universal acceptability. But what is universally acceptable will differ in different societies with 
divergent cultures. In a well-ordered hierarchical society the notion of what is reasonable will 
differ from that of a constitutional democracy. In the former it will be a conception of the 
common good which will determine what is reasonable. What reason, then, can Rawls give 
against those in our society who advocate such a conception of justice? Only the appeal to a 
consensus over what is reasonable in our society. But the existence of his opponents, unless 
they are a tiny minority (and how small is allowable is itself a problem), disprove the existence 
of a consensus. Rawls might say that they simply mistake the nature of the consensus, but 
that in itself is to impose upon them the view that they are seeking to interpret a consensus 
rather than acting upon a view of the truth. 
So in both versions of his argument the possibility of Rawls carrying through his 
understanding of the liberal principle of legitimacy depends upon the existence of a consensus 
around values which are basic relative to justice; and the possibility of deriving from this a 
justification for liberal principles of justice depends upon the existence of a consensus around 
the right sort of values - fairness, or the freedom and equality of citizens. The objections to 
Rawls' project just discussed bite at both levels. They cast doubt upon the existence of a 
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consensus of the right sort. But they also cast doubt about the existence of a consensus at 
all. 
Rawls project of legitimacy depends upon there being a basic value consensus in 
society. It is not a circular project because he does not assume a consensus around liberal 
principles of justice but around certain considered convictions relative to justice. But how 
does he know that there is such a consensus and over what values it exists if it does? His 
appeal is simply to the intuitions of his readers. He can point to widespread ideas such as 
racial and religious toleration, or opposition to slavery, as well as to fundamental convictions 
about fairness and free and equal citizens. The problem is that some of these are very 
Indeterminate ideas, and political controversies arise over their interpretation and realisation. I 
have mentioned above two ways of regarding fairness. But even convictions about toleration 
and slavery have some indeterminacy. Does religious toleration extend to allowing novelists 
to insult your most revered figure? Does it mean equal status for all religions in schools and 
civil institutions or is it consistent with state establishment of one religion? If slavery is forced 
labour can housewives be slaves? Does being paid for your labour make a difference, if you 
have to work in order to live? Questions such as these undermine the easy recourse to shared 
moral intuitions. And why pick out these shared intuitions and not others shared by the 
majority of people and relevant to justice, such as around the primacy of heterosexual 
monogamous relationships, marriage, and the family? If the objection is that too many people 
dissent from this then how many is too many? And how do we know how many dissenters 
there are? 
The conclusion to be drawn from these points is that the notion of a consensus is not 
an untroubled one. Knowing that there is a consensus over some one value or set of values, 
and knowing what is the content and moral salience of that consensus, are not straightforward 
matters. How can we know these things? For Rawls the only answer seems to be that they 
are a matter of pre-political knowledge. If each person can achieve a reflective equilibrium 
around the same substantive principles then we have achieved a consensus. But that can 
only be tested out through public debate. A consensus is a public, shared thing. In order to 
have a consensus, then, we already need to be part of a shared community. Any consensual 
agreement cannot be an inviolable feature of the foundations of that community. Moreover, 
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the difficulty of reaching a consensus which Is not merely superficial means that the problem 
of political legitimacy remains for the cases when no consensus which is deep enough is 
reached. What happens when we simply have opposed understandings of what fairness 
requires, say, or what approach to religion should be taken in schools? 
Rawls' response might be to say that his aim is precisely to put forward a position 
relevant to such debates, to put forward the case for one side rather than another. He is 
putting forward a theory of justice, a moral theory and not the foundation charter for society. 
But such an interpretation of his project would be at odds with his fundamental project of 
political legitimacy. He is not just advocating one view of justice, he is saying that in our 
societies only political action by the state which is undertaken in accordance with that view is 
morally legitimate, because only such action would be acceptable to all. But if Rawls is 
intervening within political debates he can only claim that his position would be acceptable to 
all either by abandoning the consensual view of acceptable to all, or by claiming that he is 
interpreting what people in some way already believe. The former position involves dropping 
his project of legitimacy, while the latter implies that whatever is agreed upon is legitimate - 
which would mean Rawls giving up his particular position on justice. Rawls' position only 
makes sense if it is understood as saying that in our societies liberal principles of justice are 
legitimate. But I have argued he has no sound basis for arguing that. 
A further response Rawls might make relates to how is project is to be understood in 
relation to democracy, and hence to the question of whether Rawls does indeed depend upon 
a notion of a pre-political consensus. The notion of democracy plays a differing role in the two 
books. In TJ democracy as majority rule only comes in once the two principles of justice are 
in place. It "has a subordinate place as a procedural device. "55 In PL, by contrast, the whole 
argument is directed towards working out a conception of justice for a democratic society-56 
And Rawls' view can be characterised as being in one sense fundamentally democratic 
because it is based upon a principle of legitimacy as acceptability to all, which means that it 
issues from the will of all in some sense. What this means is that Rawls operates with a two- 
level notion of democracy, although it is only latterly that this has become clear in his writings. 
N Rawls, A Theory Of Justice, p. 356. 
"See, for Instance, Rawls, Political Liberalism. p. 3. 
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In PL Rawls draws a distinction, originally found in Locke, between "the people's constituent 
power to establish a new regime and the ordinary powers of officers of government and the 
electorate exercised in day-to-day politics. "57 Both these powers are expressions of 
democracy, but of democracy taken in different senses. The people's power to establish a 
constitution embodies democracy as a form of sovereignty, whereas their ordinary powers are 
those of democracy as a form of government. 0 Moreover, this democratic power of 
sovereignty is not exercised only once, when a constitution is being established. Rather the 
constitution must be endorsable by citizens at all times, not in virtue of what the intentions of 
the constitutional founders were, but as representing our conceptions of citizenship here and 
now. so 
On this basis Rawls could say that the consensus on which he relies is not, as I 
claimed above, a matter of pre-political knowledge. Rather, the constitution reflects the 
ongoing political deliberations of the citizens to whom it applies. 60 The consensus therefore 
becomes revealed through the continuing endorsement of the constitution. But there would be 
a number of problems with this claim. Firstly, it is unclear in what sense the notion of 
democratic sovereignty is really one of democracy. In particular, in the constitutional regime 
Rawls pictures there are no continuing institutions through which the constitution can be 
continually subject to democratic scrutiny. There is the Supreme Court, which Rawls takes to 
represent public reason, 61 but that is not a democratic institution in which citizens can express 
their will. Moreover, there is the problem that democracy as sovereignty, on Rawls' account, 
seems to require unanimity, yet democracy is associated with decision-making in cases where 
unanimity does not exist (commonly, though not necessarily, with majority rule). Rawls admits 
this is an unresolved problem. 62 Furthermore, Rawls' project was to fix the basic rights and 
liberties embodied in the constitution once and for all, so that they no longer became a matter 
for political debate. 63 Yet if the constitution is grounded upon continuing democratic 
" Ibid., p. 231. 
~A good account of this distinction can be found in Samuel Freeman, "Original Meaning, Democratic Interpretation, and the 
Constitution', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 21 (Winter 1992), pp. 3-42. Rawls endorses Freeman's account In 'Reply to Habermas', 
158 (footnote). 
Freeman, op. cit., pp. 18-17. 
See Rawls, 'Reply to Habermas', pp. 153ff, where he argues against Habermas' claims that Rawls' conception of justice means the 
constitution cannot be conceived as a political project and is based upon pre-political wills. 
"' Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 231. 
0' Rawls, 'Reply to Habermas, ' p. 180. 
"See, for example, Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 151.152: the reasonable basic liberties In the constitution..... are reasonably taken 
as fixed, as correctly settled once and for all, ' and again p. 232: by a democratically ratified constitution with a bill of rights, the citizen 
body fixes once and for all certain constitutional essentials. ' 
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sovereignty then it seems that he must leave open the possibility of constitutional revision. 64 
This threatens the whole project of justifying a liberalism, part of whose very purpose is to put 
constraints upon the democratic power of the people to decide upon such matters as basic 
rights and liberties. 
To invoke continuing democratic sovereignty as the basis of Rawls theory, as it has 
lately appeared he wants to do, thus leaves open the questions of how this sovereignty is to 
be embodied, and seems to undermine the basic project of justifying constitutional constraints 
upon democracy. The distinction between democratic sovereignty and government was 
meant to save the latter, but it can only be done by removing any meaning from the notion of 
sovereignty being democratic if the people's will is to be regarded as fixed. If their will is 
revisable then rather than the constitution being a pre-democratic constraint it is itself a 
product of democracy. Moreover if Rawls' project is founded upon democratic sovereignty in 
any meaningful sense, with the possibility of non-unanimity, then the problem arises of what 
are the moral foundations of that sovereignty. 
The basic problem with this line of development in Rawls, however, lies in the 
distinction between democratic sovereignty and democratic government. There is a distinction 
between sovereignty, the question of where the ultimate power in society lies, and 
government, the exercise of that power for particular purposes. But democracy is an answer 
to the question of sovereignty, not the basis for sovereignty. In other words, the contention 
that the people as a whole are to exercise power needs itself to be given a justification, and 
that justification cannot be in terms of democracy. There must be a justification of why the 
people should rule. But this justification can either be of why the people should be sovereign 
at all levels, or, more commonly in the literature, merely of why they should rule within a 
settled liberal constitutional framework which constrains democratic power and sets the 
criteria by which it is to be judged, for example on whether it produces just outcomes (where 
just is defined by the constitutional principles). Rawls now seems to be straddling both camps 
but this is not a tenable position. The upshot is that either he must give up his endorsement of 
democratic sovereignty, or give up being a liberal. That means that he cannot defend his 
~ in *Reply to Habermas' Rawls refers to the possibility of citizens being able to 'adjust and revise' the constitution as changing social 
circumstances require' (p. 155). 
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liberalism as not requiring a pre-political value consensus. He can only drop this requirement 
at the cost of giving up his liberalism. 
Rawls' project is to articulate a moral vision of the just society which, he believes, is 
based upon moral convictions already present in our society. This is common to both TJ and 
PL. He then wants to show that this moral vision, which we will upon reflection accept as our 
own, Is indeed a suitable and viable basic charter for our pluralist society. This second step of 
the project is also constant between the two works in intention, but the difference between 
them arises in its working out. In TJ Rawls thinks he can demonstrate that the principles of 
justice further the good of each person because, although we have different conceptions of 
the good, they each have a common structure. By PL he has abandoned this view, and 
merely hopes, on grounds he believes to be strong, that each person can find from within their 
own comprehensive views about the good that the principles of justice are something they 
should accept. That is, in summary, the continuity and discontinuity of Rawls' theory. 
Underlying it throughout is the view that political legitimacy lies in the acceptability to 
all of the principles on which basic social institutions are grounded: this expresses the moral 
aim that we should each live in a society whose basic character expresses our will. My 
criticism of the theory has been that it depends upon the claim that there Is a consensus 
around certain values of fairness, or the freedom and equality of citizens, which are basic 
relative to justice, and that from these values a consensus can be reached over principles of 
justice. The fact that the basic consensus exists can be disputed, but more fundamental is a 
worry about how we know either way. Whether the ideas we have about fairness and its 
importance are the same ideas is something we need to discover. Nor is it clear that there is 
only one way in which ideas of fairness can be used in formulating principles of justice. These 
concerns imply that, if we want basic social institutions to reflect the will of each person, which 
we have taken as a necessary requirement for a moral community, then we cannot ground 
them upon a moral consensus. Democratic sovereignty is not compatible with the liberal 
project of imposing fixed, pre-political constraints upon the scope of power. Rawls' attempt to 
combine the two breaks down. He tries to meet the requirements of democracy as popular 
will while circumventing democratic politics by appealing to an existing moral consensus. But 
there is no obvious fact of consensus to which he can appeal: whether or not there is a 
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consensus will emerge from a political debate, and cannot be the foundation for politics. Thus 
Rawls' project is a failure. 
3.7 OTHER CONSENSUAL THEORIES 
I have argued that neither the communitarians, nor the approach of Rawls, can 
provide the basis for a moral community by showing why we should each accept liberal 
principles as the basic charter of society. In the next chapter I will look at one other strategy 
for providing such a justification, based upon considerations of what best advances people's 
interests. Then in part two of this thesis I will seek to defend an approach which accepts that 
if the basic structure of society is to reflect the will of all then it must be a democratic structure, 
involving institutions which lead to universally acceptable resolutions of conflicts, rather than 
making the fruitless attempt to find principles which each always accepts as a binding 
constraint. The emphasis then is on institutions and process rather than on moral principles to 
which social institutions and individuals have to conform. 
Before going on, however, it is worth mentioning that, although in this chapter I have 
focused on Rawls, there are many other writers whose approach is to seek to justify liberal 
principles of justice as the basis for social institutions on the grounds that they can be shown 
to follow from certain basic values we already share, or that they everyone should accept 
these principles because they are the right expression of the values we share. There are 
differences between these approaches, and some of what I say in the next chapter about 
perfectionist truth claims as a basis for political morality could also be applied to some of the 
writers I want to mention now. But one thing which unites them is that they all hold that liberal 
principles are founded upon moral values of such general appeal that they can form the basic 
charter of society without any coercion being involved; in other words, that all can freely accept 
these principles without having to give up their substantive notions of the good. 
Shared basic values 
Many writers take some notion of equal respect to be fundamental, such as Charles 
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Larmore65 and Ronald Dworkin". It can also be discerned In the justifications of minimal 
liberalism or libertarianism given by Friedrich Hayek 67 and Robert Nozick°e. Dworkin argues 
that treating people with equal respect, which is, he says, a generally shared principle, 
requires that the state not be based upon any particular conception of the good, in opposition 
to the view that we treat people with respect when we treat them according to some such 
conception. Larmore contends that, although there is in modern society reasonable 
disagreement about the good, there is nevertheless a shared norm of equal respect, which 
means that when we disagree about how to live together we should go on on the basis of what 
we do agree about. That means that the state must be grounded upon neutrality over 
questions of the good, on which we disagree, and hence upon a minimum moral conception 
the content of which, however, Larmore does not elaborate upon). 
A related theory can be found in the work of Brian Barry69, who argues for principles of 
justice on the basis of the universal appeal of the notion of impartiality. This notion arises from 
the desire to live in a society whose basic structure its members all freely accept, coupled with 
the view that because no conception of the good can be conclusively proved, therefore no 
such conception can enter into the basis of society. The theories of Hayek and Nozick are 
very different from Dworkin and Barry (it is unclear how far they are from Larmore in practical 
effect) by holding that equal respect means that the state should only enforce equal liberty and 
equality before the law, and that equal respect means it should not bring about any particular 
distribution of other goods. 
All these, and others not mentioned, rest on the premise that we have certain basic 
notions - equal respect, or what Barry calls the 'agreement motive' - which form the grounds 
for the justification of liberal principles as the basis of political community. The status of these 
notions is that they are taken to be strongly rooted moral notions we share. As with Rawls, 
that does not mean that their morality lies simply in their being shared - they are simply taken 
to be notions which are generally accepted as fundamental notions of morality. But now the 
same problem arises as with Rawls' reliance upon the concept of fairness. If these theories 
's Charles Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge, 1987), and 'Political Liberalism, ' Political Theory 18 (August 1990). pp. 
339-360. 
"See, for example, Ronald Dworkin, 'Liberalism, ' Liberalism and Its Critics, ed. Michael Sandel, (Oxford, 1984), pp. 80-79. I am not 
sure that Dworkin would still endorse this position. 
" Friedrich Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago, 1960). 
"Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford, 1974). 
~ Barry, Justice as Impartiality, passim. 
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are to give accounts of the moral basis of political association they must be In some sense 
acceptable to all. That these are shared concepts is not however sufficient for this. They are 
subject to different interpretations and different weightings against other values. As Dworkin's 
argument itself shows, equal respect can be interpreted in a quite different way, as involving 
treatment in accordance with some conception of the good. That can also be taken as over- 
riding the desire that all people freely accept the basis of society. The result is that principles 
which are acceptable to all cannot be derived simply from a claim that a notion like equal 
respect is widely shared. 
Of course, some of these writers would respond that they want to show why the liberal 
interpretation of equal respect is the right one. But then we again need a prior framework 
which can command the political legitimacy of reconciling individuals to society within which 
such controversies can be conducted and settled, including a method for settling disputes 
whose outcomes carry with them moral legitimacy. In practical terms if the aim is to justify a 
liberal constitution which can be reconciled with the individual will of everyone to whom it 
applies then that must either be done on the basis of an appeal to a value which everyone 
shares and interprets in the same way, or it cannot be done at all. My claim is that we cannot 
know outside of political disputation whether there is any such value. Therefore no such value 
can form the basis of political association, and the liberal constitutional project cannot be done 
at all. That is not to say that within a framework of political disputation liberal values cannot be 
advanced as the best way on which to proceed, but the basic task is to reconcile the individual 
to that framework, which must henceforth be done on grounds other than those of shared 
values and moral principles. The only other alternative for liberals is to say that the legitimacy 
of political association must be based upon a conception of what is the true notion of the good. 
In other words legitimacy is based upon truth rather than consensus or communal identity, on 
what is objectively in our interests, rather than on what we already share. This is the end- 
based approach I will consider in the next chapter. 
Pluralism and social peace 
Lastly in this chapter, however, I want to mention a group of theories which at first 
seem different from those which characterise liberalism as based upon shared values. These 
take the justification of liberalism to arise from the existence of pluralism, and of pluralism over 
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Ideas of the right as well as of the good. The justification is that liberalism Is taken to involve 
negotiation and compromise between individuals and groups within society, and hence that 
each person should accept liberalism as allowing them to do the best they can. The emphasis 
appears therefore to be on institutions which allow negotiation and compromise, and 
agreement upon principles is eschewed precisely because no such agreement is thought 
possible. 
Thus Isaiah Berlin70 argues that the resolution of value conflicts is theoretically, and 
not just practically, impossible, because the existence of a plurality of values is an objective 
truth. Hence social arrangements are always a matter of ephemeral agreement, of trading-off 
competing values. We have to choose between competing values, and this gives a centrality 
to the value of freedom, but even that has to be balanced against other values - it can have no 
absolute priority. Others argue for the same conclusions without holding a view about the 
objective plurality of values. Richard Bellamy" contends that societies mirror a balance of 
power, and that any value consensus should be viewed with suspicion as likely reflecting 
socialisation, covert persuasion, and coercion. We need therefore to give central place to "fair 
procedures that favour the expression and temporary conciliation of a plurality of idea is. *72 
Political decisions are only ever ad hoc and temporary, and political arrangements are only 
designed to achieve a modus vivendi rather than a principled basis for social unity. Stuart 
Hampshire73 also emphasises procedures rather than principles, with a minimal morality of 
procedural justice based not upon shared beliefs but the age-old historical experience of 
negotiating with enemies and of the consequences of not negotiating and compromising. 
Now, it might seem that this group of views should be congenial to my project of 
showing the priority of institutions of discussion as the basis of political arrangements, rather 
than an agreement upon principles. But looks can be deceptive. One problem with these 
views is that it is unclear whether they are genuinely advocating trade-offs between different 
views, or are aiming to justify a form of liberalism as a framework within which compromises 
's Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, (Oxford, 1969), and 'The Pursuit of the Ideal, ' The Crooked Timber of Humanity (London. 
1990), pp. 1-19; John Gray, Isaiah Berlin, (London, 1995). 
r' Richard Bellamy, Liberalism and Modem Society, (Cambridge, 1992), especially pp. 252-261; "Citizenship and Rights, ' Theories and 
Concepts of Politics, ed. Richard Bellamy (Manchester, 1993). pp. 43-76; "Pluralism. Liberal Constitutionalism and Democracy. a 
Critique of John Rawls's (Meta) Political Liberalism, ' The Liberal Political Tradition, ed. James Meadowcroft (Cheltenham, 1996), PP. 
77-too; with Martin Hollis, 'Liberal Justice: Political and Metaphysical, ' Philosophical Quarterly 45 (January 1995), pp. 1.19. 
Bellamy, Liberalism and Modem Society, p. 254. 
" Stuart Hampshire, Innocence and Experience, (Hamiondsworth, 1989). 
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can take place. 74 If they advocate a liberal framework of individual liberty then holders of non- 
individualistic views are likely to feel that their positions are placed at a disadvantage, and that 
there is not a genuine process of compromise going on. 
Another problem, however, is that these views can only get going if they are grounded 
upon one moral value, that of social peace. The conflicting tendencies in society have to 
agree that talk is better than war. Without this moral commitment it remains open for people 
to resort to force to seek to achieve their ends rather then compromise them within peaceful 
negotiations. If they are to be reconciled to a political system which arbitrates conflicts by 
peaceful means, rather then by fighting, there needs to be sufficient reason why peace is 
always preferable to war. Otherwise it might be the case that some will put the realisation of 
their beliefs above civil peace. Yet for these theorists the value of civil peace remains 
ungrounded. Hampshire seems to draw the contrast between civil peace and a society which 
is no better than the war of all against all in Hobbes' state of nature 75 but this is not the right 
contrast to draw. The real difficulty arises in showing why people should not engage in 
conquest of their own society; in other words, why coercion of others into a society regulated 
according to your views should not be your aim if it were practicable to achieve it, that is, if you 
had the forcible power, or the manipulative power, to bring it about. 
Richard Bellamy argues for political association based upon the duties necessary for 
free communication and negotiation. 76 Like Hampshire, he advocates a minimal conception of 
justice in political procedures of negotiation, from which procedures more substantive 
agreements about questions of justice will result. He, too, advocates this on the grounds of a 
desire for civil peace. But Bellamy also wants to oppose societies based upon a consensus 
which has not been freely arrived at. " This, if it can be grounded, provides a reason why 
people should prefer civil peace to civil war. The grounding he provides is in what he terms a 
metaphysical view, based upon a universal conception of free and equal persons. 70 As such, 
each person is owed the duties of free communication, and each person is motivated to 
For example, Gray, op. cit., pp. 150-1, argues that both positions can be found within Berlin's writings. ' See, for example. Hampshire, op. cit., p. 73: '... a bare minimum concept of Justice.... Is Indispensable, If there Is to be a peaceful and 
coherent society. ' But peace and coherence can be brought about by means other than negotiation. » See, for example, Bellamy, 'Citizenship and Rights, ' p. 65. 
This concern is most evident In Bellamy, Liberalism and Modem Society, p. 249-250. However at this point he appears to reject as a 
jam of coercion the sort of metaphysical view of human agency he later comes to advocate. For another writer who views consensus 
with suspicion, as not necessarily resulting from free agreements, see Ian Shapiro, 'Three Ways to Be a Democrat, ' Political Theory 22 
(February 1994), p. 134. 
' See Bellamy and Hollis, 'Liberal Justice: Political and Metaphysical, ' p. 12, and Bellamy, "Pluralism, Liberal Constitutionalism and 
Democracy, ' P. 94. 
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accept these duties because only by participating in a society in which they are recognised can 
each one safeguard their own status as a free person. Bellamy attacks Rawls for wanting to 
avoid all metaphysical commitments, although it may be more true to say that what Rawls 
wants to avoid is any specific metaphysical commitment: in an overlapping consensus 
Individuals can bring to bear their own metaphysical conceptions in finding support for the 
principles of justice. Rawls' point is that a political conception must not depend upon any one 
metaphysical view, not that it must in every sense be innocent of metaphysics. Bellamy's 
view, however, in so far as it depends upon such a metaphysics, falls foul of this objection. It 
now appears that, notwithstanding pluralism, we must each accept this notion of free and 
equal persons. Yet it is not clear why this view must be compelling. Why isn't it subject to the 
same strictures about differing interpretations of what free and equal means, and objections to 
attempts to put some issues beyond the reach of political conflict, as Bellamy himself urges 
against Rawls? 79 Why must someone adopt this notion of persons, rather than one which 
grounds our duties towards one another on the basis of a conception of the good? Bellamy 
would presumably say that the existence of pluralism rules out the latter, but then it is unclear 
why pluralism doesn't also rule out using his conception as a foundation. He might take a 
perfectionist route, and say that his view is justified because it is right: I will argue in the next 
chapter that perfectionism will not work, either, but in any case it is evident that this is not the 
way Bellamy would want to go. Without his metaphysical doctrine of the person, however, all 
that he is left with is the same ungrounded commitment to civil peace as that of Hampshire. 
And thus both theories end up facing the same difficulties as the accounts of Rawls and 
others considered earlier in this chapter. 
In any case, even if we grant that social peace is a shared value, and that it always 
overrides other values as long as no other values are being forcibly imposed, there is no 
necessary passage from social peace to negotiation and compromise. Other resolutions are 
possible: one is to agree to leave all disputed questions for individuals to act as they see fit, 
another is to adopt majority rule to decide which conception has most support, and act on that 
rather than compromise. Still another is to appoint a committee of experts to decide what 
should be done on a particular issue. So the value of social peace is insufficient to justify the 
» For example. In ibid. pp. 79-88. 
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modus vivendi politics envisaged. Once again, then, we are faced with the impossibility of 
justifying political arrangements on the basis of shared moral values. 
75 
Chapter Four 
Goodness, utility and perfection 
So far I have considered two strategies for justifying liberal values as the foundation of 
the basic structure of society. I have found wanting both the view that our membership of the 
actual communities into which have formed us as individuals gives us an obligation to uphold 
the basic values and institutions of that community, which would justify liberalism if we are 
living in a society based upon liberalism, and the approach which sees liberal values as those 
which we can all, or mostly, agree upon, notwithstanding our substantial differences. 
I now turn to the third strategy of justification which I wish to consider. This approach 
defends liberal values on the grounds that they are necessary to promote the human good, or 
that indeed the human good consists at least in a necessary part in liberal values. Liberalism 
is therefore justified on the grounds of pursuit of the good. But as the formulation of this 
strategy which I have just given reveals, it can be followed in two very different ways. One 
version takes liberalism as justified as a means to the good, without taking a stance on the 
substantive nature of the good itself. That leads to a utilitarian justification of liberalism. The 
second version holds a definite view of the good, as necessarily involving liberal values, 
primarily the value of personal autonomy. This is taken to be a truth-claim about the good, 
and on this basis a political community based upon liberal values is to be justified. That yields 
a perfectionist justification of liberalism. 
In this chapter I will consider both approaches, but I will deal with utilitarianism fairly 
briefly, largely because it quickly runs into seemingly insuperable difficulties and hence is 
currently largely in eclipse. My argument will be that, insofar as utilitarianism can be 
developed in response to the seemingly devastating criticisms of it which are routinely made 
today, based upon the claim that it violates the separateness and integrity of persons, it 
actually loses its distinctiveness. It can no longer avoid taking a substantive stance on the 
nature of the human good, and thereby tends to become a form of perfectionism. Hence I will 
deal at greater length with liberal perfectionism, which has also received some powerful 
defences in its own right recently, particularly from Joseph Raz. In respect of perfectionism 
my argument will be that although Raz's theory in particular can be defended against some of 
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the rather brisk counter-arguments made by non-perfectionist liberals, nevertheless it 
ultimately cannot provide a solution to the problem of constructing a morally legitimate political 
community, primarily because by seeking to justify the political sovereignty of institutions and 
practices based upon one set of values it cannot provide a unique solution to the problem of 
legitimacy. 
4.1 UTILITARIANISM 
Pleasure and desire 
Utilitarianism is an end-based approach to justifying liberalism but, unlike 
perfectionism, it does not rely upon some particular substantive conception of the good. 
Rather it consists of an account of what all conceptions of the good have in common, either 
classically in terms of some single conception to which all more particular views about the 
good can be reduced, such as mental states of pleasure and the avoidance of pain, or more 
recently as the satisfaction of desires. On mental state views utilitarians hold that although 
different ends may be pursued, the nature of the good is ultimately single, whereas those who 
take the end to be the satisfaction of desires can fully admit plurality in conceptions of the 
good - it is the property of being desired which makes something a good and it is this property 
which enters into the utilitarian calculation. ' This desire-satisfaction version of utilitarianism 
admits pluralism of the good because it is in effect a formal analysis of what it is to have a 
conception of the good: all that unites the various conceptions is that they are desired by 
individuals. They are not to be reduced to a single underlying form of value. 2 The desire- 
satisfaction version can therefore avoid the dual implausibility found in mental state views, of 
the reduction of all ends to a single conception of value, and the simplistic psychology of 
pleasure and pain. 
But the more sophisticated version of desire satisfaction itself faces difficulties. 
Simply satisfying the desires people happen to have is an implausible account of value too. It 
seems perfectly reasonable to say that certain desires of mine are not valuable and do not 
contribute to my well-being. I may have the desire to get drunk every night but few would say 
it was actually in my best interests to fulfil that desire. Thus it is not necessarily actual desires 
' See James Griffin, Well-being: Its Meaning, Measurement, and Moral Importance (Oxford, 1986), pp. 7.39, for discussion of these 
different types of utilitarianism and a defence of a restricted Informed desire account of what utilitarians count as well-being; our well- 
being consists In maximising those desires we would have on full Information and which are central to our lives (the success of my life 
depends upon their achievement). 
2 Ibid., pp. 31-2. 
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of mine which should be satisfied, but those I would have if fully informed about possible 
desires and their consequences. 
However, this in turn runs the danger of disconnecting the informed desires whose 
satisfaction is now what is to be pursued, from the actual desires I may have. At some point, 
perhaps only when realised in practice, an informed desire must become an actual desire. I 
may hate the process of training, say, but recognise its desirability in order to be able to 
pursue the career I want. But that I would appreciate opera if I were fully informed does not 
mean that I ever will actually desire to listen to it. Moreover, the theory needs to take into 
account desires I once had but have no longer: is the desire to be satisfied my adult desire to 
study or my juvenile one to be a professional footballer? The danger is either that the theory 
will fail to discriminate between earlier and later desires, or that it will be reduced to satisfying 
simply whatever desires I happen to have now. 
The suggestion of James Griffin is that the account of what is valuable is that of the 
satisfaction of those informed desires which will constitute a successful life3. But then the 
notion of informed desires becomes open to rational deliberation and to the suggestion that 
certain values are necessary if any life is to go well, and that these values can be stated with 
some definiteness. 4 At this stage utilitarianism converges with a form of perfectionism, which 
while short of specifying a full form of life nevertheless makes claims about what any 
successful form of life must contain - the sort of perfectionism, indeed, which I will be 
discussing later in this chapter. 
Justifying liberalism 
Leaving perfectionism aside for now, however, the question arises as to how 
utilitarianism, in whatever version, fares as a justification of liberalism. The first point to make, 
of course, is that although utilitarianism has often been used as a justification for liberalism, 
there is no necessary connection between the two. A utilitarian advocacy of liberalism is 
based upon the judgement that overall the good is maximised in a liberal society. But the 
contingency of that basis for liberalism has often made liberals uneasy, and been a spur to the 
' Ibid., pp"21-2 
4 Gnffin's own stab at producing a list of such prudential values can be found at ibid., pp. 67.8. It Includes the value of personal 
autonomy, though without giving it the foreground importance found In the perfectionist views I discuss below. 
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development of alternative justifications. The worry has been that utilitarianism would allow 
liberal values to be overridden on particular occasions, if that better promoted overall well- 
being. 
In response to this concern, many utilitarians have developed a two-level theory, 
which excludes particular infringements of liberal values by arguing that things go better 
overall if those values are observed on all occasions, even if strict utilitarianism would favour 
doing something different on specific occasions. There can seem something paradoxical in 
this rule-utilitarianism, since it justifies, on grounds of maximising the overall benefit in the long 
run, not maximising it here and now. Even if it can be sustained, however, it can still seem an 
insecure basis for liberalism, since if someone were to demonstrate that on utilitarian 
reasoning things went better in a non-liberal society, then the theory would require the 
abandonment of liberalism. 
Supposing, however, that as it happens utilitarianism, in whatever form is most 
favourable, does lead to the adoption of liberal political values of some sort - certainly the 
defence of individual liberty. That in itself would not give a full justification of liberalism, for if 
liberty and so on were valued as means to achieving the overall benefit, the more fundamental 
question remains whether maximising the overall benefit in this way is what we should be 
doing. The main contemporary objection to liberalism, developed by Rawls and others, is that 
it "does not take seriously the distinction between persons"5. In Rawls' hands, this criticism is 
based upon the charge that in utilitarianism "the principle of rational choice for one man is 
taken as the principle of social choice as well"6. For individuals it is rational to maximise the 
fulfilment of one's desires: what utilitarianism does, according to Rawls, is to extend this 
principle to society as a whole. This leads to social choices being made about what is the 
best balance of desire-satisfaction to be achieved overall, without taking into account the 
integrity of individual persons. Thus this principle of social choice would allow for some 
individuals being deprived of the ability to achieve any of their wants if that maximised overall 
satisfaction. In utilitarianism it is not individuals which are ultimately valuable but states of 
affairs. The good is in a sense detached from the particular individuals who hold certain 
John Rawts. A Theory of Justice, (Oxford, 1972), p. 27. 
" 1bd., p. 187. 
This point 13 made by Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London. 1985), pp. 76-77. 
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ends as their good. The move from rational choice for an individual to social choice on the 
same maximising basis is paralleled by the move from individuals with their own conceptions 
of the good to a single overall social conception of the good, even if on desire-satisfaction 
views this does not mean reducing the good to a single quality - the criterion is still net gain of 
benefit, even if not aggregation of goodness conceived as a single ultimate standard. 8 
This line of objection to utilitarianism, that it would justify the sacrifice of some or all of 
the interests of some individuals to achieve the overall benefit, is the most frequently cited 
reason given by many today for rejecting utilitarianism. It is not unanswerable: utilitarians can 
respond that it seems irrational to block the infringement of individual rights in order to achieve 
some much greater overall benefit. Moreover, the use of utilitarianism to support individual 
rights, as in rule-utilitarian theories, seems to give some bulwark against such infringements 
as well as providing a foundation for rights. 
Can utilitarianism reconcile individuals to political authority? 
These arguments bear upon the soundness of utilitarianism as a moral theory. In 
political philosophy, however, the ramifications of the move from individual conceptions of the 
good to a conception of the good overall seems to me to count decisively against 
utilitarianism. The justification of political structures, whether liberal or not, on the grounds 
that they bring about the greatest overall net benefit only expresses the will of individuals if 
they adopt this principle of social choice, and agree that their own conception of the good 
should enter into the melting pot on the same basis as all other conceptions in order to 
determine the overall good. But this means individuals giving up the notion that political 
authority should be exercised according to their own views. This is not the same as the 
argument of political liberals that people should not want the state to promote substantive 
conceptions of the good, because that means both that the state does not promote the good 
at all, and that what the state is founded upon is values that everyone holds which are not 
controversial - beliefs about, or relevant to, justice, rather than the good. For the utilitarian, on 
the other hand, the state will promote the good, as determined by the assessment of the 
' See Griffin. op. cit., pp. 35-6. 
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overall net benefit, and hence will not ground its legitimacy upon non-controversial shared 
beliefs. 
The question is, therefore, whether adequate reason can be given that individuals 
should be willing for this to be the case. In the transition from individual good to overall net 
benefit can individuals perceive a coherence which allows them still to see the social outcome 
as in some way being what they want? A utilitarian can claim that the integrity of individual 
conceptions of the good is maintained as each enters equally into the determination of social 
choice. However, it is not true that this is a procedure neutral between, or favourable equally 
to, all conceptions of the good. 
Firstly, there is the fate of those who hold conceptions of the good which are 
conceptions of the common good. Such a conception might be one that says that the good 
life is essentially one where people pursue virtue together, within the setting of a society which 
is shaped around and supports such a life. There is no difficulty about this view entering into 
the utilitarian calculus as a desire or preference held by an individual. Of course, someone 
holding such a position might object that what they want brought about is their view about the 
good, and so far we don't have a reason for moving from this desire to the desire to bring 
about the greatest amount of pleasure or desire-satisfaction overall. But leaving that aside, 
there is a question whether such a conception of the good in essentially collective terms can 
even be conceived within a utilitarian framework, without, as Patrick Neal puts it, doing 
violence to the to the language of such a conception. 9 
For the holder of the collective conception it is essential to his view that it is not just 
one which an individual happens to prefer, but rather one that only has meaning if others hold 
and pursue it too. It is not just that he is advocating a conception which is applicable for 
everyone and not just him, but that its formulation involves essential reference to others and 
ends which can only be collectively, and not individually, pursued. If, for example, it is part of 
the good that we are engaged in shared political activity to shape society according to our 
collective will, then this is not a good which can be pursued individually, and nor is it meant 
just as a formulation reflecting my preferences, but as a belief about our essentially social 
0 Patrlci Neal, 'A Liberal Theory of the Good? ', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 17 (September 1987), 587-582. 
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natures. The point Neal is making is that liberalism - he is attacking both political liberalism 
and utilitarianism - cannot claim to be neutral between such different ways of conceiving the 
good. Liberalism inevitably involves conceiving the good in an individualistic way and in Neal's 
view liberals should defend their political views on the grounds of the rightness of such a 
conception. 
Now, political liberals can at least partly respond to this charge by using the distinction 
between the political and non-political realms and allowing collective conceptions of the good 
rein in the non-political realm, and they would give reasons why this is all the proponent of a 
collective view of the good can have. But utilitarianism cannot avail itself of this distinction. It 
cannot, therefore, be justified on the grounds that it treats all conceptions of the good equally: 
it rather only allows individualistic conceptions of the good. But then something substantive is 
being said about the nature of the good. 
This argument is similar to one made by Ronald Dworkin against utilitarianism. 10 He 
argues that one justification of utilitarianism is that it is impartial between conceptions of the 
good and so treats people as equals, each with an equal chance that their preferences will 
succeed in being adopted as social policy. However, preferences can be either personal, 
relating to one's own good, or external, referring to the goods and opportunities one wants 
others to have. If external preferences are counted, Dworkin says, then people are no longer 
being treated equally in the way we first thought: the chances of your preferences succeeding 
are now being affected by how others regard you. If you are black in a community of white 
racists your chances will be adversely affected. Utilitarianism therefore requires that only 
personal preferences are taken into account. But, Dworkin says, this cannot be done: often 
personal and external preferences are inextricably tied together, with the preference one 
want's for oneself being dependent upon external preferences: a preference that one lives in a 
whites-only community would be based upon a racist view which involves external preferences 
for the position and prospects of black people. So utilitarianism cannot be justified because it 
cannot in fact treat people equally. So on this view, as on Neal's, the utilitarian claim that it 
t0 See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London, 1977), pp. 234-7. 
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treats individuals equally, because their conception of the good enters equally into the 
utilitarian process of social choice, cannot be sustained. " 
Even if, however, utilitarians can refute these charges, and sustain the claim that the 
doctrine is based upon equal treatment, that would not be sufficient to show that therefore 
individuals should regard the outcome of a utilitarian process of social policy determination as 
morally legitimate. That would require showing that people should want both their own 
preference and whatever the process determines is of overall net benefit. A parallel is 
sometimes drawn between utilitarianism and majoritarian democracy, with each preference 
having one vote and the overall outcome being decided by the majority. 12 And just as there is 
the democratic paradox, about reconciling what I individually want with a desire that what the 
majority wants should be enacted, so there is a problem of reconciling my preference for what 
want and a desire that whatever on the utilitarian calculation is of overall net benefit should 
be enacted. 
The parallel is not exact, however, in several ways. One such way is that in 
majoritarian democracy you are not required to want X, where X is what the majority wants, 
but you are required to want whatever the majority wants to be enacted. You want X to be 
brought about, therefore, not because you want it but because the majority wants X and you 
want whatever the majority wants to be that which is brought about. You can still think that Y, 
your own preference on the matter, would be the better policy. But on the utilitarian view you 
must want X because X brings about the greatest net benefit overall. You can still think that Y 
would be in one sense the better policy, but you must also want the overall greatest happiness 
or satisfaction of desires, and that means wanting policy X which secures just that. The 
difference comes to this: the democrat thinks that Y is the better policy, but the best is that the 
majority decides what should be done, even if they favour a less good policy. To reconcile 
oneself to utilitarianism, however, you must think that the best policy is not your preference Y 
but whatever brings about the overall greatest amount of benefit, which turns out to be X. You 
must think that X is the better policy, and not just that it should be done rather than Y because 
"Of course, Dworkin argues that utilitarianism offends against the right of individuals to be treated as equals, whereas Neal advocates 
a different conception of the good. What unites them is their negative argument against the utilitarian claim to equal treatment of 
individuals and their beliefs, rather than their positive positions. 
"Jeremy Waldron discusses this parallel in his 'Rights and majorities: Rousseau revisited, ' Liberal Rights (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 392- 
421. 
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of another belief you have about the benefits of majority rule. You may personally prefer it if Y 
was done, but you accept that X should be done because the right thing to do is to bring about 
the greatest net benefit, to maximise the satisfaction of the good. 
If liberalism is to be justified on utilitarian grounds, therefore, quite aside from the 
issue of the contingency of such a justification, individuals must be prepared to want the 
overall good just as it emerges from a calculation of the overall net benefit. On the utilitarian 
account they must want this because the general good consists in the maximisation of 
individual preferences or desire-satisfaction. This means, not, as in the democracy parallel, 
abiding by the will of the majority, but seeing as good the overall net benefit conceived in this 
way. Now, presumably anyone will want more benefit rather than less. But what utilitarianism 
does is to trade on this desire, moving from individuals wanting more rather than less of 
whatever it is they hold to be good, to wanting more of goodness conceived as if it were a 
neutral or unitary property. This commits individuals to wanting the maximisation of some 
good which is not conceived in their own terms. This move is what Rawls refers to when he 
says "The most natural way, then, of arriving at utilitarianism .... Is to adopt 
for society as a 
whole the principle of rational choice for one man. "13 Utilitarianism, therefore, involves a claim 
that what the good for society consists in is the promotion of whatever constitutes the overall 
net benefit in a process whereby this is calculated irrespective of the content of individual 
conceptions of the good. Individuals will be reconciled to this only if they accept the move 
from wanting the good as they themselves conceive it to wanting the overall good as it is 
conceived in this indeterminate way. 
The fundamental problem with utilitarianism as a justification of liberalism, therefore, 
is that it involves individuals wanting the overall good to be brought about, when that good is 
likely to be conceived in different terms from the good they personally believe in. They must 
therefore believe both in the good conceived in their own terms and in this general good, the 
terms and content of which is not known in advance. This is even more serious than the 
charge made by Neal about how utilitarian liberalism does violence to non - Individualistic 
conceptions of the good. For now, even if this problem about individualism does not affect 
you, you are still committed to a view about the overall good which is likely to be different from 
trawls. op. cit.. pp. 26-7. 
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the one you personally hold. The utilitarian justification of liberalism can only succeed, 
therefore, if it can be shown that this conception of the overall good is one we should hold and 
one which should over-ride our own personal conceptions. 
The basic utilitarian claim is that wanting the overall good conceived in this way is in 
the interests of everyone. The greatest happiness, or the overall net greatest satisfaction of 
desires, is what we should want, and we should want it because it is in each of our interests to 
want it. I have mentioned above some doubts about whether conceiving of the good in this 
way can be made consistent with the equal treatment of each of our interests, but I have not 
argued that these objections cannot be met. Nor am I going to do so. Rather, what appears 
at this point is that structurally utilitarianism does indeed become a form of perfectionism. It 
differs from the latter in that it does not have a substantive theory of the good. However, it 
does conceive of the general or common good in a particular way, as overall maximisation, 
and it justifies that conception on grounds of being in the interests or to the benefit of all. To 
that extent its defence as a justification of liberalism lies in the soundness, not only of the 
particular claims it makes about the nature of the general good, which the arguments of Neal 
and Dworkin address, but more fundamentally on whether the strategy of looking for a 
particular conception of the good can succeed as a basis for justifying political authority. That 
is the general question to be asked about perfectionism, which at this structural level we can 
now see includes utilitarianism within its scope. We can return to the arguments about the 
particular way utilitarians conceive the good if it appears this perfectionist strategy can 
succeed. My argument will be, however, that it fails, and if the strategy falls then so does 
utilitarianism, as well as other more straightforwardly perfectionist theories. It is to this 
argument against the general strategy of perfectionism that I now turn. 
4.2 PERFECTIONISM 
Liberalism and human perfection 
Perfectionism is a moral theory urging us to maximise whatever contributes to human 
excellence or flourishing. It can derive its conception of human flourishing either from an 
account of properties constitutive of human nature, as in the traditional Aristotelian view, or 
more broadly from considerations of human capacities which may be biologically or socially 
85 
based. " It therefore has an objective conception of the human good, and holds that we ought 
to pursue this good regardless of our present inclinations. '5 
What is distinctively liberal about this approach, when it is used to support liberalism, 
is that the good which is affirmed Is one which allows room for, indeed in some way underpins, 
the pursuit by individuals of their own particular and more substantive conceptions of the 
good. Thus the conception of the good which is affirmed in such accounts is not a fully 
specified theory of what the good is for persons, which spells out a full account of desirable 
human ends. Rather, the conception of the good is that individuals should be free to pursue 
their own conceptions of ends. It is affirming this as a good which distinguishes perfectionist 
from contractualist justifications of liberalism. Thus, for example, Joseph Raz argues that in 
societies such as ours which are generally characterised by conditions of moral pluralism then 
it is possible to show that human well-being requires personal autonomy. 16 The Ideal of 
personal autonomy has powerful attractions and can exist, Raz holds, independently of social 
conditions'. But in modern industrial and post-industrial societies human well-being can only 
be secured through autonomy: "For those who live in an autonomy-supporting environment 
there is no choice but to be autonomous: there is no other way to prosper in such a society"te 
The ideal of personal autonomy in Raz is essentially that "people should make their 
own lives»19. Making one's own life involves freely choosing one's goals and relations with 
other people, as opposed to having others making those choices for you, or being coerced, or 
drifting through life without making choices. Individuals can be autonomous to a greater or 
lesser extent, and it is not part of the ideal of personal autonomy that the degree of autonomy 
be maximised, with every aspect of one's life being chosen. Rather the Ideal refers to a 
characterisation of the basic path of a person's life. Raz's ideal is, it seems, sufficiently 
realised if a person freely makes those decisive choices which shape the overall course of 
their life. Whether you exercise your capacity for autonomy in respect of those choices which 
'" See Thomas Hurka, Pen'ectionism (New York, 1993), pp. 3-4, for this distinction between what he calls respectively 'narrow' and 
'broad' versions of perfectionism. Unfortunately for our purposes, Hurka concentrates mainly on the narrower version, which grounds 
perfection upon claims about human nature. This means he does not discuss the perfectionists, like Raz and Galston, who are most 
Influential in the contemporary debate but fall into the broad camp. 
Ibid., p. 17. 
~ Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford, 1986), pp. 390-395. 
"Ibid., p. 370: it would be wrong to Identify the Ideal [of personal autonomy] with the ability to cope with the shifting dunes of modem 
society'. 
"Ibid., p. 391. 
19 Ibid., p. 369. 
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are less significant is a matter for you, and does not affect the characterisation of you as being 
an autonomous person, nor does it fundamentally affect your well-being. Indeed, it seems a 
possibility that over-exercise of autonomy, an obsessive insistence on freely choosing every 
detail of life, could damage well-being. 
If, however, an autonomous life is to be possible, then there must be a plurality of 
possible goods available for us to choose from. Raz defends a value-pluralism which holds 
that there are many possible good lives, and that no one person can live a life which exhibits 
all the virtues. Maintaining a range of choices is necessary if we are to live autonomously. 
But why should we want to do that? Autonomy may require that there be a plurality of goods 
from which to choose, but the existence of a range of conceptions of the good does not itself 
require us to be autonomous: we may follow tradition rather than freely choose. An 
autonomous life has been an option in past societies, and it is not that it is not possible to live 
a non-autonomous life in modern society. Rather it is that our lives will not go well unless we 
live them autonomously. 
In modern societies, Raz says, autonomy is an intrinsic constituent of well-being. This 
is because the social environment in which we live is itself constituted by institutions and 
practices which have become ones where individual choice is inherent. There is no necessity 
that social forms be that way, but they are so here and now, and so success In pursuing 
individual destinies through these social forms - and there is no where else to live - 
necessarily involves choice. Raz gives two examples of what he means: conventions of 
marriage have changed from a norm of arranged marriage to one of free individual choice of 
partner, and increasingly indeed of forms of bonding beyond traditional heterosexual pair- 
bonding; and the nature and value of work has changed from a situation where the norm was 
to undertake the work one's parent did to one where free choice of occupation is the norm20. 
These areas of life, marriage and work are two of the most decisive in determining how one's 
life goes. That they and other key areas are increasingly constituted in terms of choice is part 
of the social environment over which individuals have no control. Individuals can only prosper 
" Ibid.. pp. 392-3. Raz arguably over-simplifies pre-modem patterns of work: for example, In aristocratic families there might be 
different expectations for younger brothers than from the eldest. Girls would of course be expected to marry. Moreover even In quite 
recent times In advanced industrial societies following in one's parents' footsteps has often been the norm: In many places successive 
generations went to work in the local factory, mine, or shipyard. it is only in the last two decades that these patterns have nearly 
disappeared as Industrial change has speeded up. And some occupations, especially in the communications media, still seem 
remarkably susceptible to family dynasties. 
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by successful participation in these institutions. Therefore they can only prosper by exercising 
their capacity for free choice. So the exercise of personal autonomy is not a freely chosen 
good, even though the more particular ends an individual pursues will in a good life be freely 
chosen, at least in the instances of the most significant choices. 
Perfectionist ideals and the state 
Raz's theory, then, is an example of perfectionist liberalism, where liberalism is 
grounded upon a distinctive account of human well-being as requiring personal autonomy. 
What are the consequences for politics of this account? Firstly, the moral value of autonomy 
generates, Raz argues, certain moral duties. From the value of autonomy it follows that there 
is reason for each person to make themselves and everyone else autonomous. But it is 
impossible to make another person autonomous, since autonomy is intrinsically the exercise 
of free choice. What one can do, however, is foster the development in others of the capacity 
for autonomy, and this is what each of us, for Raz, has a duty to do. These duties comprise 
not coercing or manipulating others, helping them to develop the abilities of reason, 
imagination, and so on required for autonomy, and creating a sufficient range of options from 
which choices can be made21. 
These moral duties therefore go beyond the duty of non-interference with others, 
which has often been taken to be the only duty implied by liberal theories of individual 
freedom. Indeed, Raz argues that negative freedom in the sense of freedom from coercion 
gains its value from the contribution it makes to personal autonomy. Some interferences may 
be trivial while others may even be helpful to autonomy22. What Raz seems to mean by the 
latter thought is that since our concern with autonomy derives from our prior concern with well- 
being, interference to remove an option which does not contribute to our well-being is 
consistent with autonomy and may even improve our ability to exercise it, for example by 
removing a temptation to which we might otherwise be prone. If smoking damages my well- 
being then preventing me from smoking serves to at least not make my life any less 
worthwhile then it already is, and to make it more worthwhile than it would be if I smoked. And 
if I am liable to give in to the temptation to smoke if the option is before me, because of a 
 Ibid., pp. 407-8. 
27 Ibid, P. 419. 
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tendency to physical or psychological addiction to tobacco, even though I know that it 
damages my well-being, then removing the option from those from which I can choose in that 
particular situation will render me better able to exercise my capacity for free choice (if I do not 
know that smoking damages my well-being then the preferable option may be to educate me 
so that I can perhaps learn to resist the temptation myself. That would lead to a higher degree 
of autonomy). 
Now, Raz takes the view that it is the job of the state as well as of individuals to carry 
out moral duties. This is because, in short, "perfectionist ideals require public action for their 
viability"23. We have seen that for Raz personal well-being is grounded upon the existence of 
the social forms which support it. A person can only prosper if they pursue goals which are 
grounded in existing social forms (which is not to say that individuals cannot sometimes go 
creatively beyond those social forms, but the forms must always be their starting point), which 
involves both the availability of those forms and the appropriate orientation of individuals to 
them. In modern society that means personal autonomy. The creation of a range of options 
adequate for the exercise of free choice, and the provision of the conditions for autonomy to 
exist in terms of cognitive capacity and so on, both of which we have seen are for Raz moral 
duties, both require public action if they are to be achieved. And for Raz there is no barrier to 
such action being state action, rather than, say, the action of voluntary civil associations. He 
rejects the view that the state should stand aside from ideals of individual morality. Instead, 
he says, "it is the goal of all political action to enable individuals to pursue valid conceptions of 
the good and to discourage evil or empty ones"24. 
What this means for the exercise of political authority is that the state is bound by the 
well-known liberal principle, first advocated by Mill, known as the harm principle. This 
principle, in Mill's hands, says that the state can only coerce individuals in order to prevent 
harm to others. But Raz gives the principle a wider interpretation: the state can only coerce 
individuals to prevent harm to anyone, that is, including the harm a person may do to his or 
her self. This extension to the harm principle, Raz argues, follows from the notion of 
autonomy-based duties. Harm is caused by not following these duties: "One harms another 
» Ibid., P. 162. 
24 Ibid., p. 133. 
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by failing in one's duty to him, even though this is a duty to improve his situation and the failure 
does not leave him worse off than he was before "2S. So one causes harm to people, among 
other things, by not promoting their capacity for autonomy and by not providing options for 
them to choose among, and this extended understanding of the harm principle governs the 
actions of states: "... if the government has a duty to promote the autonomy of people the harm 
principle allows it to use coercion both in order to stop people from actions which would 
diminish people's autonomy and in order to force them to take actions which are required to 
improve peoples' options and opportunities»2e. 
The harm principle thereby becomes a principle of how the state should promote the 
well-being of individuals. But that is not the limit of the permissible activity of the state. The 
promotion of well-being also means that the state should promote worthwhile ways of life and 
discourage worthless ones. If, Raz says, the state can act on the moral reasons embodied in 
the harm principle then there is no reason why it cannot act on reasons arising from the rest of 
morality. But, he says, the harm principle does limit the use by the state of its coercive power. 
It can promote valuable ways of life and discourage others but only by non-coercive means 
such as subsidies, rewards, publicity, and so on. 21 The reason for this restriction is that 
coercive imposition of ways of life is incompatible with the promotion of personal autonomy. It 
would undermine personal independence and is likely to interfere not just with the individual's 
choice of what is not valuable but also with their capacity to choose the valuable. So the 
perfectionist state should promote the autonomy of individuals, for which it can (but does not 
have to) use coercive means, and also promote worthwhile ways of life, but by non-coercive 
means only. 
Raz's theory is the most sophisticated of recent accounts of perfectionist liberalism. 
Another theory is that of William Galston. His view is that it is impossible for a liberal theory to 
avoid relying upon a substantive account of the good. Galston's account of the good again 
centres upon the value of individual autonomy. At its minimum, he says, a liberal cannot avoid 
affirming three basic goods: human existence in itself, humans conceived as having purposes, 
and the fulfilment of those purposes. 28 But, he says, because any justification of liberalism 
21 lbid., P. 418. 
u lb d., P. 418. 
'? Ibid., P. 417. 
"William A. Gatston, 'Defending Liberalism, American Political Science Review. 76 (1982), pp. 625426. 
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must affirm at least that much, it is already in the business of justifying liberalism on the basis 
of a theory of the good, and so should avail itself of a full-blown theory. 
Against the objection that there is reason to base the justification on only a minimal 
account of the good, because of the general acceptability of that account compared to the 
more controversial fuller theory, Galston argues that this dividing line is purely arbitrary. His 
reasons for saying this appear to be two-fold. Firstly, he finds himself mystified by the 
proposition that we can have knowledge of the good which can be used in political justification, 
but only up to a point: if we can proceed on the assumption that existence is preferable to 
non-existence, that fulfilment of purposes is preferable to non-fulfilment, then why are we not 
free to enter into the full range of traditional arguments about the good life? On the basis of 
what epistemological considerations do we draw the line between objectivity and subjectivity 
just where liberal theorists wish to draw it? "29. 
Secondly, and less rhetorically, he holds that the liberal account of the good is 
contestable all the way down, that even the minimal notion can be challenged, for example by 
those who put death higher than life for reasons of a concept of honour or of religious faith. 
So, Galston concludes, liberals cannot avoid advancing a controversial account of the good, 
and so should advance the strongest argument they can. That means putting forward a full 
theory of the good, encompassing elements such as the value of individual development of 
potential capacities, of happiness, and of rationality. For Galston individual freedom is only 
valuable as a means, unless it is identified with self-development30. Thus for Galston the state 
should promote this view of the good, for example by providing a wide range of opportunities 
for self-development. 
Non-neutrality and the justification of coercion 
What unites both Galston and Raz is a similarity, but not identity, of views of individual 
well-being; the view that individual well-being depends upon the existence of social forms 
which support it; and an advocacy of the legitimate role of the state in promoting through both 
coercive and non-coercive means the particular substantive view of well-being. Both have 
» Ibid., p. 828. 
30 William A. Galston, Justice and the Human Good (Chicago, 1980), pp. 97-99. 
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been described as communitarian liberals31 because of their concern that the state should 
promote a conception of the common good, and their grounding of Individual well-being In 
such a common good, so that individuals cannot prosper unless they are supported In the right 
way by the wider community. Hence individual and community are entwined. But they are 
distinguished from the communitarians I considered earlier in Chapter Two, among other 
differences, by the account of political legitimacy which they offer. Those communitarians, it 
will be recalled, justified political authority on the grounds of the obligation we had to the 
institutions which had constituted our identity. Raz and Galston, however, want to claim that 
their conception of the good in terms of autonomy is objectively true, and should be pursued, 
irrespective of the moral conceptions reflected in existing social structures. Although Raz 
draws attention to the nature of social forms in determining what constitutes human 
flourishing, we do not have an obligation to pursue the ideal of personal autonomy because 
we have been formed by those social forms. Indeed, Raz wants to argue that we should 
pursue autonomy as a moral ideal even if we have come from cultures and traditions where 
autonomy has not been valued. His argument is one that if we have been brought up in a 
caste society we should give up that inheritance because it is not the way to flourish in the 
modern world. 
These arguments for the ideal of personal autonomy are not meant just as ideals of 
personal morality but as justifications of liberalism. That means that the use of political 
authority on the basis of this conception of the good has to be justified. The standard 
objection made by political liberals to perfectionists such as Raz and Galston is that basing 
political institutions upon such a conception of the good inevitably leads to coercion, because 
the ideal will not be acceptable to everyone and cannot rationally be made so. Disagreement 
about the good is reasonable and hence government on the basis of a particular conception of 
the good involves coercion of those who do not share this conception. The perfectionists do 
not shrink from this conclusion. We have seen that Raz is prepared to allow the state to 
promote autonomy through coercive means if these are appropriate, and Galston argues 
against Rawls' political liberalism that the state cannot avoid taking a stand on controversial 
issues, risking discord and even civil war - the issues he cites are slavery, which led to the 
" For example, by Richard Bellamy, Liberalism and Modem Society (Cambridge, 1992) pp. 244-248. Galston was involved in drafting 
fhe'Responsive Communitarian Platform' in the USA: see Amital Etzioni, The Spirit of Community (New York, 1993) p. 251. 
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American Civil War to defend equal rights, and the contemporary issue of abortion, where he 
says the supposed permissive neutrality liberalism would justify over the issue involves taking 
an implicit stance that abortion is not murder, since the state non-controversially prohibits 
murder, and yet this is just the point at issue. 32 So to say that perfectionism implies coercion 
is not a sufficient argument against it. 
Raz and Galston believe that the use of coercion in pursuit of moral ends is legitimate. 
So the need is to consider what it is that makes it legitimate. Galston, as we have just seen, 
holds that the use of coercion is unavoidable, since controversial issues cannot be kept off the 
political agenda. But still we might say that the state should minimise coercion, and seek to 
avoid controversy wherever possible. Galston's argument is that if the state cannot avoid 
taking a stand on some questions of the good there is no reason why it should not embrace a 
full conception. But the avoidance of undue civil strife may well be such a reason. Moreover, 
there is a difference between being unable to avoid taking a stand on some issues, and 
positively promoting a controversial conception of the good as perfectionists do. What Is 
required is a justification of the use of political authority to promote, by force if necessary, a 
particular conception of the good, and it is this which Raz tries to provide. 
Perfectionist limits on political authority 
I have already mentioned that Raz does not think that the state has unbridled licence 
to use force in pursuit of morally justified ends. The justification of government action is the 
promotion of individual freedom and autonomy. But if government action is likely to lessen, 
not strengthen, freedom and autonomy then that action is morally illicit. In practice, Raz says, 
governments are prone to the weaknesses of centralised bureaucracies such as inadequate 
information, the temptation to corruption, the willingness to brush aside individuals for the 
greater good. We should be unwilling to trust governments with too much power, although the 
degree of trustworthiness, and the areas where governments can be relied upon, varies from 
country to country. This limitation on the power of governments to promote freedom and 
autonomy derives from those very values, and as such represents the application of the 
32 William A. Galston, 'Pluralism and Social Unity, ' Ethics, 99 (July 1989), p. 721. R seems to me that political liberals do have to 
concede that at least there can be reasonable disagreement over whether abortion Is murder, to which an opponent of abortion can 
respond that even if it just may be murder, still the state should not licence It. It does seem hard to see the state as not taking some 
sort of positive stance here. 
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doctrine in conditions which fall short of the ideal: "The extended freedom from governmental 
action is based on the practical inability of governments to discharge their duty to serve the 
freedom of their subjects"33 
A similar limitation on the use of political authority to promote freedom and autonomy 
arises from another practical consideration, fear of civil strife. To the degree to which there is 
no consensus around the value of individual freedom and autonomy the possibility exists of 
attempts to follow policies based upon those values being counterproductive, leading to civil 
strife and an overall reduction in freedom and autonomy. In areas of policy where this result is 
likely then concern for these values will lead not to government imposition of policies based 
upon them but to compromise with other values. Hence for reasons both of fear of 
government and of civil strife perfectionist values will support a limitation on the powers of 
government. This is a traditional liberal position but the grounds for it are not traditional: 
freedom for government is a freedom of imperfection, but grounded upon a morality of 
perfection. T` 
In developing this interpretation of the grounds for freedom of government Raz is 
challenging much traditional liberalism which sees itself just as the doctrine of limited 
government, protecting the freedom of private individuals from public and state interference. 
He thus seeks to express a different relation between individual and the state than in 
traditional liberalism, where politics and individual freedom are often seen as opposed values, 
and government a necessary but regrettable limitation upon freedom. In Raz's political 
philosophy freedom and autonomy are the values which should guide action both for 
individuals and for governments. Where freedom and autonomy are best promoted by 
government action then such action is morally licit, while the limitation upon government action 
stems from the same grounds. The boundaries of legitimate state action are not given in 
advance: whether the best way to advance freedom and autonomy is by government action or 
by leaving individuals free to act is to be determined in concrete circumstances, not by a priori 
argument. 
"Raz. op. cit., p. 428. 
14 Ibid.. P. 429. 
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The Justification of political authority in perfectionism 
Raz therefore argues for a basic unity in moral purpose between individuals and the 
state. Underlying this position is an argument about the legitimate basis and justification of 
political authority. From where does the moral legitimacy of political authority stem, according 
to Raz? The function of governments is given by the 'service conception' of authority, that its 
role is to serve the governed. How do governments serve the governed? They do so by 
helping individuals better to act on reasons for action which anyway apply to them, but which 
they could not perform so well without the support of authority. This position is broken down 
into a number of theses. Firstly, the 'dependence thesis' says that authorities should, and can 
with moral legitimacy, only issue directives which are "based on reasons which already 
independently apply to the subjects of the directives and are relevant to their action in the 
circumstances covered by the directive" 35. The role of authorities is therefore only to help 
subjects better act on reason. Their role is not to try to get individuals to do what they do not 
already have reason to do, although of course people may not recognise what it is they have 
reason to do. 
This leads to the 'normal justification thesis', that authority is only justified when by 
following the directives of an authority an individual is better likely to comply with the reasons 
he has independently of the authority than if he went it alone and tried to act himself directly on 
his reason. 36 The dependence and normal justification theses together constitute the service 
conception of authority. They lead to a further thesis, the'pre-emptive thesis', that the 
directives of a legitimate authority are to be accepted as sufficiently action-guiding without 
further deliberation about what to do (although deliberation about the merits of the case are 
not excluded - one must act on the command of a legitimate authority but needn't stop 
thinking)37. One acts not on grounds of the reasons for the action being a right one 
independently of authority, nor is the authoritative directive simply another reason for acting 
additional to those one already has, but the directive replaces and pre-empts any other 
considerations as to what to do. This is because a legitimate authoritative directive is based 
only upon reasons which independently apply to the subjects of the authority and is only 
Ibid., p. 47. 
Ibid.. p. 53. 
"Ibid., p. 48. 
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legitimate when the use of authority improves the chances of subjects conforming with those 
reasons - the dependence and normal justification theses. In that case one's interests are 
best served by obeying the authority without bringing any other considerations to bear. 
This implies that in accepting an authority one is committing oneself In advance to 
accepting its rule over a period of time and over a range of matters. It is not the case that In 
each instance each individual has to decide whether a command is legitimate. That is the 
point of the pre-emptive thesis: if accepting an authority will better enable you to act as you 
have reason to act then you have sufficient reason to act as the authority commands without 
pausing to consider each case on its merits. Of course one should be vigilant and reflect on 
the general course an authority is taking. If an authority makes a mistake that does not nullify 
its justification as long as continuing to accept the authority Is In one's interests. If however an 
authority is no longer in general acting on the reasons its subjects have independently then its 
authority loses moral legitimacy. 
If, however, an authority can only command on the basis of reasons which its subjects 
already have then what difference does the existence of authority make? Raz insists that what 
he terms (at the risk of thesis overload) the 'no difference thesis', that is that "the exercise of 
authority should make no difference to what its subjects ought to do "38 , is not implied by the 
dependence thesis. Authorities, particularly governments, can do things which individuals on 
their own have reason to do but cannot do alone, or cannot do so well. Thus governments 
can establish conventions where two alternative courses of action are equally reasonable, 
such as whether to pay taxes monthly or quarterly, or where there are co-ordination problems 
where we each have reason to do what everyone else does, for example driving on the same 
side of the road. They are also required in Prisoner's Dilemma situations where the situation 
of individuals determines their reason to act but where each acting alone cannot bring about 
the situation which is most favourable to them39. The use of political authority can also be 
justified by considerations such as the superior wisdom in some cases of governments in 
deciding how individuals should act; the costs of time, energy and resources in making such 
decisions; and the greater effectiveness sometimes of indirect rather than direct strategies in 
"Ibid., D. 48. 
so Ibid., pp. 48-51. 
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achieving some goals40. Thus governments can make a difference even while only acting on 
dependent reasons (reasons given by the dependence thesis). 
Raz's account of legitimate political authority directly connects to his advocacy of a 
political morality of individual freedom and morality. As we have seen Raz argues that 
individuals have a reason to act to promote freedom and autonomy, because that is how to 
flourish in modern society. In some cases government action can best help them realise 
these values. In those cases government wields legitimate authority. In other cases it 
doesn't, either because individuals can do better on their own or because of the practical 
limitations on the ability of governments which I mentioned above. The normal justification 
thesis thus does not support the normal unlimited claims to authority which governments 
make for themselves. It can also lead to a piecemeal effect throughout society since some 
individuals might do better for themselves while others on the same issue profit from the help 
of government. This effect can, however, be mitigated by the desirability of individuals 
identifying with a relatively just community. This attitude of identification can be expressed in 
terms of an act of consent to the authority of the state or a feeling of respect for the law. So 
individuals can voluntarily take upon themselves a more general obligation to conform with 
political authority than simple consideration of the normal justification thesis would indicate. 
Such an extension of legitimacy is however itself justified by that thesis since it is only justified 
if identification with society is morally valuable. Moreover it is not morally binding on subjects 
and cannot be required of them. 
The conclusion Raz draws from this is that there is no general moral obligation to 
accept the authority of governments. The authority even a just government has over 
individuals varies. On social co-ordination issues its authority is extensive. On other matters 
its authority over individuals depends upon the competence of individuals, which may vary, 
and on whether people have volunteered their consent to authority or respect of the law. But 
moral authority is not the only reason for conformity. Individuals are affected by government 
action whether or not they are subject to its authority, through its manipulation of resources 
and the environment. Moreover a government's command of the legal system generates 
prudential reasons for obedience. 
10Ibld., D. 75. 
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Perfection versus consensus: Raz's critique of Rawls 
On Raz's account, then, both the moral legitimacy of political authority and the limits to 
that legitimacy are given by reference to the same set of moral considerations, which is a view 
as to what values people rationally should pursue. In the modern world these are the values 
of freedom and autonomy. This understanding of moral legitimacy and the justification of 
liberalism is thus very different from that of Rawls. Raz is horrified by the possible 
consequence of basing legitimacy upon acceptability to all that it may lead to the endorsement 
of "highly wicked" principles as a society's conception of justice". By this he seems to mean 
that in reaching agreement upon principles for political association people in the overriding 
interest of seeking agreement may in fact do great harm to the prospects of their realising 
their conception of the good, while perhaps aiding other conceptions which they may see as 
immoral. 
Raz attacks Rawls, and other liberals like Thomas Nagel, for advocating what he 
terms "epistemic abstinence" 42. This is, he says, to be distinguished from the familiar liberal 
position that the truth of reasons individuals may have for action does not justify government 
relying upon the same reasons for action. Rather, it is the view that "governments should be 
unconcerned with the truth of the very views (the doctrine of justice) which inform their policies 
and actions" 43. The truth of a conception of justice for Rawls, he says, must be grounded in a 
full view of the good, or, as the later Rawls would say, in a comprehensive moral doctrine. But 
if the conception is to be acceptable to all it cannot be grounded on any one such full view of 
the good or comprehensive doctrine. Thus, Raz alleges, the overall goal for Rawls is to 
establish a basis for social stability and unity. But, Raz says, why are these goals important? 
The answer he gives is because they are valuable. And to advocate any conception of 
justice for our society is to recommend it as truly the conception for us. "If it is argued that 
what makes it the theory of justice for us is that it is built on an overlapping consensus and 
therefore secures stability and unity, then consensus-based stability and unity are the values 
" Ibid., p. 129. 
"Joseph Raz, 'Facing Diversity. The Case of Epistemic Abstinence, ' Ethics In the Public Domain (Oxford, 1994), pp. 45-81. 43 Ibid., p. 48. 
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that a theory of justice, for our society, is assumed to depend on...... There can be no justice 
without truth "45 . 
It is not clear, however, that Rawls needs to deny either of these points. It Is, as I 
have argued, mistaken to take Rawls' basic project as being a non-moral one. Rather It is a 
project of political legitimacy, conceived as being acceptability to all of the basic principles of 
political association. The moral importance of social stability and unity is that they exemplify 
this conception of political legitimacy. Far from this showing what Raz calls Rawls' "shallow 
foundations', basing his theory only in the public common culture46, Rawls' account is based 
upon the bedrock of a conception of the necessity for a moral life of living in a community with 
which one is fundamentally in harmony, through its being based upon a moral principle one 
accepts for oneself -a view, fundamentally, of what it is to be free. Neither need Rawls deny 
that his conception of justice is true for our society. It is true, if his argument works, because it 
is the conception which is legitimate, which is acceptable to all. Of course, what Rawls is 
concerned to deny is that this particular conception of justice is true in any more absolute or 
transcendent sense. It is not true for all places and all times, and the reason for this derives 
from the same moral principle which makes it true for us here and now, if it is true - that it is 
acceptable to all to whom it is meant to apply. It would not be true for others because it would 
not meet the moral criterion of acceptability to all of them. 
In what way, then, is Raz at odds with Rawls? The difference is seemingly clear cut 
enough. Whereas for Rawls government must act on a conception of justice and eschew 
action justified with reference to a comprehensive moral or religious doctrine, Raz sees the 
grounds and limits of governmental action as being given by such a doctrine. Underlying this 
difference is a different conception of political legitimacy. Whereas Rawls is concerned to 
meet the liberal principle of legitimacy, where political authority is justified by its acceptability to 
all, for Raz the justification of political authority is given by the normal justification thesis, that 
political authority is justified if it better enables a person to conform with reasons which 
independently apply to him. This thesis relies in turn upon the dependence thesis, that any 
authority can only command on the basis of reasons which already independently apply to the 
46 Ibid., p. 55. 
49 Ibid., P. 49. 
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subjects of the command. In brief, political authority is justified if and only if it helps people do 
better what they have reason to do anyway. This is the service conception of authority. 
Political action by state institutions is instrumental to the interests of individuals. What Is In the 
interests of individuals may vary in different societies but it can be objectively known, because 
social forms determine what values an individual needs to conform to if their life Is to go well. 
Thus in modern Western society not only the number of opportunities offered to Individuals but 
also the very character of those opportunities supports autonomous ways of life and fails to 
support non-autonomous ones47. A determinate answer can therefore be given to the 
question of when government action is morally legitimate. It does not follow, though, that 
everyone has sufficient reason to accept and conform with political authority which acts to 
promote autonomy since, as we have seen, the effect of this conception of political legitimacy 
in determining an obligation to obey is uneven - not everyone's life will always go better if 
governments act in particular aspects, although the lives of some might. But there are 
important areas, notably social co-ordination problems, where everyone has sufficient reason 
to accept authority. 
The fundamental difference between Raz and Rawls, therefore, is that whereas for 
Rawls political legitimacy is ultimately a matter of finding a common basis for consensus, for 
Raz it is a matter of determining what objectively is the good for human beings in the modern 
world and taking that as the basis for determining the grounds and limits of governmental 
action. But what arguments does Raz give to justify his view of political legitimacy? I now turn 
to that question. 
Can a perfectionist political morality be justified? 
I have already sketched the main points of Raz's theory of political authority. The key 
aspects are the propositions that authorities cannot legitimately act on reasons people would 
not already have (the dependence thesis) and that they cannot legitimately act on such 
reasons unless by their doing so individuals are better able to conform to the reasons which 
they already have (the normal justification thesis). What arguments does Raz give for these 
propositions? 
41 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, pp. 391.392. 
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His main positive arguments are two arguments from analogy from the case of 
arbitration in practical disputes48 and that of theoretical authorities49. The arbitrator reaches a 
decision based upon the reasons the parties to the dispute already had. He sums them up, 
perhaps see them and their implications more clearly, and weighs them against each other. 
Similarly a theoretical expert reaches his conclusion on the same evidence as I should have 
reached my own conclusion, the difference being that he is better able to reach conclusions 
which are likely to be sound than I am. Raz admits that there is no proof that practical 
authorities such as governments have the same structure, but he thinks it likely, and therefore 
the dependence thesis will also apply. The normal justification thesis is similarly supported: 
the parallel drawn is with the giving of advice, where one accepts advice normally because it is 
likely to be sound50. As with arbitration and theoretical authority, you accept their decision 
because in relevant ways doing so is likely to enable you better to reach an outcome one 
wants in any case. 
Coupled with these arguments Raz seeks to remove some possible objections. One 
we have seen is the no difference thesis, that authority so conceived makes no difference to 
the reasons agents have to act. The reply to that was that it made possible actions which 
individuals had reason to want but could not achieve on their own. Another objection Raz 
discusses is that there is a need to distinguish between adjudicative authorities, such as an 
arbitrator or expert, and legislative authorities. The latter give their subjects new reasons to 
act. Thus for example prior to the passing of the appropriate law citizens had no reason to 
pay the tax the law now empowers state officials to collects'. To which Raz's reply is, firstly, 
that in at least some cases the moral legitimacy of a law derives from the moral correctness of 
what the law enforces: a law requiring parents to provide for their children is only justified 
because parents already had this moral duty (and, by implication, the passing of the law better 
enables them to fulfil this duty, perhaps by discouraging backsliding or by helping keep a 
sense of priority amongst conflicting pressures)52. As for the tax example, Raz says, if the 
purpose for which the tax is to be collected is justified then we already had a reason to pay up 
voluntarily before the law was passed. The effect of passing the law is to set up a machinery 
"Ibid., pp. 41-42. 
~ Ibid., pp. 52.53 
10 Ibid., pp. 53-54. 
Ibid., p. 43, 
u Ibid., pp. 4344. 
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for collecting the money and to try to exclude free riders and to bind doubters. Passing the 
law better achieves the objectives which the money is for but it does not create new 
objectives 
The case for Raz's conception of political legitimacy is therefore suggestive rather 
than conclusive. The objection which Rawls would raise to the conception is that in the 
absence of consensus on what way of life it is that constitutes human well-being even In 
contemporary societies then the imposition of political authority based upon such a conception 
of well-being will lead to coercion of those who disagree with it. Raz would not dissent from 
that conclusion but neither, as I have said, would he shirk from it. Coercion is only justified to 
prevent harm, but as we have seen on his view preventing harm is not just freedom from 
coercion but promoting autonomy. Moreover governments can act in ways which do not 
involve infringing the autonomy of those who disagree with it, by propaganda, say, rather than 
enforcing laws. Finally, the consideration of promoting autonomy limits the degree to which 
governments should act to promote it if doing so involves such a degree of coercion that 
overall autonomy is damaged rather than advanced. 
Rawls' point, however, cuts deeper. He is fundamentally saying that a society can 
only become a moral community if its basic principles are those which each person within the 
community can endorse for themselves. For Raz it is the truth of the moral values which basic 
principles embody which determine the moral standing of the community: a society has the 
basis for being a moral community if it promotes the well-being of its members. Each person 
should in full rationality endorse this conception of well-being and there are no moral grounds 
for compromising with other views in the interests of social peace, although the existence of 
other views will determine how the founding principles are best to be advanced in practice, 
and compromise may be necessary but only if that is the best way to advance the true 
founding principles. I have criticised Rawls' argument not because his principle of legitimacy 
is fundamentally mistaken but on the grounds that fulfilling it depends upon the pre-existence 
of a social mechanism for discovering and constructing a basis for agreement and for mutual 
assurance that there is agreement and precisely on what. In other words the starting point for 
a moral community cannot be agreement on principles but agreement on a search for them. 
0 Ibid., pp. 45-46. 
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Raz's view bases political legitimacy on one particular claim to the truth of a foundational 
moral principle. It would of course fit perfectly as an argument within the sort of search for 
moral principles which I have envisaged. But Raz does not take it in that way. On his view 
political authority is only justified if it is based upon a true view of what constitutes human 
flourishing in appropriate social conditions. 
I think Raz's position is, however, not satisfactory as an account of political legitimacy. 
Basing legitimacy upon truth can appear attractive. Part of its power comes from the power of 
the idea of truth. After all, what trumps truth? Why should what is true give way to or 
compromise with what is not? We might bring in prudential arguments here about the 
necessity of compromise for social peace but Raz's response would be that compromises 
have to be determined by the same principles one is trying to advance. He is willing to 
compromise but only when compromise is the best way to promote well-being. I have argued 
that the banner of truth is not sufficient, however, to distinguish the position of Raz from that of 
Rawls. It is what sort of truth upon which governments should be based which is in question. 
It has been suggested that Rawls does have a minimal view of what makes life go best, not 
just by opponents such as Galston but friends such as KymlickaTM. If his fundamental position 
is that of freedom does not that too need justifying? On this account Rawls ends up looking 
like a perfectionist with an account that humans flourish when they are free. But on what 
grounds is this supposed to be true? Rawls never makes this clear. I have suggested that 
the basic thought is that a basic condition of a moral community is that we live according to 
laws we would prescribe ourselves, and hence arises the task of reconciling the coercive use 
of political authority with our moral beliefs. 
The trouble with Rawls, however, I argued, was with the notion that this project could 
be successfully achieved on the basis of agreement upon foundational moral principles. Raz's 
project does not require any such agreement, so does it fare better? One trouble with the 
dependence thesis of authority is that it assumes that we know what reasons apply to us. If 
'4 Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford, 1989), seeks to dissolve the distinctions Rawls himself draws between 
his own project, with Its priority on concepts of the right, and that of the perfectionists who give priority to a conception of the good. 
Kymlicka sees the difference as being over definitions of the good (p. 35). In that Kymlicka agrees with Galaton. The liberal definition, 
which he claims Rawls shares, is that we have an essential Interest in leading a life that Is good, which means living according to our 
own beliefs while recognising those beliefs are fallible and hence that we have an interest in revising those of our beliefs which are 
mistaken (pp. 10-13). However, it Is a mistake to think that Rawls grounds his political principles on such a view of our good. While he 
holds that people form their own conception of the good, this need not be an Individualistic conception, nor need he think that they must 
view their beliefs as being revisable. All he need Insist upon Is that they be treated as having separate beliefs when it comes to political 
and civil rights. 
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we are unsure of what constitutes well-being we may argue about it and we may consult 
experts, if we believe such are to be found. But Raz's theory assumes a confidence about a 
claim to the truth in this area. 
Just as Rawls' account depended upon a confidence in what we agree on for it to 
reach substantive conclusions about the conditions of political legitimacy, so does Raz depend 
upon a confidence about the truth to reach conclusions on the same issue. In the absence of 
confidence about the claim that only an autonomous life is a worthwhile life we lack on Raz's 
account confidence in what constitutes morally legitimate government action. So his theory 
depends upon our ability to be confident that it is true that in if we are to flourish in the modern 
world we must cultivate personal autonomy. 
However, confidence in the supreme value of the autonomous life requires a lot of 
discussion and consideration. It is not immediately clear what such autonomy consists In. 
Raz says it means deciding for ourselves the basic course of our lives, but what decisions are 
they? And do we have clear criteria for when a decision is our own, given that it all our 
decisions are inevitably influenced, often unconsciously, by our upbringing and our social 
environment? 
More fundamentally, it is not even clear that autonomy in some sense is the only way 
we can successfully live in the modern world. Indeed, many with communitarian and religious 
sympathies have in recent years been saying the exact opposite. They would hold that it is 
both possible and desirable to reform our lives so that we recognise our dependence upon 
others, rather than assert our independence. They may or may not be right but the claim is 
not obviously absurd. It may be that the lesson of recent history is that we should want less 
autonomy, not more. 
In particular, their claims would challenge the view that the justification for the use of 
political authority must be the promotion of autonomy. Their accounts may not challenge the 
need for a higher degree of autonomy in the modern world than in more traditional societies, 
but they may also show the desirability of acting to mitigate the impact of modern economic 
and social forces in some respects. Thus, to take one example with some contemporary 
currency, proposals to introduce some form of compulsory community service for young 
people to reinforce recognition of social ties and responsibilities look like an infringement of 
104 
autonomy. 55 Their aim and justification would be the promotion of social responsibility and, 
whatever the merits of the policy, that is not obviously a mistaken or unnecessary aim. The 
thrust of this sort of politics is that it is the task of the state to modify the forces which underpin 
the modern autonomous character, not to promote autonomy. So there are real and 
controversial issues about the relationship between autonomy and dependence, and the 
relative weight which governments should give to each in its policies. 
Raz's theory requires us to come to confident conclusions about what sort of policies 
are in our interests if our basic social institutions are to carry moral legitimacy. But that 
confidence is not to be had. Indeed much of the content of actual political debate is about the 
interrelationship and conflict between these two themes of autonomy and dependence. So 
just as Rawls' account of political legitimacy depended upon a unity over grounding moral 
beliefs, which turned out to be elusive, so Raz's account seems to be in a similar position. 
This time the basis for unity is meant to be not just consensus, but a demonstrable conception 
of what is true about human flourishing in the modern world. Raz argues that the modern 
world is such, not only in the range of opportunities it offers but in the very forms that it offers 
them, that we must be autonomous if we are to flourish. But there does seem a story to tell 
about our dependencies and about the difficulties and uncertainties of choice, and there is no 
clear way to balance these contrary factors. On Raz's view political legitimacy consists in the 
state acting to further our interests, but that depends upon us having a clear idea of what our 
interests are. Yet that is precisely what we do not have, and where the heart of contemporary 
political disputes lie. In parallel with my points against Rawls, the agreements about our 
interests which Raz sees as lying in the foundations of political community are rather a 
product of politics, if they are obtained at all, and not the starting point. 
4.3 PERFECTION, UTILITY, AND THE PROJECT OF RECONCILIATION 
I have argued that the perfectionist justification of political authority worked out most 
fully by Raz would only work if we could be confident that we had knowledge of what 
constitutes human flourishing, either in general or just in the modern world. However, the 
question of political legitimacy is posed when we do not have an agreed moral basis for 
°' Such a proposal is found In Etzionl, op. cit., pp. 113-5. In the UK similar Ideas have been mooted In several political places, Including 
the Labour Party. 
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association in a view of how life goes best. The question of the morality of authority arises 
whether we have such a basis or not, but what gives a special issue about the morality of 
political authority, and which gives rise to the moral need for reconciliation, is that it is used to 
coerce people or to command and deploy resources for substantive purposes which are not 
shared by everyone who is subject to the authority. The task is to show that there is a shared 
moral bond, which is either not immediately obvious so that the need is to make political 
institutions transparent, or which can be constructed by ensuring that political institutions are 
constrained by a set of rules which themselves can be shared by everyone. Raz would say 
that a moral community can only be constructed on the basis of a fully justified conception of 
the moral life, so that authority can be seen to promote our moral interests. But the question 
to be answered is whether it is possible to construct a moral community which does not 
depend upon such a full moral conception. 
Raz's argument relies upon the dependence thesis. But he conceives this thesis so 
that the only reasons which count are those relating to an individual's way of life, his 
perfection. But why should these be the only relevant reasons? Nothing in his account blocks 
the legitimacy of authorities acting on reasons which are not to do with perfection, which are in 
a person's interests, and which the existence of an authority enables them to achieve, or to 
achieve more effectively. Among a person's interests may be that of living in a society which 
is morally acceptable to them. But that need not be a full blown perfectionist conception of 
moral acceptability. It is begging the question to say that the only way in which conflicts with 
others can be resolved in ways acceptable to me is if they are fully resolved in favour of my 
beliefs. It is possible that moral acceptability can be achieved at a lower price. That need not 
damage my hopes of living out my full moral conception, even if, as Raz believes, doing so 
depends upon the social forms I inhabit, but nor does it rule out the possibility of being morally 
reconciled with my society even if I cannot realise my full moral conception. Of course, at 
present this only states a possibility, and I will need to show that it is one which can be 
actualised - which is what the second half of this thesis is about. But claims about the 
unavoidability of acting upon a conception which is held to be true will not as Raz wants rule 
out this possibility. 
106 
The quest for an account of conditions of political legitimacy therefore remains 
situated in the area where Rawls poses it, of acceptability to all, even though as I have argued 
Rawls does not successfully solve the issue. Arguments for a theory of moral perfection, such 
as that of the prime value of individual autonomy, have of course a place in political argument 
but are not appropriately situated at the level of political legitimacy. To say that a political 
association is only a moral community if it is grounded upon such a full moral conception rules 
out the possibility of moral reconciliation in less ideal cases. It also makes political legitimacy 
dependent upon moral knowledge when any claim to such knowledge must always be open to 
question. Again the hope must be that we can have a moral community which remains moral 
even if our moral knowledge remains a matter for contention and uncertainty. Otherwise the 
possibility of a moral community just seems a utopian dream. 
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PART TWO 
POLITICAL LEGITIMACY AS DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
Chapter Five 
Justifications of democracy 
5.1 LIBERALISM, THE BASIC STRUCTURE, AND DEMOCRACY 
In the first part of this work I considered three strategies for justifying liberal principles 
as the moral basis for political community - identity, consensus, and knowledge of the good. I 
argued that communitarian theories of identity, history and membership fail to ground an 
obligation to uphold and maintain the traditions which have formed us, even if, doubtfully, 
these can be clearly identified and belong to one recognisable tradition rather than a mix. 
Against end-based theories, both utilitarian and perfectionist, I urged that they fail to solve the 
problem of providing a single solution to the problem of political sovereignty: given that the 
nature of the human good is disputable, we end up with competing claims for the principles on 
which political authority should be justifiably based. This seemed to return us to the approach 
of looking for a moral consensus amidst diversity. But I had already rejected that approach, 
on the grounds that it depended upon being able to appeal to a stable, enduring, and 
transparent consensus. Whether or not there is such a consensus, and over what values the 
consensus holds, are matters of dispute; and I argued that even if there were a consensus 
around a particular value or group of values we could not know this without a process of public 
deliberation, nor could we avoid this process being continuing if we were to be assured that 
the consensus continued to hold. This indicates that prior to any political action based upon 
moral principles there must be a process, which is public if not political in nature, which 
involves the search for consensus, and must therefore carry with it the force of moral 
legitimacy both to engage people in the process and to answer the problem of how to go on in 
political association if no consensus is to be found. 
All these approaches to justifying liberal principles as the foundation for the basic 
structure of society go astray, therefore, in a similar way. They all fail to show that one and 
only one set of values, and liberal ones at that, would form the basis of morally legitimate 
political sovereignty and obligation. Each approach tries, but fails, to focus on one 
determinate set of values. They therefore cannot solve the problem of how to reconcile the 
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individual to the political community, because they fail to justify a unique set of values on 
which political authority can be based and which each individual can accept as providing them 
with a binding political obligation. The conclusion to be drawn is that therefore the moral 
reconciliation of individual and political community cannot be based upon any unique set of 
values. 
It seems that the foundations of moral community must therefore be built around a 
basic public process which decides which values should form the basis of political decisions 
and actions, and so this process cannot itself be grounded upon prior shared values. It is 
natural to suppose that a democratic political process would be the sort needed. The task is 
to harmonise together individual opinions which might be different, but which have as their 
most salient feature that they are initially unknown to each other. The outcome is to be some 
sort of single view -a general will is to be formed, if you like. The general will, however, need 
only be a political one: that is, the question to be answered is one of what we should do, not 
one of what the moral truth is (I shall say more about this below). Thus the general will might 
be to let the majority decide. And it is democracy which is the political system in which the 
popular will decides, whether that is expressed as a general will or as majority rule. ' 
The problem, however, is how a democratic process is to be justified if it cannot be 
grounded upon any pre-political value consensus. The task of a democratic system is to 
deliver outcomes in the forms of political decisions which are morally legitimate and therefore 
binding upon individual members of society. Through democracy, then, the legitimacy of 
particular political policies and actions is to be constructed. Policies and decisions are only 
legitimate if they result from a democratic process, properly followed. But that raises the 
question of the moral legitimacy of democracy itself. Why does a democratic political process 
constitute the moral legitimacy of a political association, and morally obligate individuals? How 
can it do so when no shared foundational values can, by hypothesis, be relied upon? 
Moreover, why does the need for public discussion lead to a democratic political system? The 
remainder of this work will be devoted to answering these questions and sketching out the 
implications of the view I develop. 
' To anticipate, my argument will be that majority rule can only be justified if it Is based upon a prior general will that lt is the right way to 
proceed. 
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5.2 A FOUNDATIONAL COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY 
In discussing democracy in this way we need to distinguish justifications of democracy 
which essentially see it as the best way to promote and protect liberal values, from those 
which give it a more fundamental role. Democracy as a safeguard against arbitrary 
government protects individual liberty, and is perhaps more likely than any other system of 
government to bring about just outcomes. But these justifications of democracy take place 
against a backdrop of a justification of political authority based upon liberal principles, and 
where those principles constrain democracy before they empower it. In such discussions2 
democracy is a means to assumed liberal ends, and that is also why, when liberal political 
philosophers discuss the moral foundations of political association, they give scant attention, if 
any at all, to the topic of democracy. 3 Not much attention is paid to how democratic 
commitments are related to liberal theories. 4 The question of ends only comes into view when 
notions of participatory democracy are being discussed, since participatory democracy would 
only be justified as an end in itself, or when democracy and political participation is seen as a 
necessary part of an ideal of individual self-development. 5 
There are, however, a number of different ways in which democracy can be seen as 
an essential component of morally legitimate political association, and they do not all support a 
notion of participatory democracy. The main sources of such a commitment to democracy as 
more than the subordinate device seen in liberal theory are threefold: 
' See, for example, William N. Nelson, On Justifying Democracy (London, 1980); Ross Harrison, Democracy (London. 1993); Jack 
Lively, Democracy (Oxford, 1975). 
' Thus John Rawls discusses the principle of majority rule in A Theory of Justice (Oxford, 1972) only once the principles of justice are In 
place, and describes it as having 'a subordinate place as a procedural device' (p. 356). 
The existence of this gap has been noted in Ian Shapiro, "Three Ways To Be A Democrat, ' Political Theory 22 ( February 1994), p. 
125, it would be going too far to say that theorists of democracy and justice speak past one another, but there has been little 
systematic attention to how considerations about democracy and justice are or should be mutually related'. Shapiro himself argues for 
democracy as a'subordinate foundational good' on the grounds that 'given the impossibility of neutrality among foundational 
philosophical commitments, democracy Is the most attractive foundational political commitment' (ibid., p. 148). Dissensus, not 
consensus, is the norm In social life, he says, and any consensus needs to be treated with suspicion as to the procedures by which it Is 
maintained. Democracy, therefore, is the means by which we can challenge any suspicious consensus and work out what values we 
should pursue. The problem with this argument is that It still leaves the justification for democracy at the level of desirability, without 
showing why it generates morally binding political decisions for all agents. Democracy will be attractive on this account if we are not 
committed to any particular substantive doctrine, or already have a strong attachment to democracy. But the task is to why democracy 
morally binds, and that conflicts between democracy and other value commitments are only apparent 
11 have ignored here and In what follows arguments for civic republicanism, even though they normally mandate a greater degree of 
participatory democracy than mainstream liberal theories. However the role assigned to democracy In civic republicanism Is similar to 
that in liberalism, that of protecting Individual liberty. lt Is just that greater participation is though necessary to achieve this. Civic 
republican theories are to be distinguished from those, sometimes called civic humanism, which advocate political participation as part 
of the good life, and not just of Instrumental value - see the next footnote. For civic republicanism, see Philip Pettit, The Common Mind 
(New York, 1993), chapter 6, and various writings by Quentin Skinner, particularly 'The Paradoxes of Political Liberty, ' The Tanner 
Lectures on Human Values, VII, ed. S. M. McMurrin (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 227-50, and 'On Justice, the Common Good, and the Priority 
of Liberty, ' Dimensions of Radical Democracy, ed. C. Mouffe (London, 1992), pp. 211-24. 
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(i) a perfectionist commitment to an ideal of citizenship as an essential component of 
the good life for individuals; 's 
(ii) democracy as the appropriate response to the existence of a plurality of moral and 
ethical views in modern society. Democracy here is the project of continuing 
negotiation between antagonistic views, and can have no single moral basis itself;? 
(iii) democracy as the expression of a theory of discourse ethics, where moral truth is 
the outcome of discussion under specified conditions of unconstrained speech. 
This grounds a political ideal of deliberative democracy as the realisation of this 
ideal .8 
I want to follow none of these roads. 
Perfectionist justifications 
Perfectionist theories of democracy fare no better than the liberal theories I discussed 
earlier. The claim that participation in democracy constitutes the good life is no more 
indubitable than were the arguments of Raz and Galston for personal autonomy which I 
discussed earlier. Since the underlying principle of political legitimacy is that the state should 
act to promote the objective interests of individuals, unless there is agreement as to where 
those interests lies we will have competing claims for sovereignty. Hence the problem of 
political legitimacy cannot be solved on a perfectionist based, whether liberal, democratic, or 
whatever. 
Pluralism and democratic negotiation 
I argued above in Chapter Three that liberal theories of negotiation were premised 
upon the value of social peace in the face of irreducible conflict between a plurality of moral 
views, but that this was an inadequate basis for grounding liberalism: there had to be reason 
why a concern for peace overrode other values, and in any case negotiation is not the only 
way to achieve peace. Those views foregrounded democratic procedures as procedures of 
negotiation, and advocated minimal liberal views of justice as being warranted by the 
requirements of those procedures. Here, however, l am considering views which similarly 
" Examples of this line of argument Include Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age (Berkeley, 1984); 
Ronald Beiner, What's the Matter With Liberalism? (Berkeley, 1992); Paul Barry Clarke, Deep Citizenship (London, 1996). 
' See, for example, Chantal Mouffe, The Return of the Political (London, 1993). Stuart Hampshire's account In Innocence and 
Expenence (Harmondsworth, 1989) could also be viewed In this light - see my discussion above. Consciously post-modemist works, 
based on an opposition to toundationalist narratives, also fall Into this camp - for example, Stephen K. White, Political Theory and 
Poshnodemism (Cambridge, 1991). 
" Most prominently, of course, associated with the discourse ethics of Jürgen Habermas. 
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want to justify democracy on the basis of the irreducible character of ethical and cultural 
pluralism, but which on that basis either reject liberalism or want to radicalise it through large 
extensions of democracy. This is seen as requiring a consensus, not on norms, but on 
democratic procedures to negotiate conflicts9. But here again the underlying motive for 
allegiance to democracy must be a commitment to certain common values, a commitment 
which cannot itself be grounded within a thoroughgoing pluralist perspective. As Mouffe 
points out, in arguing for a justification of what she calls 'radical democracy' along these lines: 
"Antagonistic principles of legitimacy cannot coexist within one single political 
association; to accept pluralism at that level automatically entails the disparition of the 
state as a political reality ...... Modern democracy, far from being based upon a 
relativist conception of the world, as it is sometimes argued, is articulated around a 
certain set of 'values', which, like equality and liberty, constitute its 'political principles'. 
Those who conceive the pluralism of modern democracy as being total and as having 
as its only restriction an agreement on procedural rules do not realise that there can 
never be pure, neutral procedures without reference to normative concerns. "'o 
Thus Mouffe here accepts that unless there is reference to a "framework of 
consensus"" within which pluralist conflicts can take place, then any form of political 
association is impossible. But given the existence of pluralism, how can there be consensus 
around such a framework, minimal though it might be? Scepticism about the possibility of 
such consensus has lead to the radical views which Mouffe attacks, where differences exists 
at all levels. Such views accept the legitimacy of all differences, but that implies not 
distinguishing between differences which are admissible and those which are not - in other 
words, acceptance on a level of all differences leads to an uncritical lack of differentiation 
which makes politics impossible. 12 
So Mouffe needs to justify a democratic politics despite the existence of 
thoroughgoing pluralism. She rejects the response to pluralism made by political liberals such 
as Rawls, who, she says, see it as existing in the non-political sphere while an overlapping 
political consensus is reached around principles of justice. 13 Liberals such as Rawls, she 
" See Mouffe, op. cit., pp. 4-8. 
t° Chantal Moutte, 'Democrat'ic Politics Today, " Dimensions of Radical Democracy, ed. Chantal Mouffe (London, 1992), pp. 11.12. 
Ibid., p. 14. 
Ibid., p. 13. 
"Moutfe, Return of the Political, pp. 41-59. 
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argues, underestimate the extent to which pluralism affects political possibilities. Firstly, it 
means that even if there is a consensus around the need for democratic procedures, there will 
still be conflict about the content of those procedures. A fixed settlement on political 
principles, therefore, is unattainable, and we must accept that political conflict even over 
fundamentals is a permanent feature of the modern world. Secondly, she attacks the liberal 
view of the role of the political sphere being to leave room for each individual to pursue their 
own ends. Instead, she wants to conceive individual identity as intrinsically pluralist: the 
pluralist character of society constitutes individuals' identities as contingent and ambiguous, 
and the appropriate response is to forge a "common political identity as radical democratic 
citizens, '14 to identify with the core values of democracy, which individuals will interpret in 
different ways, and reflect these values in all areas of life. 
This justification of democracy, however, seems to depend upon certain prior values. 
In advocating a certain form of individual identification it prioritises that possibility above 
others: it means saying that it is better for individuals to conceive of their moral and religious 
beliefs as uncertain and provisional, or that it is the case that beliefs cannot be held in any 
other way. But this, rather than accommodating pluralism, is to take a particular position 
within a key modern conflict. Mouffe acknowledges that it is impossible to avoid taking such a 
position, and that any political regime will therefore be coercive to some, 15 but does not 
acknowledge that there may be other viable ways to conceive of individual identities today. 
Her position therefore turns out to be based upon highly controversial assumptions, but that 
makes it difficult to see how she can justify democratic politics as the appropriate response to 
pluralism if that justification is itself based upon a deeply contestable view. 
In particular, Mouffe's affirmation of a radical democratic identity advocates regarding 
all attachments and particular identifications as provisional. Although at any time you can tell 
a story about why you take the stance you do, you must simultaneously be aware that other 
stances with equally good justifications are possible. The question is whether this is coherent. 
If all stances are contingent and none is that which is rationally justified, then that must apply 
to the refusal to take any stance as right over others. There seems no more reason to adopt 
the democratic stance advocated by Mouffe then there is to adopt the liberal one advanced by 
" Ibid., p. 71. 
'ý Ibid., pp. 152-153. 
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Rawls. The question is, what story about citizen identity and the political is the true one? 
Mouffe is committed to saying that no one story can be privileged above others, but then that 
very commitment is itself ungrounded. But if we have no grounds on which to decide whether 
our identifications are in some sense right, or just one possibility among others equally good, 
then we lose any possibility of coherence as individual agents. Mouffe's view is therefore self- 
undermining, and provides no suitable foundation for democratic (or indeed any) politics. 
Discourse ethics 
As to the justification of a conception of deliberative democracy on the grounds of 
discourse ethics, I am sympathetic to the idea that it is a deliberative democracy that we want. 
Indeed, I use this label as the best description of the institutional consequences of the 
argument I discuss in the next two chapters. However, I certainly do not want to endorse or 
associate myself with the grounds of justification used by Habermas and others. 
A full discussion of Habermas' theory would be too long and complex to undertake 
here. However, for Habermas moral truth consists in the consensus which would result from 
free, unconstrained talk. Political norms, therefore, emerge from such a process of public 
deliberation. Moreover, this process will be based upon purely procedural norms of political 
justice, such as equal rights of participation. A deliberative democracy provides the 
institutional structure for a discourse which, through its orientation towards the truth and its 
inclusivity of all citizens, provides a moral legitimacy to the consensus which emerges. 16 
This conception seems close to what I am looking for in seeking democratic grounds 
for political legitimacy. But there are crucial problems with Habermas' position. Firstly, it is 
motivated by a theory of what constitutes moral truth. It is what everyone would agree to in 
unconstrained discourse. This notion is difficult enough, since it is not clear why it should be 
assumed that even truly unconstrained discussion will lead to convergence on just one 
conclusion. This leads on to a difficulty about what to do when a consensus cannot be 
reached. " Habermas appears here to say either we should engage in bargaining and 
negotiation between different viewpoints to achieve a trade-off, or we should move to a higher 
'I In discussing Habermas I have drawn upon the selection of his writings In William Outhwaite, ed., The Habermas Reader 
(Cambridge, 1996); Jürgen Habermas, 'Three Normative Models of Democracy, ' Democracy and Difference, ed. Seyla Benhabib 
(Princeton, 1996), pp. 21-30; Jurgen Habermas, 'Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls' Political 
Liberalism, ' and John Rawls, 'Reply to Habermas, ' both in Journal of Philosophy 92 (March 1995), 109-180; David M. Rasmussen, 
Reading Habermas (Oxford, 1990); Stephen K. White, The Recent Work of Argen Habermas (Cambridge, 1988); Simone Chambers, 
Reasonable Democracy (Ithaca, New York, 1996); Thomas McCarthy, 'Kantian Constructivism and Reconstructivism: Rawls and 
Habermas In Dialogue, ' Ethics 105 (October 1994), 44-63. 
"See McCarthy, op. cit., pp. 55-7. Habermas endorses bargaining in 'Three Normative Models of Democracy, ' p. 25. 
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level of abstraction in the hope that agreement can be found there - say, on leaving 
controversial matters to individual consciences. But there is a third alternative Habermas 
doesn't appear to admit but which is normally taken as central to democracy, which is to vote 
and abide by the majority decision. The reason why Habermas does not adopt this alternative 
is that both bargaining and moving to a higher level still retain the goal of reaching a 
consensus on what to do - although it seems questionable whether bargaining achieves the 
sort of rational consensus Habermas originally meant, since the calculation of bargaining 
seems to require a different sort of rationality focused on advantage rather than truth. Majority 
rule, however, means admitting that there is no consensus on what to do. Still, there could be 
a consensus on voting as a way of resolving disagreements for the purpose of practical 
action. But that sort of consensus seems to sit ill with Habermas' notion that a deliberative 
democracy is orientated towards the truth (although no worse than does bargaining, perhaps). 
The central problem with Habermas' position is that it is based upon this conception of 
what constitutes moral truth. Whatever the merits or otherwise of that position, it does not 
seem to me a suitable basis for a theory of political legitimacy. For Habermas the basis of a 
legitimising reconciliation between individual and community is a notion of how moral truth is 
to be achieved. But why should people accept that what emerges even from an 
unconstrained dialogue is the truth? Now, it may be that in cases of conflicting norms, 
because we hold that we have good grounds for our views, and that these grounds provide 
equally good reasons for others to share our views, we enter into persuasive dialogue with 
others with the aim of reaching agreement. 18 But that does not mean that we need regard 
truth as being what emerges from dialogue. We may do so, and that may even be the right 
view: perhaps what we should regard as true is what passes a collective dialogic examination. 
Yet even then it does not follow that the truth-making characteristic of the consensual view is 
that it is agreed upon. We may believe it to be true because it is agreed upon, but its truth 
may be in virtue of something else - say, its correspondence with reality. 
Moreover, it is of the essence of many religious doctrines that truth is not a human 
creation, and many moral views - perhaps even the liberal ethic of personal autonomy - prize 
the individual conscience over an inter-subjectively determined consensus. We may hold that 
'I Chambers, op. cit., pp. 91-97. 
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we each have good reasons for our views, and that does seem to imply that in the ideal long 
run our view would be the victor in a debate with its competitors. But Habermas' views imply 
that we must regard every social norm is based upon a claim to validity which is a claim that it 
can be justified as true. 19 However, the claim to validity upon which social norms are based 
might be just that they are politically legitimate, justified by some recognised and acceptable 
political procedure, and not that they represent the moral truth. The claim to political 
legitimacy and the claim to normative validity are separate claims, which Habermas brings 
together. Yet it is entirely possible, and indeed common, that we can recognise the political 
legitimacy of a claim a state makes, while holding that the claim does not represent the moral 
truth. This is another example where the problem is to explain the political paradox of why we 
can accept as morally legitimate the use of political authority to enforce norms which we do 
not accept as being the morally right or best thing to do. 
Hence the structure of a deliberative democracy based upon such a conception of 
moral truth would seem to be biased against other moral and religious traditions which 
understand moral truth in a different way. 20 If Habermas' project is to articulate the rational 
presuppositions of all moral conceptions and so to include all existing moral and political 
doctrines21, then it fails. In a discourse ethic view of politics, it is not the deliberative process 
alone which legitimises, but also a contentious notion of what constitutes moral truth. But that 
cannot be the basis for reconciling the individual and the political community, any more than 
basing legitimacy upon a single set of liberal values turned out to be. What Habermas fails to 
see is that the problem of political legitimacy is not to be settled by dissolving it into the 
question of what underlies the moral validity of norms. The political problem remains even 
once we have a theory of moral truth. 
There is a similarity between the argument I put forward for my version of deliberative 
democracy in the next two chapters, and Habermas' view. Somewhat like him, my position 
could be seen as being based upon a characterisation of certain features of all moral, and 
perhaps all rational, conceptions. But unlike him, this is not based upon an attempt to 
" Ibid., p. 95: in Issuing an order with the expectation that it will be understood and carried out, the Commander raises the claim that 
the norm to which the speech act appeals is valid. ' It is moral validity, and not just political validity, which Chambers, following 
Habermas, means here. 
20 Rawls, 'Reply to Habermas, ' p. 135, makes the point that Habermas' position falls Into what Rawls would term a comprehensive 
doctrine, determining many matters beyond the political realm. 
2' Rawls, plausibly it seems to me, characterises Habermas as following this Hegelian project see Ibid., pp. 138-7. 
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reconstruct what constitutes truth for all conceptions. Rather, my argument is based upon 
certain structural conditions involved in having a conception at all. I am therefore not 
advancing any particular view of moral truth, nor does my theory require the translation of 
moral and religious views into any other terms. Hence I hope that my argument will avoid the 
pitfalls I have identified in that of Habermas. 
5.3 AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
My argument in what follows therefore attempts to justify deliberative democracy not 
on the basis of any values or of any particular conception of moral truth. It focuses on the 
institutions and procedures which, if followed, assure that the outcome is morally legitimate 
and that members of society have a morally binding obligation to accept them. The norms of 
justice will be determined through the process of democratic deliberation itself. However, the 
requirements for achieving moral legitimacy will impose constraints upon what the democratic 
process can decide which, I will argue, are sufficient to disarm the traditional liberal fear of 
democracy and the tyranny of the majority. What will be justified will not therefore be a liberal 
political system, although there will be some features which it will share with liberalism, and 
liberal positions on particular issues will always be a possible option within the public 
deliberative process. 22 
It would be better, however, not to say that what I am seeking to do is to justify a form 
of democracy as the basic structure of society. Although my analysis of liberal theories of 
justification has led to the conclusion that something like a form of democracy is required for 
political legitimacy, it does not follow that a conclusive argument can be given to justify 
democracy. Rather, the need is to proceed by seeking to work out what structures, if any, 
individuals have binding commitments to. It just turns out that they do have binding political 
commitments to a structure which is best labelled 'deliberative democracy. ' Or so I shall 
argue. The task, therefore, is to provide a different basis for working out what political form 
21 My approach bears some similarities to that taken in James S. Fishkin. The Dialogue of Justice (Yale, 1992). Fishkln takes himself to 
be justifying a form of liberal democracy, although he emerges with a strong conception of participatory democracy. However, he bases 
the political obligation of individuals upon the obligation to reciprocate when essential benefits have been distributed by society. These 
essential benefits comprise the social conditions of full membership' (ibid., p. 138). What exactly they are can only be decided 
discursively, but the general notion is of a material minimum which allows all individuals to have their claims and interests treated 
equally in political dialogue. The crucial question for Fishkin's argument is whether the receipt of these benefits does Indeed constitute 
a non. defeasible basis for political obligation. Moreover, there seems no reason why we should be concerned, In Fishkin's system, to 
include other people. But without a compelling motivation to be inclusive there can be no safeguard against withdrawing benefits from a 
minority and so excluding them from political membership. Nor is there any reason why the obligation Involved is to participate, rather 
than just to obey. These weaknesses seem fatally to undermine Fishkin's theory. 
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can constitute legitimate grounds for political association. It is not just a question of putting 
forward democracy as the solution to problems found in justifications of liberalism, or as an 
inherently attractive ideal. Although it appears that a form of democracy is the answer to the 
problem of political legitimacy I have raised, and indeed that is how the argument will turn out, 
it would be wrong to assume prior to that argument that a justification for democracy can 
succeed where that for liberalism has failed. That is in effect what many arguments for 
democracy do assume. The problem identified with liberalism by democratic theorists may 
be the thinness of its conception of the individual, the shallowness of its view of moral 
pluralism, or its commitment to individual moral sovereignty. In each case the defect is to be 
remedied by proposing democracy as the expression of what is lacking in liberalism. Thus 
democracy is defined in terms of a thicker conception of the individual, or a response to deep 
pluralism, or as people working out norms collectively. But that is not to get to the root of the 
problem. What is wrong with justifications for liberalism is not the attachment to liberalism as 
such: rather, it is the justification which goes awry. So the issue is not that liberal values are 
wrong in some way, and here are democratic values as a more attractive (to some) 
alternative. What is needed is to go about the problem of justifying basic conditions for 
political association in a way which avoids the pitfalls identified with justifications for 
liberalism. What political forms emerge from that justification as constituting a morally 
legitimate political association cannot be in principle specified in advance. What I hope the 
argument will show is why we should be committed to the importance of democratic 
discussion and decision making, but that commitment emerges from an argument that at the 
outset could lead in any direction. The argument I will give is not designed to justify 
democracy, but to work out what political form is morally legitimate and binding. It just so 
happens that the conclusion from that argument is what intuitively we thought it would be, a 
form of democracy. 
Putting the theoretical task this way indicates that we need to start with a conception 
of the person or human agency on which we can build a justification. That would be a 
dubious starting point if such a conception already carried with it normative implications. But 
my intention instead is to start with an account of what is involved in being an agent with any 
moral views at all, irrespective of the content of those views. This corresponds to the need for 
a justification of political authority to begin, as I indicated in my discussion of liberal 
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justifications, with agents who might or might not share any views in common - for whom the 
question of what they share and where they differ is something to be answered through the 
actual process of public discussion. To that extent I start from a conception of agents who are 
strangers to each other, although they need not remain strangers once engaged In public 
discussion. It is to this conception of agency, which I call that of agents with views, which I 
now turn. 
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Chapter Six 
Agents with views 
6.1 GROUNDS FOR POLITICAL LEGITIMACY 
The problem of morally justifying a basic political structure lies in an apparent conflict. 
We need to achieve a moral basis for social unity, which reconciles the individual to his or her 
political community. But we have rejected attempts to show that this can be done on the basis 
of shared membership of society, shared values, or a shared conception of interests. It 
seems that if the use of political authority to direct or restrain members of society, or to shift 
and allocate resources, is to be morally justified, each member of society must be able to 
regard this authority as at some level being used in accordance with their wishes, in a way 
which removes any justified feeling that this is in a way paradoxical. But if there is no basis of 
shared values on which we can rely, how is it possible to achieve this feat of moral 
reconciliation? 
The problem does not arise because we must assume that individuals have different 
moral, religious, or philosophical views. That would be to ground political institutions upon the 
existence of reasonable disagreement about moral values. ' The point is, however, that 
whether or not there is such reasonable disagreement, and whether there are some basic 
values on which consensus nonetheless exists, are things to be discovered, not assumed. 2 
Neither agreement nor disagreement about moral values can be the grounds for political 
association. But whether there is agreement or disagreement, what we have are agents with 
their own views meeting together. And that, I shall argue, is where our spade turns when we 
are seeking grounds for morally legitimate political institutions. 
The need for, and the possibility of, moral justification begins in our existence as 
separate agents with our own beliefs. More precisely, as agents with beliefs which bear 
' In describing this as 'reasonable disagreement' rather than 'moral pluralism' I am following Charles Larmore, Pluralism and 
Reasonable Disagreement, ' Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge, eds. Ellen Frankel Paul at al (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 61-79. The 
point Is to distinguish a plurality of Yiews about morality from the philosophical thesis that there exists ultimately more than one source 
of moral value. 
2 In fact, as I shall say later In my argument, it Is not a matter of simple discovery. In discovering what we each believe we may find out 
what we each ourselves believe, and we may find beliefs altering in the process. Discovery is not just finding out what Is already there. 
It is also In Important ways a process of making. 
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upon how we should act and live together, with views about the nature of legitimate political 
authority and its justified purposes. In order to bring out this characterisation of the agents in 
question, to distinguish it from other conceptions of human agents, and to draw attention to 
that dimension of agency which is crucial for my purposes, I shall call the conception I want to 
use that of 'agents with views'. 
It might appear that this characterisation of the starting point for the task of moral 
reconciliation in a legitimate political community is an individualistic one, which excludes the 
holding of beliefs which are essentially shared with others - views such as that I can only live a 
virtuous life in a virtuous community. But I have argued in the first part of this work that there 
is no valid move from any such conception, whether conceived in communitarian or 
perfectionist terms, to the basis of a morally legitimate political community. Thus while 
individuals may hold views which they regard as being essentially shared, from the 
perspective of political legitimacy there are no beliefs which can be taken as shared by all. 
Even if there are such beliefs, I have suggested that discovering that fact is itself a political 
task, rather than the foundation of politics. That we have beliefs about the good, or indeed 
more narrowly moral beliefs, in common, if we do, would be something we have to discover. 
Hence it is right to start with a conception of individual agents with views, without prejudice to 
the nature of those views. I have also suggested that it is possible that in the case of views of 
the good which appear to depend upon the existence of certain social forms for their 
realisation - like the view that we should be personally autonomous, but that being so requires 
an autonomy-supporting community - it may be that moral reconciliation is possible with a 
political community which falls short of what would be the ideal on such a view. And indeed I 
will argue in what follows that agents with views like this are nevertheless committed to a 
morally legitimate political community which may well fall short of their full ideal. 
Now, my argument will be to show that being an agent with a view involves each such 
agent in certain commitments to political institutions and processes, and, as part of these 
commitments, to regard their own views and their relationship to them in particular ways. 
These commitments, I will argue, arise from the logic of views. Views, in the sense which I 
will elaborate shortly, have some necessary features and the holding of views commits agents 
to these features and what they imply. Agents are therefore inescapably drawn by the logic of 
the views they hold into political structures of democratic deliberation and decision making, 
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and Into practices which constitute such structures, and must recognise the rational and moral 
legitimacy of these if they are to continue being an agent with a view. 
This argumentative strategy bears some relationship to the once popular "conceptual 
argument" for political obligation. This argument, inspired by the work of Wittgenstein, held 
that there is an internal, conceptual relationship, rather than an external, empirical, one, 
between being a member of a political society and the obligation to accept the authority of the 
government of that society. It is just part of what it means to be a member of society that one 
has an obligation to accept its political authority. 3 A closely related argument arises from 
Wittgenstein's argument against the possibility of a private language, that one cannot learn the 
language in which to conceptualise one's own experience without following rules about the 
correct use of language on different occasions, and the necessity that rule-following be 
governed by public criteria of correctness. This can be seen as feeding into the modern 
revival of communitarian political thought, with its insistence that conceptions of the good are 
essentially social. 4 Both forms of argument are of course familiar in other areas of philosophy, 
such as the argument against epistemological scepticism that it is meaningless to doubt the 
possibility of all knowledge of the world, as distinct from knowledge claims about particular 
local parts of the world, because the very formulation of the sceptical claim presupposes that 
we have some knowledge. 
Now, in citing these arguments I do not mean to endorse them, or to situate my own 
account within this framework. However, there are parallels between the type of argument I 
wish to mount here and those I have mentioned. My approach is to take the concept of being 
an agent with a view and to spell out the logic involved in views and the holding of them. And I 
will crucially argue that views are intrinsically public rather than private, and that the way in 
which they are public implicates agents in certain determinate social forms, the political 
institutions of a deliberative democracy. In this way my argument for deliberative democracy, 
like the private language and anti-sceptical arguments cited, is a sort of transcendental 
argument, which starts from the existence of agents with views and moves to the conclusion 
of the commitment to deliberative democracy as a necessary condition for being an agent with 
John Horton, Political Obligation (London, 1992) pp. 137-145, gives a good account of this school of argument 
RaymondPlant, Modem Political Thought (Oxford, 1991) pp. 330-343 draws out the links between Wittgenstein and the 
communitarians. Horton, op. cit., pp. 145ff., builds upon the conceptual argument to develop a communitarian theory of political 
obligation. 
123 
a view. My argument does not take this form because of any pre-existing attachment to this 
argumentative form. Rather, it arises through the process I have traced so far in this work, as 
the naturally required way of proceeding given the problem of moral reconciliation of individual 
and community and the impasse reached by the failure of other attempts to solve this 
problem. And if my argument works where others have failed then that is justification enough 
of the strategy. 
6.2 THE CONCEPT OF AGENTS WITH VIEWS 
I turn now to the question of what it is to be an agent with a view. Are we all such 
agents? Is having views of this sort is some way obligatory? Is it better to have more views 
rather than less? I shall try to make the concept of agents with views clearer in what follows. 
Political views 
Firstly, to be an agent with a view does not mean we all have, or should have, a fully 
worked out political philosophy. Rather, it is to have a belief about any matter, however 
narrowly specified, which explicitly or implicitly implies either the taking of political action or 
refraining from political action. So many views will fairly obviously require political action for 
their realisation. I may have a straightforwardly political view, such as the necessity for 
governments to ensure a minimum level of welfare. A little less directly, I may believe in the 
value of individual autonomy, and require a range of government action to support this belief 
in practice, by supplying education, preventing economic monopolies of supply which restrict 
choice, protecting privacy and freedom of speech, and so on. I may more simply believe in a 
more limited role for government, as the defender of individual liberty through upholding the 
legal system and civil peace. 
Often, though, our political commitments arise as a consequence of our views on 
specific issues. If, for example, I believe that fathers have obligations to their children, I may 
want the state to impose and enforce a recognition of that obligation through maintenance 
payments upon those who do not voluntarily meet it. Or I believe in a woman's right to choose 
whether or not to have an abortion, and require the state to protect that right. Some of our 
views will hardly be controversial - who, for instance, will say that the state should not uphold 
contracts? - but on many issues controversy is possible, and in modern societies often likely. 
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Different positions on controversial moral and social issues will often have different 
political implications, even if the difference is only whether the state should actively intervene 
or stay out of this particular arena. The abortion issue is the most glaringly obvious 
contemporary example, where the moral dispute about whether and in what circumstances 
abortion is morally permissible has the political dimension of whether the matter is to be left 
for individuals to decide, which involves legally permitting abortion under certain conditions, or 
whether abortion is to be legally prohibited. But the political dimension arises on many other 
issues too, where the issue is whether we want the state to protect individual sovereignty in 
this area, or to regulate it in some way - on issues from possession of firearms, freedom of 
speech issues, through to moral education and institutions of marriage and other legally 
recognised relationships. 
is everyone an agent with a view? 
The point is that in one's everyday commitments and projects one can hardly help 
having political views, at least implicitly. In that sense I do hold that everyone, or nearly 
everyone, who we recognise as an adult human person is an agent with a view. Of course, 
there are the standard issues here about the dividing lines between children and adults, and 
persons and those who by reason of mental injury or disability are unable to be persons in the 
full sense of active, morally responsible beings. 5 But this is not an acute problem for the 
conception of agents with views: it is possible to recognise differing degrees of rational 
capacity still equally leading to the holding of a view. I shall say more in a moment about what 
constitutes a view'. But in so far as agents is concerned, the point I am trying to establish is 
that everyone who has sufficient rational capacity to form moral or more broadly practical 
beliefs will be an agent with a view in my sense, i. e. will possess implicit or explicit political 
views. 
This may not seem wholly obvious: couldn't someone completely abstain from political 
views, focusing only on private life? But even then some view of political legitimacy is implied, 
even if it is only that the state should keep out of, and allow plenty of scope for, private lives. 
So for my purposes even negative views about politics count, because they too are views 
I To say nothing of the distinction between humans and other animals. It follows from my later argument about what is Involved In being 
an agent with a view that possession of the capacity for reason and linguistic ability are minimum conditions for such agency. Thus 
non-human animals will not qualify (on the basis that no animal has developed a linguistic capacity which goes beyond that of a young 
child). The dividing line between adults and children is harder. I shall say a little more on this below. 
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about the scope and limits of legitimate political authority. Of course, someone may just never 
consider the political dimensions of their moral or religious beliefs. They may only become 
explicit if the state intrudes, if their private life is disrupted as the state attacks the 
monasteries, or the war disrupts farming and conscripts one's sons, and so on. Then views 
about the legitimacy or otherwise of state action are likely to become explicit. But that they 
emerge then serves to confirm that there was all along an implicit view about the legitimate 
sphere of political action. 6 So to have a conception of one's ends is to have at least an implicit 
view about the legitimacy of any interference with those ends, or the role of the state in 
supporting or enabling their pursuit and realisation. 
But still, it may be the case that someone does manage not to have any political views 
at all, even implicitly. Perhaps they are completely indifferent to what the state does, even if it 
Interferes with their private pursuits. This may be someone, say, who holds that freedom is 
not found either in private life, from which the state must be excluded, or in political activity, 
but in a state of mind separate from politics.? Such a freedom is not found in civic virtue or in 
minimising political constraint, but in the rational regulation and self-discipline of our desires - 
freedom is a character-based notion. In this sense, one could be free even under a tyranny: 
this is the view, perhaps, of those who believe, with Oscar Wilde, that one can be free even in 
prison. 8 
Now, if we assume that this view of freedom is a coherent one, 9 it appears that it 
would be possible for someone to fail to be an agent with a view in the way which I intend 
here. However, this admission does not undermine my argument. The problem I am 
addressing is that of reconciling individuals with the political community. This problem arises, 
it will be recalled, because of the political paradox: the apparent conflict between my believing 
one view to be the best course of action, but also believing that if the state is acting 
legitimately, then some other course of action can be justified. The problem is giving an 
account of what it is for the state to act legitimately which reconciles these two beliefs and so 
removes the appearance of paradox. But now, if someone does not have a political view, 
A good example of the political dimension of lives lived seemingly in Indifference to politics is that of Romany or gypsy communities. 
Following the first free elections in modem Romania there was a Romany delegation to the new democratic government which 
presented just one demand: to be left alone. 
David Cooper, The Free Man' On Liberty, ed. A. Phillips Griffiths (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 131-148. 
Ibid., p. 131. 
" it may be that 'freedom' is not the right term for the notion being invoked here, although Cooper argues that It Is. But this Is not a 
decisive point for my purposes here. 
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whether because they hold the character-based notion of freedom I have just outlined, or for 
some other reason, then the political paradox and the problem of moral reconciliation does not 
arise. If someone consistently maintains indifference to the state then there is no problem of 
ensuring that the actions of the state have moral legitimacy with respect to that person. As 
soon as interference by the state leads an individual to take up a political stance, however - as 
soon as they say to the state, leave me alone - then they problem of legitimacy and 
reconciliation arises. But then they have a political view. In practice, if consistent indifference 
to politics even in the face of interference with private life exists at all, then it is extremely rare. 
That is why the problem of political legitimacy is important and pressing, since for most, if not 
all of us, politics looms large in our lives. But for those who are truly indifferent to politics, and 
manage to remain so, if such there be, then the problem I am trying to solve does not arise. 
Perfection. community, and consensus: an alternative approach 
So my claim is that we are all, or nearly all, agents with views, at least once we have 
reached sufficient maturity to formulate rational beliefs. As we will see it is possible to cease 
to be an agent with a view, and indeed it is the desire to avoid that, if we have it, which 
motivates us to participate in constructing and maintaining a morally legitimate political 
community. But my argument does not rest upon a claim that we should be an agent with a 
view. It does not depend upon a perfectionist theory of the good. If we are agents with views 
then that is a fact about us. It is a fact that we are agents with certain normative beliefs, and 
want to draw conclusions from the logic of having such beliefs. 
Nor is there any idea in the conception of agents with views that the holding of views 
is a good in itself, and that the more views you have, the better it is for you. In fact, such a 
position would be a nonsense. If you hold the view that the state should leave individuals free 
to act as they wish on moral issues such as abortion, marriage, and so on, is this one view - 
the state should leave such matters to individual consciences - or is it as many views as one 
can enumerate particular instances? If holding more views was better generalising a view so 
that it subsumed many particular cases within it would reduce one's moral standing. That is 
surely wrong. What if you don't have a view on such matters - perhaps you cannot decide 
what the right position is. Is it better to take a view, no matter what the view is, then not to 
have one? That hardly seems right. But to be an agent with views need not imply that one 
has made one's mind up about everything. That would be like saying that to be a moral agent 
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one must have determinate moral beliefs. Not to have made up one's mind about which of 
two or more competing views is right is not to cease to be an agent with a view. As I shall 
explain shortly, what is important about being an agent with a view is the logical preconditions 
of being such an agent. That one has only tentative views, or has not yet made up one's mind 
between possible alternatives, does not affect these preconditions. 
Thus my position is different and distinct from all three approaches to the justification 
of political authority which I discussed earlier. It does not say that we should uphold the norms 
that we find in our community, although the concept of membership of a community does play 
a role in it. It does not depend upon a pre-political consensus, although reaching a consensus 
at some level is the goal of the political process. Thus like such consensual views 
acceptability to all plays a vital role, but that acceptability is set as a goal to be achieved if 
legitimacy is to be attained, rather than a foundation of the system as such. Lastly, my 
position is not grounded upon any conception of the good for human beings which it Is the role 
of the state to promote, although the state is not debarred from acting on conceptions of the 
good if doing so is the legitimate result of the political process. So while elements from all 
three approaches are accommodated within the position I outline here, it is grounded upon 
none of them. 
6.3 THE NATURE OF VIEWS 
Now, however, I turn to the crucial question for the argument I want to develop on the 
basis of this conception of agents with views. What about the nature of the views themselves? 
I have said that a view is, for my purposes, a political view. It is a normative belief about the 
scope and limits of legitimate political action. The view can be positive or negative in content, 
and held explicitly or implicitly. But now what I want to draw attention to is that all views will, in 
a sense I will explain, be grounded views. 
Views as grounded on iustifying reasons 
The idea of a grounded view is this: views are not mere prejudices, or matters of 
taste, or totally arbitrary. Views are, or can be, justified by appeal to some reason or reasons 
which the agent believes provides a justification for the view in question. Such reasons might 
be an underlying principle or reason, but they need not be. It might be an appeal to some 
other aspect of the view which I take to be decisive, for example what the Bible says, or the 
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consequences of actions. At bottom, though, will be some principle, whether or not the agent 
can spell it out, which is taken to make the holding of views on such grounds right. So that the 
appeal is not just "it says that homosexuality is wrong in the Bible", but, at bottom, that what It 
says in the Bible is right and constitutes what we should do. 1° Even if a view Is held to be self- 
evident - as in, for instance, that torturing children is wrong - this still Implies a principle that 
here no further reasons are necessary to show moral rightness in this kind of case. 
It should be evident that this is a very wide conception of reasons which can justify 
views. The point is not that, after philosophical examination, the reasons do turn out to justify 
the view in question. Rather it is that agents must be able to claim, and defend the claim, that 
their view is justified for these reasons which they can cite. Whether the reasons are valid 
reasons for any view, and whether they do indeed justify the view in question, are precisely the 
issues which can cause disagreements to arise. So reasons which ground views can take any 
form: they can be logical, or pragmatic, or inferences to the best explanation. They can utilise 
deductive premises, generalisations, claims to authority, and all forms of argument. They can 
be expressed in the form of reasoned argument or more suggestively in fiction and parable. 
No claim can be ruled out in advance. The criterion of having grounding reasons is in this 
sense purely a formal one. Views are here considered just as they submit themselves, as it 
were, for reasoned examination, rather than after such an examination. 
Hence this conception of agents with views is mean to apply to the fundamentalist as 
much as the enlightened liberal. The fundamentalist has beliefs which he may think are 
unquestionable: their truth, say, is guaranteed by their appearance in the holy book, at least in 
some interpretation of it. But still this view is grounded on a claim that what is in that book 
represents the unquestionable word of a god, or whatever, and some reasons will be adduced 
to support that claim. And such reasons, being reasons, can be challenged like any others. 
So the fundamentalist might think that they can avoid the commitments which I shall go on to 
argue agents with views cannot escape. But they are wrong in this belief. The logic of being 
even a fundamentalist drives them in the same direction. This need not mean that they must 
give up their claim to certainty -I shall argue below that my position does not involve the claim 
that all views must be regarded as fallible. But if the fundamentalist wants to continue being 
10 Ronald Dworkin has a similar notion In his concept of a moral position, which he uses to discriminate moral views from moral 
attitudes which are merely prejudices etc. See Taking Rights Seriously, (London, 1977), pp. 248-253. 
129 
able to justify, even to himself, that his beliefs are certainly true, then he is an agent with a 
view just as much as any other. 
Views and dogmas 
So are all the views I have been discussing grounded in this way? Well, it is possible 
to hold a belief, even a moral belief, which is not grounded in the way required for it to be 
properly a view. A belief could be held on grounds of mere prejudice or personal attraction or 
aversion. In that case the belief is not properly a view but is instead a mere dogma. Now, as 
a matter of fact I think that in the majority of cases beliefs are held on justifying grounds, 
whether these grounds are directly reasons for the belief or some form of meta-reason for why 
it is right to hold a belief in such a manner - for example, that it is right to believe the Bible 
because it is revealed truth, say. But there are also consequences involved in holding a belief 
as a dogma rather than as a grounded view. 
Firstly, if we hold a belief on grounds which we take to justify it we make an implicit 
claim to being a rational agent. True, others may not find very convincing the justification for a 
belief which we find compelling, and so they may not have a high estimation of our rational 
capacity, but they will have the sense that we have such a capacity. Yet if we hold beliefs as 
dogmas then, to the extent that that is apparent, others will lack the evidence that we are 
capable of rationality. This is linked to the second consequence, which is that a belief which is 
held as a dogma loses its claim on other people. A view which is based on justificatory 
grounds carries with it a claim that others should accept and believe it on the same grounds. 
(I come back to this public nature of justification below). It is part of having a view, but not part 
of having a dogma, that others should come to the same belief. A dogma, unlike a view, is 
essentially a private matter, as it is a question of personal taste or aversion, and not of reason. 
So, if we have as part of our beliefs the thought that others should believe the same thing, if, 
in other words, we take the truth of what we believe to be anything more than a purely 
personal matter, then we need to ensure that we hold our beliefs as views and not as dogmas. 
Only if we have views, properly speaking, do our beliefs have any rational claim upon other 
people. 
What about beliefs that do not, as it were, carry with them the desire to convert others 
to the same viewpoint? Some religions, for example, do not want to convert unbelievers, 
because the members of the religion are judged in some way to be the elect, and membership 
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of the elect or of the chosen people is not up to human choice. But even in such cases the 
desire is still that those not so blessed should recognise the truth about the world and their 
destiny. Thus, to take one instance, to be a Jew is a matter of birth, at least In the orthodox 
tradition, and orthodox Judaism does not seek converts. But that does not mean that non- 
Jews should not recognise and accept the beliefs on which Judaism is based. It is just that 
their role will be different. So even in such cases the beliefs still are taken to have a claim 
upon other people. 
Ob ections 
Now a couple of objections may occur at this point. Firstly, doesn't this conception of 
agents with views fail to distinguish the political views on which I want to focus from any view 
on any practical or theoretical issue at all? Secondly, haven't I cheated in my programme of 
working from the concept of agents with views to a justification of a political system, by 
building political views into the concept at the outset? 
On the first, the concept of grounded views is of course of general application to views 
about anything at all. I leave aside the issue of whether we can have beliefs which are not 
grounded, but based upon whim or fantasy. It may well be that there is no real difference here 
between practical and theoretical views. For my purposes, however, the difference will only 
emerge further in the argument. It is, in short, that only views which have political dimensions, 
which incorporate a position about the legitimate scope and limits of the state, will generate 
political commitments and obligations. Views about science may generate commitments to 
norms and institutions of scientific discourse, to the scientific community, but not to political 
association. Only views which are already political in nature, i. e. which are about what the 
state can and cannot do, will have that result. 
That of course leads to the second objection, that I have cooked the books by building 
in a political dimension from the start. I do not, however, think this risks making my argument 
circular. Indeed what I intend to show is that the political commitments we have, we in a 
sense already have simply through the holding of political views. It is not my programme to 
generate political commitments out of non-political beliefs. My position is that the holding of 
political views, even if only negative ones, is inescapable, and that that makes a fundamental 
political commitment to a certain sort of political system inescapable too. We are thus drawn 
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Into the political Institutions of what I shall call a deliberative democracy regardless of our 
ostensive views. 
Another thing I do not want to do is to use my argument as a justification of morality 
tout court, rather than simply of a political morality. My argument only works, If it does, 
because the views on which it is based have a political dimension. It may be possible to argue 
on parallel grounds that having views at all implies certain moral bonds, for example to the 
general wrongness of lying. But that is not my argument. In particular, my argument does not 
depend upon my being able to generate the moral out of the non-moral. I am not trying to do 
that. I am simply trying to spell out the implications of the political views we implicitly or 
explicitly hold. Indeed, I argued that being an agent with a view was not simply a matter of 
human nature. It is not possible to read off a moral requirement to be such an agent from the 
fact that we can be. 
Summa 
So far, then I have argued that we are all, or nearly all, agents with views. The views 
in question are about the scope and limits of legitimate political authority, and they need not be 
explicitly held. Any such view is grounded - that is, it is held on grounds of reasons and an 
underlying principle which together are held to be a justification for holding that view. Such 
grounds need not imply that all views must be held on purely rational grounds, since I can cite 
principles such as that the Bible should be our guide to behaviour, and explain why this is so; 
and I can admit factors such as sympathetic and imaginative identification into my grounds if I 
wish. The point is just that views are not held groundlessly, even though the grounds given 
can vary greatly in kind. 
I have tried to make the idea of agents with views plausible. It is simply the notion that 
we are each a separate agent with our own political beliefs, and that our beliefs, if they are not 
mere dogmas, are grounded upon justifying reasons. It is because our beliefs are views and 
not dogmas that conflicting claims about the character and purposes of political authority 
arise. My contention is that this is how we primitively confront each other in society. My 
procedure now will be to excavate further what is involved in being a political agent at all, in 
being an agent with views, to show that certain political commitments are already implied in 
our very status as such agents. In being agents with views we are already implicated in 
processes which provide a basis for mutuality and a moral community. 
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6.4 JUSTIFICATION AND THE COMMUNITY OF TALK 
The public nature of justification 
To be an agent with a view, I have suggested, is to hold a view on grounds which 
seek to justify the view. These grounds might either be directly reasons for holding the view to 
be right, or a principle which takes rightness to lie in some foundational principle - like, for 
example, that the Bible is an infallible and righteous guide to action. Now, it follows from the 
grounded nature of views that we have an obligation to respond to challenges to our view by 
citing the grounds which justify it, listening to criticism, and defending the view in rational 
debate. Why is any agent with a view obliged to this extent? Being an agent with a view 
means one holds views which have justifying grounds. The obligation to be prepared to justify 
one's view arises from the nature of justification itself. At first sight, justification applies to 
myself only. In advancing my view, I am committed to the claim that my view is justified by the 
grounding reasons I would cite in defence of my claim. All that I might take this to mean is 
that I regard the justification as sufficient to justify my holding the belief. But it is intrinsic to 
justification by grounding reasons that this justification is not private, is not for me only. 
Justification is intrinsically public: if I claim that reasons justify my view I am 
committed to claiming that they do so not only for me but impersonally, for others too. If I 
have a view which I justify on the basis of reasons, then I am making a claim that others 
should share my view for the same reasons. To say that I have reasons which ground my 
view is precisely to say that holding the view in question is not just a matter of whim or 
personal taste, but a matter of rational compulsion given the grounding premises. Of course, 
others may not acknowledge the soundness of the justification which I claim to see and 
believe; but nevertheless I must hold that this justification should be sufficient for them too, 
even though they cannot see it. 
So justification is intrinsically public in the sense that my justifying reasons for my view 
are reasons not for me, but in principle for others too. But there is a further dimension to this 
public nature of justification. Having a view which is grounded in reasons involves the implicit 
claim that my view is grounded rightly on the best reasons. That is what it means to say that 
my view is justified. Therefore, it follows that when my view is queried or challenged by others 
need to listen to the challenge and to respond. I have to reassure, in the first instance 
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myself, and secondarily others, that my view Is indeed justified by being validly grounded on 
the best reasons, or I have to develop my views in order to take account of criticisms I have to 
accept as being rightly made. If I do not respond in this way then I lose the basis for my claim 
that I have a legitimate view, since that involves the presumption that my view Is grounded on 
reasons. If I do not listen and respond to criticism then my view becomes no longer grounded 
on reasons in the sense that the reasons justify the view, but becomes a view I assert without 
any longer caring whether the grounding reasons I may still give actually justify the view. In 
that way what starts as a view, based upon grounds which justify the view, or are claimed to 
do so, atrophies into a dogma. I may, of course, want to insist that the reasons still do justify 
the view, but I can only do so if I show that I am responding to criticisms which have been 
made of the view and its justification. 
But can't I just dismiss criticisms? If I am sufficiently arrogant then I can adopt a 
dismissive style, true, and reject criticism out of hand. However, in so doing, I am implying 
that the criticism is ill-founded - it ignores or misconstrues some factors, or leads to 
unacceptable consequences, etc. If I actually take no notice of criticism, or fail to give it 
proper weight, then I am failing to do justice to my own views as being rationally justified. I am 
failing to show to myself, and so to others, that my views are held for the best reasons and 
rightly follow from those reasons. So having a justified view is not a static position: one must 
be ready to become involved in a dynamic process of maintaining and developing the 
justification. And that process is intrinsically a public one. 
Beins drawn into discussion 
Couldn't this process of justification just be private in another sense, in that while 
must develop my position in response to the views and criticisms of others I need not enter 
into dialogue with them? Well, there are many different ways of engaging in public dialogue, 
and some degree of vicarious participation is possible as one follows the debate between 
protagonists without speaking up oneself. But some degree of participation in public dialogue 
is an inevitable part of having views, for a number of reasons. Firstly, comprehending 
different positions to one's own and arguments against the view you hold is not just a matter of 
listening to an opponent in silence and inwardly, silently to oneself, mounting a defence. It 
involves discussion even to understand what the issues at stake are, although the forms of 
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discussion are broad and can encompass both oral and written communication. Secondly, to 
have a view which Is justified is implicitly to say that other views are not justified, and that all 
agents should agree with the view you hold because it is rationally, i. e. Impersonally, justified. 
But then holding to your own view means being prepared to say to others why their views are 
mistaken. Thirdly, we are talking about views which have a practical character. That too is 
part of their public nature: they in many cases will give reasons for action which are meant to 
be of general applicability. It is again part of the logic of having a view that if they are meant to 
be of more general application then you do not keep them to yourself, although that they are 
public does not mean that they have to be universal - they may only apply to agents In certain 
circumstances. 
However, these various dimensions of the inescapably public nature of being an agent 
with a view imply that, although agents have an implicit commitment to participation in public 
dialogue, that commitment is not open-ended in one sense. It does not imply that agents have 
to strenuously devote all their energies to political discussion. For many, discussion might be 
low key and largely informal, although it should be informed by the wider political debate, and 
a political deliberative process should involve the provision of suitable forums for discussion. 
While a level of political participation is mandatory for all agents, a high level of activism 
remains voluntary. 
I am, however, required to give my justifying reasons for my views if I am asked to do 
so. This is because having justifying reasons is intrinsically a public position. My justifying 
reasons are open to public debate. If they are criticised I must listen and respond because 
part of what it is to have justifying reasons is to be responsive to criticism. I cannot ignore 
criticism from others and maintain that I have justifying reasons. Thus while I may feel I do 
not have to justify myself to others I cannot maintain the position of having a justified view if I 
do not fulfil my rational obligations, which are part of what it is to have justifying reasons for a 
view. Hence I am drawn into public discussion and justification perhaps even against my will, 
for it is not a matter of will but of the logic of my views, which inextricably involves obligations 
to others. I am not, though, committed to ultimate agreement. It may be rational and 
justifiable for agents to agree to differ. This means that my commitment is not to a 
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universalistic ethics (this is the difference of my view from that of Habermas which I discussed 
in the previous chapter) but to being able to justify my view on intelligible grounds. 
This commitment to justification as a public matter is a necessary consequence of the 
concept of justification. It is not just a desire that people have to justify themselves to others. 
Thus my view differs from that put forward by Thomas Scanlon", who argues that we have a 
socially acquired desire to justify our actions to others on grounds they could not reasonably 
reject. Scanlon's argument is directed towards the issue of the foundation of morality, and he 
wants to argue for that foundation as being the desire for reasonable agreement. It Is, 
however, frequently invoked in discussions within political philosophy, as capturing the view of 
Rawls and others that the use of political authority should be rendered accepted to all. The 
overriding moral aim, according to Scanlon, is that of general, uncoerced, agreement. The 
extension to the political sphere is in terms of looking for a system of rules which no-one can 
reasonably reject as the basis for the use of political authority, even if that authority is not used 
in ways which everyone holds as their own preferred alternative. 12 
What, however, are the grounds of this desire to justify ourselves to others? Scanlon 
merely says that it is not a natural desire, but one inculcated by education, and claims that "it 
seems to me that the desire to be able to justify one's actions (and institutions) on grounds 
one takes to be acceptable is quite strong in most people". 13 Scanlon's position seems to be 
a version of Kant's moral philosophy. The desire to justify oneself to others embodies respect 
for others as ends in themselves, and requires that the moral law be universal'14 but Scanlon 
seeks to avoid the metaphysical commitments of Kant by making this desire a contingent 
social fact about us. However, he gives no account of the status of this supposed fact, how it 
is brought about and its place in relation to other truths about our character. If the desire to 
justify oneself to others coexists with the desire to realise one's own moral beliefs, and the two 
conflict, then how is the tension to be resolved? 
Moreover, there seems no necessary connection between the desire to justify 
" Thomas Scanlon, 'Contractualism and Utilitarianism, ' Utilitarianism and Beyond, eds. Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams 
(Cambridge, 1982), pp. 103-128. 
' The clearest account of the political use of Scanlon is found in Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (New York, 1991), pp. 36-37. 
Often Scanlon's work is invoked in political discussion without making clear the amendment which has to be made to adapt his view 
from the context of moral theory in which it was originally advanced. 
" Scanlon, op. cit, p. 117. 
The relationship between Scanlon's position and that of Kant is mentioned in Nagel, op. cit., p. 37. 
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ourselves to others, and the reaching of uncoerced agreements. We may well desire to justify 
our views to others, and because we hold our views to be justified ones, we think that what 
justifies them to us should also justify them to others. But it is a further significant step to go 
on to say that we want to justify our views to others on grounds which no-one could 
reasonably reject. That is a much stronger claim, that we have a desire to reach common 
grounds of justification. Scanlon is committed to this stronger claim. He says that "people are 
willing to go to considerable lengths, involving quite heavy sacrifices, in order to avoid 
admitting the unjustifiability of their actions and institutions. "15 This, however, fails to 
differentiate between the two ways in which we might have a desire to justify, on our own 
terms or on a common basis. That we have a desire to justify ourselves to others on a 
common basis is much less plausible, and Scanlon has no argument to show that it is a desire 
that we do, or should, have. 
Scanlon sets up his account largely as an improvement on that of Rawls, since he 
takes Rawls' principles of justice to be primarily justified on the grounds of a rational choice 
behind the veil of ignorance, and he thinks that this is not equivalent, as Rawls must take it to 
be, to the moral question of what each individual could accept or not reasonably reject. 16 I 
have argued above that Rawls' argument can be seen in a different light. My main criticism of 
Rawls was that his justification of the principles of justice depended upon uncovering an 
underlying consensus on certain values, and that he was not entitled to make this claim prior 
to any political process. Similar remarks can be directed towards Scanlon's position. He 
makes an assumption about the desire we have to justify ourselves to others, but does not 
substantiate this claim, and indeed it seems implausible that we each have the strong desire 
to justify which his position needs. 
Thus our commitment to public justification cannot just be based, as it is for Scanlon, 
on an dubious empirical claim about desires we happen to have. Indeed, it is not a 
psychological matter. It would of course be factually possible to do a number of things when 
one's views are challenged, or to promote one's views, of which engaging in reasoned 
discussion is just one. Nevertheless, entering into discussion does have a particular weight 
Scanlon, op. CN., p. 117. 
~ Ibd., p. 119-128, especially p. 121. 
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among the range of possible responses. That your view has grounds carries with it the 
implication that you should be ready to advance those grounds in defence of your views when 
you are asked to justify your position. This may not be the only commitment one takes oneself 
to have: there may be obligations to act arising from your position, and it will take more 
argument for me to show that there are constraints on such imperatives arising precisely from 
this obligation to justify. But the central point I wish to establish at this point is that we do have 
a commitment to public justification, but that this commitment is not an empirical matter, or 
indeed a matter of desire at all. It is a commitment which arises from the very logic of having 
views, and is therefore a commitment which is rationally necessary regardless of what desires 
we contingently have and the stances we may self-defeatingly take up. 
Ideal and real discussions 
I have argued that the public nature of the justification of our views has a tendency to 
draw us into public dialogue. This is not to be understood as implying that our views are to be 
justified by any hypothetical procedure for deriving and justifying norms, such as Rawls' 
original position or Habermas' ideal speech situation. Rawls' project involves using the 
original position as a device for articulating the norms which follow from our grounding 
commitment to fairness, or the freedom and equality of persons. It is not designed as a 
procedure in which people might actually engage, except imaginatively, as a way of reassuring 
themselves that the foundation of their society is something they can endorse. '? Similarly, 
although some have taken Habermas to be positing a view of the good society in his model of 
the ideal speech situation, it seems far more plausible to interpret it as providing standards for 
real discussions, and as a model for thought experiments in which we can work through what 
a discursive justification of a norm might be. 18 The difference between the original position 
and the ideal speech situation models is that the former can be used to reach determinate 
theoretical conclusions about the principle which would be endorsed by participants in the 
original position. With respect to the ideal speech situation, however, because it only provides 
formal standards to which participants in real dialogues should aspire, no conclusion can be 
determined theoretically and in advance of real discussions. 
" See my discussion of Rawls In Chapter Three above. The role of the original position In real life Is clearly spelt out by Samuel 
Freeman, "Original Meaning, Democratic Interpretation, and the Constitution, ' Philosophy and Public Affairs, 21 (Winter 1992), 342. 
" Simone Chambers, Reasonable Democracy (Ithaca, New York, 1996), pp. 155-172, discusses both Interpretations of Habermas, and 
I follow her arguments here. 
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However, my project is different from both that of Rawls and of Habermas. What I am 
arguing is that to have any view is to be committed to actual speech and dialogue, no matter 
what the nature of the justification of that view. To anticipate somewhat, I will argue that, if 
political legitimacy is to be achieved, then political decisions must be based upon a 
discussion, and there are certain minimum standards which the discussion must satisfy if it Is 
to be legitimising. But this is not a norm of an ideal discussion. Although certain 
characteristics of discussions, principally exclusiveness, can cause it to fail to be legitimising, 
there is no standard which a discussion must reach if it is to justify a decision. Providing the 
minimum conditions are satisfied then the form of the discussion, and the considerations 
which can be brought to bear, are open. Moreover, and this differentiates my view from both 
Rawls and Habermas, but the latter in particular, the concern in being drawn into public 
dialogue on my view is not to reach agreement upon moral beliefs. It is rather to reach a 
decision about what to do, about how society should go on, even if there continues to be 
disagreement about the substantive normative issue. One way of putting this difference would 
be to say that my account is not concerned with reaching moral truth or even moral 
consensus, but in reaching practical political decisions. These decisions have to be moral but 
only in so far as they must be morally legitimate political decisions. They can be that, and yet 
be practical compromises rather than fully justified substantive moral beliefs. Dialogue on my 
view is real and political, not hypothetical and moral. 
Freedom of discussion 
I now turn to further explore what is involved in the notion of public discussion into 
which, I have argued, agents with views are drawn. This conception of agents with views and 
the necessity of being prepared to engage in public discussion of ones views might appear to 
have some affinity with the position of Mill in On Liberty, when he claims that "If all mankind 
minus one were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind 
would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be 
justified in silencing mankind". 19 I will contrast my view with that of Mill, and thereby bring out 
further features of what is involved in my conception of dialogue. 
*John Stuart Mill. 'On Liberty, Utilitarianism, ed. Mary Warnock (London, 1962), p. 142. 
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In supporting this advocacy of unlimited freedom of discussion, Mill has three 
arguments. 2° Firstly, humans are fallible and history is full of examples of opinions being 
suppressed which we later held to be true after all. Since the possession of truth Is a benefit 
we should consider and not suppress all views, even those we hold to be false. Secondly, we 
can only be assured that our views are true if there is freedom for them to be disputed, and to 
prove themselves in discussion: "Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion 
is the very condition which justifies us In assuming its truth for the purposes of action; and on 
no other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being right. 921 
This is another sense in which humans are fallible: without freedom of opinion and discussion 
we cannot rationally judge the truth and falsity of our views. Thirdly, without free discussion, 
we may hold true opinions but we will not know the truth. We will not know the grounds for our 
opinions, nor understand fully their meaning and implications. Having one's views challenged 
is essential to understanding them: otherwise, for those who do not engage in such discussion 
a belief "may be true, but it might be false for anything they know: they have never thrown 
themselves into the mental position of those who think differently from them, and considered 
what such persons might have to say; and consequently they do not, In any proper sense of 
the word, know the doctrine which they themselves profess... So essential is this 
discipline to 
a real understanding of moral and human subjects, that if opponents of all Important truths do 
not exist, it is indispensable to imagine them, and supply them with the strongest arguments 
which the most skilful devil's advocate can conjure up. "22 
All these arguments of Mill depend upon the claim that we must take our views to be 
fallible. Mill argues that we cannot hold our opinions with certainty, but Instead must always 
regard them as being possibly false. Now, my own account does not depend upon such a 
claim of fallibilism. I have argued that we are drawn into dialogue simply as a logical 
consequence of having a view, not because we must hold that view to be possibly wrong. On 
my account, even if we think our view to be certainly true we cannot avoid the tendency to be 
drawn into discussion, and that not because our certainty need be misplaced, but because the 
justification for any view can be questioned and criticised. Moreover, although this explains 
why we cannot avoid being drawn into dialogue, it is not a complete account of why we might 
"Here I toslow the analysis given in C. L. Ten, Mill on Liberty (Oxford, 1980), pp. 124-143. 
r Min, op. cit.. p. 145. 
12 Ibid., p. 164 
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be motivated to enter into it. It is a one-sided account, since if someone is being drawn, 
perhaps unwillingly, into discussion, compelled by the logic of views, there is another person 
actively doing the drawing by their questioning and criticising. I may be certain of the rightness 
of my view, not because I am a religious fundamentalist, say, but because I believe, for 
example, that treating people unfavourably on racial grounds is morally wrong. Then I may 
enter into discussion about that view not unwillingly, under pressure from a proponent of racial 
discrimination, but actively and willingly, in order to persuade those tempted by racism of the 
wrongness of that position. If I believe that my moral beliefs are right then I believe that others 
should hold them too, on the same grounds, and that has a tendency as well to propel us into 
discussion as we question the differing views of others. So on my account it is not the fallibility 
of our beliefs which primarily motivates us into discussion, although that may be a factor in 
many cases, but simply the logic of justification of views. But is this a more plausible account 
of the motivation to enter into discussion than the one Mill provides, which is based upon the 
fallibility of our beliefs? 
Mill says we should enter into dialogue with others, and consider other views, because 
unless we do so we cannot take ourselves to have true and justified beliefs. The necessity for 
discussion arises because our views might be wrong, and unless we prove these views 
continually in opposition to others we cannot know that they are right. But this seems an 
implausible claim. In some spheres this might be a motive for entering into dialogue: in 
scientific or philosophical enquiry, for example, discussion is necessary for the correction of 
error, and only those views which have survived expert peer discussion can be regarded as 
being at least candidates for truth. But this conception does not extend into all aspects of the 
sphere of practical beliefs. Here it seems more plausible to say that in many instances we 
enter into discussion convinced of the rightness of our views, and in order to convince others. 
We believe that our moral or religious views are correct ones, and discuss with others in order 
to bring them to our viewpoint, whereas Mill seems to think that we must always be ready to 
believe that our opponents may be right, and our beliefs wrong, and that we should enter 
dialogue open to the possibility of being converted. 
Unlike Mill's account, my conception of agents with views recognises that we do not 
enter into dialogue on many practical matters in order to avoid error. The motivation for 
discussion with others is often to convince others of the rightness of your views, not because 
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you think they might be wrong. Now, in so far as you are discussing with others who have 
different views which are also based on grounds they take to justify the views, then Indeed it is 
a possibility that the force of argument might show that their view is right and yours wrong. 
But that need not be a very likely outcome, nor need it be one which you have In mind when 
entering dialogue. If you enter into discussion with a racist who advances grounds for their 
racism - say, arguments about the distribution of IQ among ethnic groups - you need not think 
that your views might be wrong and that being persuaded of the truth of racism Is a possible 
outcome. Your anti-racist view is based upon grounding reasons, and so as a rational agent 
you must acknowledge that if compelling reasons for racist views were forthcoming you would 
have to change your moral view. But you need not enter into discussion with a racist to see if 
that result comes about, as it were in a spirit of disinterested inquiry, with an open mind as to 
what the truth might be. The arguments for racism, such as they are (and more often, but not 
always, racist views are dogmas rather than properly grounded views), are well known, and 
there need be no expectation that the discussion will throw up new ones. You enter Into 
discussion in order to bring others to agree with you, not because you think you might come to 
agree with them. 
. So what attitude need we take towards discussion and debate? We must indeed 
be prepared to engage in such debate if our beliefs are challenged. But there is no necessity 
to go around stirring up debate, if we do not regard our capacity for rationality as high among 
the goods we should be promoting. We cannot avoid being drawn into debate if we are to 
continue holding our beliefs as well-grounded. But we need not stir up such debate in order to 
reassure ourselves of the truth of our views. 
Mill would contend that unless we actively sought out debate we risk reducing our 
beliefs to a mere prejudice, as we lose a real grip on what the beliefs mean or signify. That 
means that we must always be considering challenges to scientific, moral, and religious 
beliefs. This is an implausible position. It implies that we can only believe that torturing 
children is wrong, say, if we can find people prepared to deny that. There are two objections 
to such an idea, though. Firstly, it implies that we must always be prepared to contemplate 
belief in the immoral. Yet how can we contemplate that torturing children could be right, not 
just perhaps on some story which poses a moral dilemma in highly unlikely circumstances, but 
as a general moral truth? And what damage is done to our capacities as moral agents if we 
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are able to contemplate with favour moral evil? Secondly, and perhaps more fundamentally, it 
does not seem necessary to always be challenging my beliefs if they are to be maintained as 
rational. If I regard the reasons for them as sufficient to justify the belief then that Indeed does 
seem sufficient. Knowing the grounds on which I hold a belief may Indeed help strengthen 
that belief, and that does mean that I implicitly deny alternatives to those grounds. But it need 
not follow that I need to continue to defend those grounds and need continually to find 
challenges to them. A Christian need not always find heretics to fight, nor give up their project 
of converting all humanity to Christian beliefs, which would also follow from Mill's view. Their 
conviction of the existence of God and Jesus and the truth in some sense of the Bible does 
not require that they need always be finding ways of establishing it anew. But it does require 
that if it is challenged they be prepared to defend it, they cannot just ignore challenges. It is 
important to think what this means in practice. A church group can develop and practice its 
faith without having to find non-believers in which to engage in weekly debate solely to 
continue to prove to themselves the justifiability of their beliefs. But in a society where 
Christian beliefs are challenged they cannot avoid meeting this challenge. They need to 
defend their views and cannot just turn aside as if the views of others did not matter. They 
matter to those who hold the beliefs which are being challenged, in order to maintain 
assurance in the justifiability of those beliefs. But if no challenge is forthcoming then they 
need not create one. 
However, this is not the full story, because while there Is no need to engage In 
discussion in order to continually to prove to oneself the justification of one's views, 
nevertheless the public nature of the justification does mean that there is a motivation to 
engage in dialogue with others in order to bring them to agree with you. The prime implication 
of this is that it is through dialogue that you should seek to promote your views, and I shall 
argue in the next chapter that it is self-defeating to seek to promote views in any other way. 
Indeed, strictly speaking, while a belief which is held as a view can be promoted by other 
means - by manipulation, say -a view, which is based upon grounding reasons, cannot be 
promoted other than by seeking to persuade others of the rightness of those reasons. But it 
does not follow from this that everyone must be evangelical for each of their views, actively 
seeking to convert others. The key point is that agents with views must be prepared to defend 
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and advance their views through discussion, and that therefore the holding of views draws 
agents into dialogue. 
Are agents with views autonomous agents? 
I have argued that the public nature of the justification of our views has a tendency to 
draw us, willingly or not, to engage in public dialogue. This leads us on to the question, 
however, of whether we can ever identify with our beliefs, if they are always open to challenge, 
and whether the conception of agents with views does not presuppose that we are 
autonomous agents. But I have argued that the conception of agents with views is not an end 
for human beings. So personal autonomy cannot be an end either. Yet someone might say 
that in holding our views on grounds which are open to public justification we are saying that 
they are potentially revisable, so that we can never see any particular beliefs as constitutive of 
our identity. And that looks like a conception of autonomy. Now, I don't think it follows from 
being potentially revisable that our beliefs cannot constitute our identity. We need not think 
that revision is a very likely prospect, and we can also think, without contradiction, that there 
are some views which, if I were forced to give up, would constitute a change of psychological 
identity in some way. To say that I identify myself through my religion, particular interests or 
tastes, my sporting loyalties, or whatever, is not to deny that I can envisage my identification 
with these altering in some way, perhaps through a loss of belief or simply some change in 
myself. And if this happens I must recognise that my character as a person would also to 
some degree change. Being an agent with a view must mean that we recognise that there is 
at least a potential for change of belief, no matter how remote and even repugnant such a 
change may seem to us here and now. 
So the conception of agents with views does not imply a commitment to personal 
autonomy, if by that is meant a detachment from one's ends because they are potentially 
revisable. They are potentially revisable, but their being so does not have this consequence. 
There is no necessity to regard revisability as something very proximate, which would imply 
that one's identity could not be tied up in one's ends. What about autonomy in the sense that 
we must rationally approve all our ends, they must be something to which we assent? Here, 
note, it does appear that acting autonomously in this sense requires that we adopt our ends as 
our own. And it does follow from the notion of agents with views that our beliefs are ones we 
approve on grounds which we take to be sufficient to justify the belief. That does not mean 
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that we cannot accept a belief on the basis of tradition, rather than reasoning afresh for 
ourselves, but we must be prepared to justify the rightness of acting from tradition. So while 
we do not need to act autonomously in order to be an agent with a view, nevertheless there 
must be a point at which we are personally prepared to defend the way we do act on the basis 
of grounding reasons which we endorse and with which we identify. So in this weak sense 
being an agent with a view does require a degree of personal autonomy. But it is not the sort 
of autonomy that those opposed to such a conception have in mind. 
However, it does seem plausible that, if the amount and qualitative level of public 
deliberation were to increase, more of this activity of justification, and of examining the rational 
basis of one's own views, would be likely to go on, and the chances of some actually revising 
their views would, at least initially, be increased. Over time we might expect that people would 
hold some views with less certainty of their truth, because they were better acquainted with 
counter-arguments and the pitfalls in one's own justifications. So the tendency of a 
deliberative democracy would be to bring about a society in which more people were 
autonomous agents than before, and tended to hold their beliefs with less certainty about their 
truth. It need not be that this scepticism and autonomy applied to all personal decision- 
making and action, or even to the key points of a life, since after reflection more people may 
come to appreciate the importance of elements of dependence and distinguish between 
decisions best made for oneself and those best made for you. A strong commitment to 
thoroughgoing personal autonomy may turn out to be no more justifiable than its opposite. 
Still, even so, the amount of autonomy one exercised in life would itself be a matter of 
personal decision-making, it would seem. Does this consequence mean that my project will 
not be acceptable to those for whom notions of personal autonomy are a great modern evil? I 
think not, for two reasons: firstly, because I am not endorsing the caricature of rigorous 
autonomy, but a relatively mild form, and, secondly, because autonomy is not something 
which a deliberative democracy would promote, but rather, to the extent that it would develop, 
it is just an unintended consequence. But might not an opponent still shy away due to an 
aversion even to this consequence? At this point I have to say that they cannot avoid a mild 
commitment to autonomy if they want to be an agent with a view, and, as I have argued 
above, not to be an agent with a view is self-defeating in that it turns beliefs into dogmas, and 
thus the belief loses its rational hold on ourselves and on others. This is a high price to pay 
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for ceasing to be an agent with a view. So some limited version of personal autonomy Is an 
inescapable part of being an agent with a view. I do not think anyone should feel threatened 
by this, for the reasons I've explained, but ultimately, if they are, they just have to face up to 
the fact that autonomy to this partial extent is an unavoidable part of having any views at all. 
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Chapter Seven 
The political commitments of agents with views 
7.1 THE PROBLEM RESTATED 
When we encounter each other in society the question arises of how our social 
relationships are to be ordered. The principal requirement of each of us is to live in a 
community with which we are in harmony. We want social arrangements within which we can 
flourish, even though our views vary on the extent to which our flourishing depends upon 
society, ranging from anarchy and the night-watchman view of the state through to fully 
paternal views. Social harmony is thus some sort of equilibrium point between society and 
our selves, as we are or as we may be. A morally legitimate community is thus a requirement 
if we are to be free and to achieve happiness, however those terms are defined and related to 
each other. 
What is in question is the form our social arrangements should take if they are to 
constitute the basis for a moral community. The question is about the basic structure of 
society, those basic institutions and relationships which provide the framework with which our 
full range of relationships must be consistent and coherent. This basic structure is a political 
structure, which is to say that it is to do with the state. The state is an institution which is 
meant to be socially authoritative: if the state is morally legitimate - that is, if states in general 
are morally legitimate and any particular one is an instance of a morally legitimate state - then 
it is ultimately morally empowered to use coercion to implement decisions and policies about 
how particular societies should be ordered. Thus fundamental questions of political morality 
concern both the nature of the basic structure and the legitimacy of the use of political 
authority both to bring about that structure and in the implementation of its business. There 
are two issues here, then, first about the morally ideal form of basic social arrangements, and 
second about the moral legitimacy of the authority which such arrangements assume, in their 
establishment and in their operation. 
The problem which these issues pose is that of reconciling the singularity of the 
answers to which they must give rise, with the plurality of views about moral and political 
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issues which seem to exist in society. But the task is, I have argued, not simply that of 
reconciling a plurality of moralities and cultures in a single common framework. Each 
individual Is to be reconciled to the basic structure of society but this Is not just a matter of 
reconciliation between each individual, taken one by one, with the single viewpoint of society. 
It is also a mutual reconciliation, where each of us can rest not just in knowledge of our 
individual harmony with society but that we are in this respect in harmony with our fellows too. 
Otherwise I do not truly know whether harmony exists; we may be calling values by the same 
name but meaning different things by them. There is thus a mutual assurance requirement 
for political legitimacy. It arises because we are each an agent with a view about the values 
we can, do, and should share. For a moral community to exist we must at least find some 
basis for agreement about the basic social structure. In finding such agreement the 
emphasis needs to be as much on the finding as on the values on which we converge. Even 
if it turns out we all share some fundamental value we need the knowledge that we do share it 
if it is to be able to play a politically foundational role. We may each claim adherence to 
fairness, say, but it is not possible to simply build an uncontroversial design for basic social 
institutions upon that basis. In setting out what fairness implies we are setting out one view 
about what fairness implies, a view which is contestable and which others claiming to support 
fairness will likely contest. Hence a consensus is not the starting point of politics, but a 
political achievement. 
So the problem is how agents with views can ever live in a morally legitimate basic 
social structure which meets this stringent requirement of mutual assurance. Building social 
structures upon common values seems to presuppose more fundamental structures which 
can provide the framework within which a value consensus can be achieved. My argument in 
this chapter will be to show that agents with views must support a basic social framework 
which is one of a form of deliberative democracy. 
7.2 OUTLINE OF THE ARGUMENT 
The starting point for resolving the moral problem of political legitimacy is that we are 
agents with views. From this basis I intend to show that we are rationally drawn to support 
institutions of deliberative democracy. In outline, my argument is as follows: 
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1. being an agent with a view involves us in public commitments, and a 
requirement to maintain a community of talk if our capacity as such agents is to be 
maintained; 
2. maintaining such a community requires a settled way of going on. It 
would be rationally self-defeating for us to seek to impose our own views on how to 
goon; 
3. we are thus led to seek agreement with others about how to go on, 
including on how to proceed when we discover we disagree about issues. We 
therefore find ourselves caught up in the institutions and practices of deliberative 
democracy. 
I argued in the previous chapter for the proposition that in seeking to work out 
what principles should govern the foundational structure of society one needs to start from a 
conception of agents with views. By that I mean that one is working out what bottom-line, 
rationally inescapable, commitments, if any, agents have as to how relations between them 
should be governed over matters to do with the general good or right or general Interests, 
beyond those contained or implied by their already existing beliefs and opinions. This 
procedure is what is required for the derivation of specifically political views, as opposed to the 
sort of construction of moral views carried out by Rawls and others where, the aim being to 
work out what our moral views should be, agents are conceived prior to their having any moral 
opinions or beliefs. Hence, I am contending, applying moral theory to the particular questions 
of politics requires a different-level approach from its application to morality more generally. 
My initial contention has been that agents have a commitment to enter into 
public discussion of their own view, and, as an inescapable concomitant, of the views of other 
people. This commitment follows from the nature of views as being justified by grounding 
reasons. To maintain my claim to hold a justified view involves me in being ready to respond 
to the criticisms of others, to defend my view or to modify it in the light of criticisms I accept as 
being rightly made. If I do not so respond then I can no longer say, even to myself, that my 
view is justified, since I have not examined it against challenges which have been made. In 
this sense, then, justification of views is intrinsically a public matter. Agents are thus drawn 
into a process of discussion of their own views, a discussion of criticisms and alternatives. 
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7.3 MAINTAINING COMMUNITIES OF TALK 
The next stage in the argument is to show that being an agent with a view 
implicitly involves not just a commitment to participate In public discussion, but also a further 
commitment to accept the use of political authority to enforce one particular view, even if the 
view enforced is not the view the agent holds. I will argue that this further commitment In fact 
follows once again from the logic of what is involved in having a view which is justified by 
grounding reasons, and that it is a development of the commitment to become involved in 
public discussion. My aim is to show that this commitment, once it is fully unfolded, is not just 
to engage in discussion but also to accept that that discussion leads to the taking of a decision 
about what should be done, a decision which can then legitimately be implemented and 
enforced by the authority of the state. 
Two commitments: views and community 
Let us look again at the commitment to engage in public discussion. This 
commitment arises from the justification of one's own views, and such justification being a 
public and not a private matter. Agents get drawn into a process of public discussion. But 
around that bare commitment more is implied. Discussion does not take place in a vacuum 
but requires a set of relationships and structures. A process of public discussion involves the 
existence of social relationships which are more or less stable over time. Public discussion 
constitutes at least one dimension of community, a community of talk. In being committed to 
talk agents are thereby committed to participate in a community. The significance of 
introducing the term'community' here is that, in being committed to talk, agents are committed 
to a form of social relationships with other agents; and the form those relationships take 
include the existence of the culture and individual attributes which are needed for a process of 
public discussion to take place. Hence this commitment brings with it the participation of each 
individual agent in social structures which include the development and maintenance of 
capacities to reason; qualities of imagination; abilities to abide by rules, to listen, to respond to 
others in a reasonable way, to engage emotions but not to be overwhelmed by them, and so 
on. Thus communities of talk arise around each agent, drawing them into a web of social 
relationships determined by the necessary requirement on agency of being prepared to 
engage in dialogue with other agents. 
150 
So the commitment of each agent to participate in discussion implies a web of social 
relationships and structures. Now, we need to set against this inescapable involvement in a 
community of talk, the commitment each individual agent also has to the realisation of their 
own views. Part of what it means for an agent to have a belief about what is right in an issue 
of practical reason is that they be committed to acting upon their view; when the issue is one 
which requires it to be acted upon generally if it is to be realised, then they are committed to it 
being generally enacted. It is here that the problem of political authority arises, for the 
existence of political authority implies that a view is being enforced against the wishes of at 
least some agents. 
The political paradox 
There are two questions which can then be asked about the use of political authority: 
why should any agent accept the enforcement of a view which is not a view he or she thinks is 
right? And if they do accept that such an enforcement is legitimate, how can it be that they 
are not thereby committed to accepting the incompatible propositions both that their view 
should be enacted, and that another view, which is not theirs but which is being enforced by 
political authority, should also be enacted? The first of these questions asks for the existence 
of any political obligations to be justified, whereas the second raises the issue of the 'political 
paradox' apparently involved in accepting the legitimacy of any form of political authority, of 
which the famous'paradox of democracy' is a special case. ' The point of the supposed 
paradox is that it implies that, in fact, the acceptance by agents of any political authority 
involves them in embracing two incompatible beliefs, both that A, their own view, should be 
enacted, and that B, which is inconsistent with A but is the position which should be enforced 
according to whatever theory of political legitimacy the agent follows, should also be enacted. 
Hence the acceptance of political authority seems to involve a contradiction. 
The need, then, is to show why agents should accept the use of authority to enforce a 
view which may not be their own, and to further show why this is not incompatible with their 
having a commitment at the same time to the enforcement of their own view. Like the 
justification of political authority in terms of communal identification, 2 the account I have given 
' The seminal statement of the paradox of democracy can be found in Richard Wollheim, 'A Paradox In the Theory of Democracy, ' 
Philosophy, Politics and Society, Second Series, eds. P. Laslett and W. G. Runciman (Oxford, 1967), pp. 71-87. Some of the extensive 
literature this article generated is surveyed in Donald Weiss, 'Wollheim's Paradox: Survey and Solution, ' Political Theory I (May 1973), 
154-170, who also points out that the democratic paradox is only a special case of the general political paradox: see Old. pp. 169-170. 
' See footnote 4 In Chapter Six above for references. 
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of the implicit commitments of agents with views already involves the recognition that each 
agent is part of a community just in virtue of their having a belief, on grounds they claim to 
justify the belief, about practical issues. Unlike the communal identification view, however, 
this is not to invoke a whole and specific community from which each agent cannot escape. 
Agents are committed to some community, but on my account only to the communal life 
necessary to having a public discussion (which may, however, turn out to be an extensive 
commitment), and then not to any specific forms of that life. I will argue, however, that this 
commitment is sufficient to justify a commitment to accept the use of political authority. 
Maintainin4 the community 
An agent cannot avoid the commitment to a community of talk, and therefore 
is inescapably embroiled in a network of structures which constitute that community. To be 
committed to participate in a community of talk means being committed to participating in 
those structures. Now, there are certain necessary conditions for the continued existence of a 
community of talk: for example, the existence of some form of language, although not of any 
particular language; the provision of some forums of discussion, though not of any particular 
types of forum; the existence of some form of education; and so on. Among these necessary 
conditions is one which is crucial for the current argument, since it is a political condition for 
the existence of a community of talk. This is that, where there are issues about how the 
community will organise its affairs, then there needs to be a decision made, that is, a 
determination of what specifically will be done. That means that a single view of what should 
be done has to be enacted. This is a necessary condition of the continued existence of a 
community of talk: without such a decision the co-ordinated use of power and resources which 
a community requires will not be possible, and neither, therefore, will be the community itself. 
That does not mean that the decision must always be for the state to positively do something: 
it could equally be for the state to refrain from acting. I turn In the next section to discuss how 
this commitment to take decisions can be reconciled with the holding of individual, perhaps 
conflicting, views: in other words, how the appearance of paradox in politics can be removed 
and the individual and community reconciled. 
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7.4 FINDING OURSELVES COMMITTED TO DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
The link between discussion and decisions 
Individual agents find themselves, by virtue of their being committed to participate in a 
community of talk, already committed to the necessary conditions for maintenance of that 
community, including that there should be decisions taken about how it should collectively 
arrange its affairs. Without the realisation of these conditions then a community of talk will not 
be possible, and that would render incoherent the possibility of being an agent, which depends 
upon having views which are publicly justifiable. 
Now, in a community of talk not just any decision procedure will do. It is 
incompatible with the existence and maintenance of a community of talk that decisions be 
taken which prevent talk, or undermine its possibility or the conditions which sustain it, or 
which limit talk arbitrarily or in the interests of one particular viewpoint. Now, it might be 
argued that agents have conflicting commitments: to discussion, and to the enactment of their 
own views, and that the latter commitment is consistent with taking means to realise their 
views which are not those of discussion and which may be inconsistent with it, such as the 
use of force, or non-rational means of persuasion, or psychological manipulation and 
techniques like brainwashing. But this is to miss the crucial point that having one's own view 
is internally related to the existence of a community of talk. It is self-defeating to adopt means 
to the realisation of one's views which undermine the existence of a community on which their 
continuing justification - to one's self, as well as to others - depends. Note that an agent can 
never claim that their view is immune to further challenge - that possibility, and therefore the 
commitment to participate in discussion, never lapses. That therefore means that agents are 
always committed to decision procedures which are consistent with discussion. 
In the absence of agreement, however, why could not an agent take the view 
that there has been sufficient discussion, and that the time has come to act? That if others 
remain unconvinced, then that merely signifies the feebleness of their rational powers, and 
disqualifies them as participants in discussion? One agent cannot, however, write off others 
as legitimate participants in the public discussion, or write off that discussion itself. That 
others persist in not accepting your arguments does not licence you to conclude that they are 
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therefore benighted in some way, and that their apparent congenital obtuseness justifies you 
ceasing to take notice of their objections. It is not for anyone to decide who counts as a 
rational agent in this way. Rational agency is demonstrated by the ability to take part in 
rational discussion. That means primarily listening and responding to criticisms, asking 
questions, making inferences etc., that is, undertaking the typical activity of rational 
discussion. Merely not being convinced by an argument does not disqualify one from rational 
agency if grounds are shown for the lack of agreement, and if the person continues to exhibit 
the normal signs and responses of rationality. So the mere failure to command general 
assent for your views does not excuse you from the obligation to engage in general public 
discussion. 
So agents are committed to the existence of a community, which involves that 
a single view will on some issues need to be enforced. But which view will it be which Is 
enforced? The decision procedure must be related to the process of discussion. The holding 
of views implies a commitment to participate in discussion. If that discussion Is to be possible 
then a single view must in some circumstances - where collective action is necessary - be 
enforced. What sort of issues will this cover? It is impossible to fully specify the scope of 
what a community must collectively decide in advance, since some more basic decisions will 
determine whether other decisions are to be collectively taken. For example, decisions will 
only need to be taken on what welfare provision is to be collectively provided if the more basic 
decision has already been made that it is the business of the community to provide welfare to 
its individual members. But some single decisions are unavoidable in any community of talk. 
Any community must reach a view about what is for collective action and what to be left up to 
Individuals. More specifically, decisions will need to be made about: the structure of public 
discussion and decision-making; the provision of education; the physical boundaries and 
security of the community; the status, rights and responsibilities of its members. Without 
decisions on these matters a coherent community cannot exist. And, as I have said, 
depending upon how these basic issues are resolved, more extensive questions might come 
up for collective resolution too. 
The aaradox resolved 
So the taking of some collective decisions is unavoidable. That means that on the 
questions which are up for collective decision some single view will be enforced. But any view 
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which is enforced must then be a view which in some sense commands assent as the result 
of discussion. That Is why agents cannot adopt means to realise their views which are means 
of force or non-rational persuasion, rather than seeking to convince through discussion. To do 
this would mean that the agent would sever the connection between the view they hold and 
the grounding justification for that view. It would imply that the view was right regardless of 
whether it could be justified by its grounding reasons, which, as we have seen, means being 
defensible in a process of discussion. But that renders incoherent the notion of having views, 
rather than mere assertions. Any view which is enforced must therefore have emerged 
through discussion. 
Agents are therefore committed to a process of discussion leading to a 
decision where appropriate - not a decision which decides the truth, but which decides what to 
do. Now for the crucial step in the argument. Having such a commitment means that one 
must accept that views other than one's own will sometimes be enacted. The outcome of 
discussion is beyond the command of any individual. Moreover, not abiding by the outcome of 
a discussion, in terms of the practical decision that is taken, will result in the violation of what 
we have seen is a necessary condition for the maintenance of a community of talk, to which all 
agents are committed, that a single view be enacted. It follows, therefore, that agents are 
committed to a single view being enforced which may not be the view they themselves hold to 
be true. 
How legitimate decisions can be taken 
Now, what sense can be given to the idea that agents are committed to the 
enforcement of views which have emerged through discussion? The clearest sense is that 
the discussion might result in unanimous agreement about what is the right thing to do, that is, 
there will be universal convergence upon one view. It is likely that effective means of public 
discussion will lead to a higher degree of convergence of views than we currently see. But 
even if convergence is always possible, it is empirically likely than on some, perhaps many, 
issues, considerable areas of disagreement will remain. Since agents are committed to a 
single view being enforced, where that is necessary for the continuation of the community of 
talk, and despite disagreement, then in cases of disagreement agents must move the 
discussion on to how to proceed in the light of that disagreement. That will mean finding a 
point of agreement on what to do which can reasonably represent the practical outcome of a 
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discussion which substantively cannot yet be concluded. This might be done in various ways. 
and perhaps differently for different issues. Options might be: 
" reaching a compromise between the contending positions, where all the parties 
gain some of what they want but give up the rest for immediate practical purposes; 
" reaching a synthesis of the contending positions. Here some new position is 
forged from the original views. It may be that a general synthesis will lead agents 
to give up their original views as transcended by the new position. Or it may be 
less powerful than that, but still able to satisfy agents as being more than a 
compromise; 
" agreeing to adopt a position of public neutrality on the issue at stake, leaving 
individuals free to act as they choose. This position, typically that liberals will 
argue for in may cases (although they will often favour other procedures as well), 
although it leads to public neutrality, is not in itself a neutral position. It may not be 
acceptable in instances where it is intrinsic to some views that they be publicly 
enforced; 
" voting, by the majority or some other acceptable principle. In the ideology of liberal 
democracies this is often taken to be the defining feature of conflict resolution, 
especially where the conflict is taken to be between essentially private 
preferences. But in fact it is but one of the means available to reach a practical 
resolution of principled disputes. 3 
Democracy or dictatorship? 
What has emerged from this argument has been a commitment to a political process 
of deliberation and democratic decision making. It may be wondered why another option in 
the above list is not the establishment of a benevolent dictatorship, rather than a process of 
democratic decision-making. Such a listening dictator would indeed base his decisions upon 
a process of discussion, but having heard all viewpoints he makes up his mind on the basis of 
' These options build upon the conception of practical discourse outlined In Thomas A. Spragens, Jr., Reason and Democracy 
(Durham. N. Carolina, 1990), pp. 131-133. Spragens argues for politics as a rational practice, requiring liberal democratic norms. He 
claims that the end of politics Is human flourishing, but that our knowledge of any conception of the good Is fallible, hence the need for 
discussion and democracy. I have argued that my position Is not based upon any such fallibilist claim - see my discussion of Mill in 
Chapter Six above. On options for reaching agreement In a deliberative democracy, see also Joshua Cohen, *Deliberation and 
Democratic Legitimacy, ' The Good Polity, eds. Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit ((Oxford, 1989), pp. 22-23. Cohen links his conception to 
strong substantive liberal commitments, such as Individual autonomy, which I do not want to follow - see my discussion of Cohen's view 
in Chapter Eight. 
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the argument she has heard, and what he says is what is enforced. What is it in my argument 
which necessarily leads to democracy rather than dictatorship? 
The key factor here lies in the commitment each individual agent has to maintaining 
the community of talk, the commitment which, I have argued, draws us into deliberative 
democracy. Each agent has this commitment because it is the precondition for their being, 
and continuing to be, an agent with a view at all. The would-be dictator is in no different 
position. What a dictatorship fails to do is to provide a reconciliation between individuals and 
the use of political authority. That reconciliation only takes place if individuals can come to 
agree at some level to the decision which is taken and enforced. In a democracy this 
happens when and if each individual can assent that the decision be taken in one of the ways 
outlined above. They are driven to accept one of these options by the logic of having their 
own view. Unless a decision is taken, the maintenance of community, and thus the condition 
for their having views, is undermined. The above options serve to provide ways of reconciling 
this necessity with the possibility of disagreement on the substantive issue of what is to be 
done. 
In a listening dictatorship, however, although the discussion can be said to inform the 
decision which has been taken - the dictator listens and takes all views into account - still the 
decision represents the dictator's own will and not the will of each individual. Now, it may be 
that each agent may come to agree that the best way of resolving a particular practical dispute 
is to put the matter to some authoritative person or institution. That is, after all, what happens 
in the legal process. This could be included as an option in the above list, but I have not done 
so because in practice such a procedure would only be instrumental to one of the other 
options. There would be a need to check that the view the authority reached was indeed 
supportable as a compromise or synthesis or whatever. So the use of an authority can be 
helpful in reaching one of the above outcomes, but it is not a way of reaching a final result, 
since individual agents would not want to give anyone power to reach a decision to which they 
may not each be able to reconcile themselves. 
In a dictatorship, however, that is precisely the power which individuals would have to 
give up. So it can never be right for agents with views to agree that a dictator should 
determine what is to be done, for that would be to allow the possibility that the moral 
reconciliation of individual and community not be achieved. Moreover, anyone tempted by 
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dictatorship also has reason to refrain from taking it up. A listening dictator has to be able to 
listen and respond to views, and to reach his own view on grounds he can justify and defend. 
He is an agent with a view like any other, even if he were to attain supreme political power. 
But now being a dictator would undermine his own status as an agent with a view. He can 
only be such an agent if he lives in a community of fellow agents, a community of talk. But it is 
a precondition of maintaining such a community that each individual can be reconciled to the 
use of political authority that is also required to maintain it. But in a dictatorship such a 
reconciliation cannot be carried out. So even a listening dictator himself should not want to be 
a dictator. 
The argument is, of course, even clearer with regard to a dictator who does not want 
to listen. I explained in the preceding chapter how a fundamentalist, for example, could only 
avoid being an agent with a view, and all that that involves, by undermining their own ability to 
claim justification for their fundamentalist views. Even someone who holds that they are in 
possession of certain truth has grounds which he or she takes to justify that claim - say, 
claims about how the bible is the revealed word of god. In practice, such a person may think 
that this licences them to impose their views upon the community. But in doing so they would 
be undermining the conditions which allow them to justify their claim as being certainly true. 
The fundamentalist may not care about this consequence. But they should care, because 
their claim to rule depends upon it. But that means the fundamentalist cannot consistently be 
a dictator - they, too, must participate in a deliberative democracy. This may be why in the 
long run dictatorships have a tendency to give way to democracies - In suppressing public 
deliberation and democratic participation the very justificatory basis for the regime is 
undermined and this its rational foundations crumble. Once it loses any claim to justification 
only force can keep it in power, and once the intellectual battle has been lost force does not 
always triumph, as recent history shows. 
Summary 
So agents with a view are committed to a process of public discussion as a necessary 
part of having a justified view; that commitment implies that agents are part of a community of 
talk; a necessary condition of the existence of such a community is that on some issues a 
single view will need to be enforced by a central authority; the view which is enforced must in 
some way be the outcome of the process of discussion; and agents, because they cannot 
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escape their commitment to be involved in such a discussion, and because they cannot 
individually determine the outcome, must therefore accept the enforcement of views even if 
those views are not the ones they favour, providing the view which is enforced is determined 
by an acceptable decision procedure (compromise, voting, etc. ). 
What of the political paradox, which claims that politics is inconsistent 
because it commits agents to wanting two incompatible things, the enforcement of their own 
views and of whatever emerges from the political decision procedure? The resolution of this 
apparent paradox lies in the enforcement of a single view being part of the condition for the 
agent having their own views. An agent must always act in accordance with whatever is 
necessary to secure the realisation of their own views. It would be self-defeating not to do so. 
But that means that an agent must accept the enforcement of a single view, even when that 
view is not their own, as a condition for the continuation of the community within which they 
want their own views realised. There is the appearance of paradox, but no actual 
contradiction: without the enforcement of views other than their own, which allows the 
discussion to continue from which agents want their own views to emerge triumphant, the 
realisation of the views agents hold would never be a possibility. 
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Chapter Eight 
Deliberative democracy as a practical ideal 
In the preceding two chapters I have tried to carry out my project of showing how 
there can be a moral community. I have argued that human agents are necessarily tied 
into a community of talk, which requires a political authority to maintain it; and that that 
authority is legitimately exercised when it is based upon a decision to which at some 
level everyone has assented, even if that assent is just to letting the majority decide. 
Thus the moral legitimacy of political authority is secured when the exercise of that 
authority issues from a process of deliberative democracy. 
The task now is to unfold further what is involved in a deliberative democracy 
and to make it seem a plausibly practical ideal which can be used to inform actual 
political attitudes and actions. This task is particularly important because there are 
several pitfalls for conceptions of a basic political framework of democracy. On the one 
hand, such a conception can seem too strong, requiring unrealistically and even 
inherently undesirably high levels of political participation; on the other, it can seem to 
fizzle out, becoming in the end indistinguishable from the liberalism the conception was 
meant to replace. In my view both pitfalls can be avoided, but doing so requires a very 
clear and careful understanding of exactly what is involved in the notion of deliberative 
democracy. I shall therefore start still at a relatively abstract level by discussing how a 
deliberative democracy relates the individual and the community, and how we should set 
about deciding what constitutes a deliberative democratic framework. Only then will I be 
able to sketch the main features of the constitutional and political arrangements which 
deliberative democracy implies. 
8.1 OVERCOMING THE FEAR OF DEMOCRACY 
I will begin by confronting one of the main concerns which may be raised by my 
conception: the traditional fear of what a democracy might do if untrammelled by prior 
liberal-constitutional constraints. That fear can be assuaged if the character of a 
deliberative democracy as I conceive it is grasped. To say that the process of 
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deliberative democracy brings about morally legitimate political decisions implies, very 
importantly, that legitimacy is to be created, that it is an achievement. ' 
I have already argued that agents with views cannot exclude from the community 
of discourse anyone who comes forward with views or criticisms of views. But still, the 
worry might be that this would not preclude the democratic passing of racist legislation, 
say, or laws otherwise biased against minority groups and viewpoints. And that would be 
so, if all that mattered was that minorities were not prevented from speaking and voting. 
But the thrust of a deliberative democracy goes deeper than that. The point is to 
construct decisions which are morally legitimate. Remember that agents are committed 
to the political enforcement of such policies which are necessary in order to sustain the 
community of talk, and that the enforcement of such policies is legitimate when at some 
level they emerge from a consensus arrived at through discussion (even if the 
consensus is just to take a vote and abide by what the majority wants). This has two 
important consequences. 
One is that achieving political legitimacy is a matter of degree. The goal is a 
total consensus, and to the extent to which this is not achieved so to that degree political 
decisions will lack complete moral legitimacy. If consensus is not attainable at some 
level necessary to reach a decision then this points to the need for more public 
discussion on what to do about the disagreement. Political legitimacy may have to be 
worked at. 
This leads to the second consequence. Political decisions are legitimate when 
they morally reconcile each individual to the collective view which is taken. Only then do 
agents have no reason not to accept the use of political authority to enforce a single 
view. Since all agents are rationally committed to living in a community whose political 
decisions carry legitimacy, each has an overriding interest in trying to bring legitimacy 
about. Now, a decision is only legitimate if it is based upon a consensus at some level. 
Thus, to return to the issue of minorities, it is a condition of legitimacy that the holders of 
all views have agreed in advance to the decision procedure: they have agreed to take a 
' The notion of deliberative democracy as the way In which political legitimacy is created is raised, on different grounds, by 
Bernard Manin, 'On Legitimacy and Deliberation, ' Political Theory 15 (August 1987), p. 352; Joshua Cohen, ' Deliberation and 
Democratic Legitimacy, ' The Good Polity, eds. Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit (Oxford, 1989), pp. 21.23; Amy Gutman and 
Dennis Thompson, 'Moral Conflict and Political Consensus, ' Liberalism and the Good, eds. R. Bruce Douglass et at (New York, 
1990), pp. 125-147. 
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vote to settle the issue, say, or to search for a compromise. But now, just letting 
minorities have a voice and a vote is not sufficient for legitimacy. They also have to 
consent at some level to the decision, or the decision-making process. So if a group is 
allowed to speak and vote, but their interests and claims are continually ignored in 
reaching political decisions, then those decisions will lack moral legitimacy, possibly to a 
serious degree. But that is not in the interests of the majority, either, since, as I argued 
in the last two chapters, political illegitimacy weakens the community of talk which is 
necessary for their own continuance as agents with views. So the majority have good 
reason to ensure that minorities are included, and not to pass exclusionary or 
discriminatory legislation. To the extent they ignore this interest then the legislation lacks 
legitimacy. Thus the traditional fear of democratic tyranny is overcome by deliberative 
democracy: all members of society have a commitment to bring about inclusive, non- 
tyrannical, morally legitimate outcomes of the democratic process. 
8.2 THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE COMMUNITY 
The argument for deliberative democracy was developed out of a rejection of 
certain ways of trying to construct a moral community, which relied upon the existence of 
a pre-political consensus or the possibility of certain moral knowledge. Thus individuals 
could, if such methods worked, come to realise that if they did not already have among 
their moral beliefs a belief in the principles on which the community was based, 
nevertheless they did have a belief - in fairness, say - from which those principles could 
be seen to follow. Or they had a commitment to their ends, from which it could be shown 
that to achieve those ends they must live in a certain sort of community. The problem for 
such views was that public reason cannot start from a pre-existing consensus: any 
consensus must be publicly discovered or constructed. They took for granted an implicit 
social unity, which the theory, and its actualisation in a process of public reason, made 
into foundational political principles. But that there is such an implicit social unity cannot 
be assumed, lest it turn out to be shallow and illusory, perhaps consisting of agreement 
on words only. And even if it does exist, it needs to be made public and explicit if it is to 
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serve as the basis of agreed political principles. Thus any political framework must 
instead take as its basis a process in which agreement Is publicly constructed. 
The commitment of individuals to a deliberative democratic process arises from 
the needs of human agents to live in, and maintain, a community of talk, if they are to 
continue to be agents. On the consensual liberal model Individuals and community are 
to be bound together by a congruency of basic moral values. For the deliberative 
democratic view individuals, as human agents, rely upon the community for their 
existence as agents. We cannot have moral (or indeed theoretical) views without 
membership of a wider community, a community of talk, within which questioning and 
justification of views can take place. It may now appear that this Is a communitarlan 
conception, where I am constituted by my membership of the community into which I was 
bom and in which I live. But that would be a wrong conclusion. Although an agent is 
dependent upon membership of a community, that does not mean that the community 
determines or constitutes the ethical beliefs of the agent. It may be that the community 
sets a horizon, in that there are limits beyond which thought cannot go in a specific time 
and place. But this horizon can be very wide indeed. Moreover, the exact nature of the 
limits cannot be specified in advance, or from within the community. It is always possible 
for an individual to step back from any particular belief or view and subject it to critical 
scrutiny. 2 Although one cannot step back simultaneously from all beliefs or views, there 
need be no one belief or view which is beyond potential scrutiny. To say that my self is 
formed by the community in which I live is to say no more than that I have a history - and 
that history includes my own previous decisions and self-determinations. It is always 
open and indeterminate how my life story will continue, since I can choose to build on 
what has gone before in my life in different ways. Nor does it follow that my life in future 
will only go well if I continue on the same road down which I have so far travelled. 
3 This 
does not mean that I must always conceive of myself as a completely autonomous 
agent, unconstrained by my history and commitments. It may be normally detrimental to 
2 The notion of'stepping back' was developed by Stuart Hampshire as an account of human freedom: we his Freedom of the 
Individual, 2n0. ed. (London, 1975). As an attempt to refute causal determinism the theory has been subject to withering 
criticism. However I believe that the notions developed by Hampshire Illuminate an Important dimension of human freedom, 
and can be understood as a theory of the compatibility of freedom, consisting of much more than simple unobstructed freedom 
to act, with the physical determination of action. It connects freedom of action or the will with social and political freedom. I 
haven't the room to develop this argument further here, and my use of the terms do not depend upon It. 
This Is the sense given to community by Daniel Bell In his Communitarlanism and Its Critics (Oxford, 1993). 
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my well-being to ignore my past and my cultural inheritance, but I can honour those and 
bring them to bear in my future life in different ways. 
The deliberative democratic view of the relationship between individual and 
community is therefore not the communitarian one. Although my intellectual and moral 
life is dependent upon the community of which I am a member, the community does not 
determine the substantive content of my beliefs. 4 That is not to say that my beliefs are 
not caused: but there is no communal ethos or tradition in which I must locate myself, or 
within which I should locate myself if I am to flourish. The stock of public ideas may be 
various, and I can use what resources I may have to decide between them and 
sometimes go beyond them. The relationship between individual and community is not a 
substantive one, where my moral, social and psychological identity is constituted by the 
community; rather, it is a formal one, in the sense that whatever my beliefs and views 
may be, in holding them I necessarily involve myself in a community. I do so ultimately 
because I cannot justify my views to myself without being open to public defence and 
justification. So to have a view at all is to be tied to a community, regardless of the 
content of the view or the dominant culture and tradition, if there is one, in the 
community. 
Of course, in a particular community at any one time there will be particular ideas 
and views held by existent individuals in the community, some of which will be matters of 
public discussion. In that sense, while in general terms my relationship as an individual 
to the community may be formal, the concrete determinate relationship at a particular 
time will contain specific ideas and beliefs. But then the nature of the community is 
determined by the views and suggestions its members bring to it, as they are shaped by 
the propositions they find in the public realm. Community and individual are involved in a 
continuing mutual process of determination of content. 
One immediate implication of this conception of the relationship between 
individual and community is that individuals have an interest not only in the nature of the 
4 Nevertheless, there are close connections between the notion of deliberative democracy as developed here and the revival of 
citizenship theory which communitarianism has partly sparked. See Adrian Oldfield, Citizenship and Community: Civic 
Republicanism and the Modem World (London, 1990). But in its emphasis on the Importance of discussion to democracy, the 
link may be stronger to an older current of citizenship theory found in the work in the mid-twentieth century of nealdealist 
political theorists such as Ernest Barker and A. D. Lindsay, as well as that of Dennis Thompson. Barry Holden, Understanding 
Uberal Democracy (Hemel Hempstead, 1993) points up some of these links: see pp. 46-7 and 88-97. Dennis Thompson has a 
useful, if now somewhat dated, discussion of the requirements of democratic citizenship In his The Democratic Citizen 
(Cambridge, 1970). 
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Institutional structures of the community, but also in the capacities of individuals 
themselves. If community and individuals are mutually shaped, then what I become 
through this shaping process is in part shaped by how other individuals contribute to it. 
Because of the openness of the process I cannot have any claim on the content of their 
beliefs, other than through the process of justification and argument. But I can have a 
concern in their abilities to engage in this justificatory process. Similarly I can have this 
concern for my own deliberative capacities. So the capacities of individuals, as well as 
the institutions of government and society, become a matter of public concern. 
8.3 POLITICAL LEGITIMACY AND THE CONSTITUTION 
The point of the argument for deliberative democracy has been to establish what 
basis we should use to establish a morally justified political framework for society. The 
question that now arises is what should go into that framework; in other words, what is 
the nature of the constitution of a deliberative democracy? 
Now, if political issues are to be publicly settled through the democratic process, 
it would appear that the only questions which are not up for democratic decision-making 
are those principles, institutions, and constraints necessary for the democratic process 
itself. But the question arises of what these are, and how extensive is the realm which is 
to be beyond democratic decision making. The key rights which many advocates of 
democracy would support as beyond democratic decision making are those of non- 
discrimination and political equality. 5 The first of these prohibits arbitrary discrimination 
against minorities, while the second ensures that citizens have those rights and 
opportunities required for the democratic process to function. But there are three 
problems with conceiving of the constitution of a democratic polity in this way. 
Firstly, the list of rights or entitlements which is to go into the constitution is itself 
uncertain and indeterminate. The non-discrimination constraint seems reasonable if we 
think of a democracy potentially deciding to treat members of minority ethnic groups, say, 
disadvantageously. But whether or not any differential treatment of individuals or groups 
' See Amy Gutmann, 'How Liberal 1s Democracy? ' Liberalism Reconsidered, eds. D. MacLean and C. Mills (New Jersey, 1983) 
pp. 25-50; Michael Walzer, 'Philosophy and Democracy, ' Political Theory 9 (August 1981); Robert Dahl, Democracy and Its 
Critics (New Haven, 1989), esp. pp. 180-182. 
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can be justified depends upon whether there is a principle justifying the treatment which 
is being non-arbitrarily applied, and whether that principle Is itself justified. In many 
cases these issues will be far from clear and far from commanding general consent. 
When Mill argued against the unequal treatment of women under the law In nineteenth 
century Britain in just these terms he was engaging in a public debate, not explicating 
matters of constitutional principle. 
6 The case is even worse with political equality. What 
rights and opportunities do individuals require for the democratic process to function? If 
we try to give a list we can start with rights to participate and freedom of speech and 
association. But these rights are open to a very wide range of interpretations. They can 
generate a range of claims for education, employment, and welfare rights, and it is 
possible to argue that a very comprehensive provision by the state of positive welfare 
rights is necessary if political equality is to obtain. So there seems to be no 
straightforward way a democratic constitution can be drawn up: there is no list of basic 
rights and opportunities which form a basis for a democratic system and which are not 
themselves matters for opposing views and public debate. 
This leads into the second difficulty, which is that if we do try to spell out what a 
constitution for a democracy might be, we find that what originally started as a 
specification for a purely procedural process becomes instead a substantive conception, 
embracing not only political rights but also a distributive conception. The more 
constitutional constraints upon democracy which are introduced, the more democracy 
and liberalism (at least liberal social justice accounts) converge? and the less room there 
is for democratic decision making. Thus Joshua Cohen argues that "democracy is a 
substantive, not simply a procedural, ideal"'. The supporting argument for this claim is 
the move already indicated from a minimal constitutional consensus on matters such as 
free expression to a more substantive position on the need for education, say, which 
requires a constitutional commitment to certain distributive principles - for Cohen, to 
Rawls' difference principle. Moreover, Cohen says, if the democratic constitution 
institutionalises the conception of the political equality of citizens, this will constrain the 
0 John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women, ed. Susan M. Okin (Indianapolis, 1988). 
1 As Gutmann, 'How Liberal Is Democracy' p. 46, points out 'Democrats have made their case against the defense of welfare 
rights by egalitarians too easy by neglecting the extent to which their own nondiscrimination and nonrepression principles 
constrain legislative will... . 
Joshua Cohen, 'Pluralism and Proceduralism, ' Chicago-Kent Law Review, 69 (1994), p. 594. 
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reasons which are admissible in public debate, since all interests are to count equally, 
and this will have an effect on legitimate substantive outcomes of the process. 9 Nor, he 
alleges, are matters better with the non-discrimination constraint which rules out certain 
decisions as arbitrarily disadvantaging minorities. Such a constraint is required to 
preserve support for the democratic system, but, Cohen says, that implies a substantive 
and not just procedural agreement on the importance of certain freedoms for minorities 
(the example he uses is freedom of worship). 1° So it appears that there is no possibility 
of instituting a democratic constitution which is short of a full conception of democratic 
justice, and we are back with liberalism. 
The first difficulty for the project of a democratic constitution was that it was 
indeterminate what should go into it, the second that such a constitution may converge 
upon a liberal one or even be identical with a substantive conception of liberal justice. 
Now, one possible conclusion from these two points is that what the argument for 
deliberative democracy succeeds in doing is to give support for a liberal conception, but 
on a different basis. However, while this would be an easy resolution of the difficulties, I 
do not think that it will work. The reason why the justification for a deliberative 
democracy cannot justify a liberal conception of justice is that in the conception of agents 
with views many of the questions of the material basis for being an agent fall into the 
domain of views, and cannot be got out of the structural preconditions of agency. One 
can of course argue about those conditions but the point is precisely that these are to be 
argued about. One can be an agent with a view at any level of material well-being. Of 
course, the lower the level the greater the chance that the range of questions in which 
you will be interested will be narrower, focusing on getting food, shelter, a regular 
income, and so on - although there is no strict necessity here. But then for the argument 
for political legitimacy agency is the basis, not the end. To take the conditions of agency 
as an end is a matter for the political debate, not the foundation of it. That is why the 
bare notion of democracy will not resolve substantive distributive questions. But then we 
seem to have a contradiction if instituting a democratic constitution requires that such 
" Ibid., p. 610. 
10 Ibid., pp. 604-606. 
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questions be resolved. The argument for democracy will not do it, and we end up as 
liberals not on a democratic but on a liberal basis. 
This leads to the third difficulty for the notion of a democratic constitution, which 
is that seems intrinsically a non-democratic conception: it puts a range of matters beyond 
the democratic process, and requires presumably an agency to enforce the constitution 
which is itself not fully subject to democratic control. " But if that were the case the 
political framework would no longer be fully a democratic one. While the justification of 
the non-democratic element would be the protection of democracy, some actions by the 
state - those designed to protect and enforce the constitution - would be legitimate even 
if they did not have democratic approval, indeed against such approval in some cases. 
Democratic legislation could be struck down by the constitutional agency. But the 
principle of political legitimacy was that decisions were binding if they were achieved by a 
deliberative democratic process. A democratic constitution would therefore seem to 
introduce a second principle of legitimacy which has no foundation - or rather, would 
seem to require a liberal foundation rather than a democratic one. So the institution of a 
democratic constitution conflicts with the project of establishing a morally legitimate 
political framework around a deliberative democratic conception. 
The conclusion we seem to have reached, then, is that the standard conception 
of a democratic constitution, as institutionalising what is necessary for the democratic 
process itself, is self-defeating. Either we can have no constitution, or we must introduce 
fundamental liberal principles into our framework. To do the latter would be to admit the 
defeat of the project of justifying a basic political framework of democracy. Can we do 
without a constitution? One motivation for introducing a constitutional concept is to allay 
reasonable, and traditionally liberal, fears about the effects of untrammelled democracy, 
where a majority could apparently decide to do anything it chooses. Constitutional 
constraints seek to protect the position of individuals and minority groups but on 
democratic grounds alone. One way of achieving a similar result without resort to 
constitutional protection would be to allow that individuals only have a limited obligation to 
abide by democratic decisions, that obligation being conditional on democratic decisions 
11 This is the argument of James Hyland, Democratic Theory (Manchester, 1995), chap. 6, especially pp. 156-161. 
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not overriding other binding moral duties I take myself to have. 12 But that seems to 
negate democracy in another way, since rather than decisions being morally legitimate if 
democratically reached, we now have a further condition upon them, that they be 
consistent with my other moral views not just at the level of the principle underlying the 
decision-making - the principle of there being unanimity at some level of the decision. 
making process - but at the level of the outcome of the decision. Yet democratic 
legitimacy was precisely meant to reconcile such differences at the level of outcome 
through harmony at a deeper level. 
Another option is simply to accept that there is a democratic entitlement to 
decide to do what is wrong as well as what is right. " But again this seems to infringe 
upon the basic democratic project of allowing everyone a say in political decision- 
making, if it is open for some to be excluded by a democratic decision. If the democratic 
project is not to be self-defeating there does indeed seem a need for some decisions to 
be ruled out in advance, and for some court of appeal against certain democratic 
decisions. 
We seemed to have reached an impasse: to introduce a constitution to protect 
those rights necessary for the democratic process itself seems impossible to do on a 
democratic basis, but equally democracy without constraints seems not only undesirable 
(at least to our liberal intuitions) but also self-defeating. However, it may be that a 
constitution as we have so far considered one is not the only option here. In taking up 
the possibility of a constitution for a democracy the issue is immediately posed in a liberal 
way, as implying limits which protect individuals and groups against democratic 
decisions. The role of such a constitution is to restrict the scope of democratic decision 
making. But that is to imply that certain democratic decisions would be morally 
illegitimate and so cannot be legitimately enforced by a political authority. 
This concept of legitimacy has no basis, however, within a democratic system as 
I have argued for it. The moral legitimacy of democratic decisions is constructed through 
the deliberative political process. A democratic decision is legitimate if the deliberative 
process has been adequately followed. Now, it is possible to say what criteria a decision 
"This Is Hyland's solution. 
13 This appears to be Benjamin Barber's position in his Strong 
Democracy (Berkeley, 1984), and also that of Walzer, op. cit.. p. 
397, although the latter also allows that there can be judicial enforcement of the rights necessary for the basic political process. 
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needs to satisfy if it is legitimate - broadly, it needs to arise from a process of discussion 
of the issue, from which no view can be excluded in advance, and within which each view 
must fare according to how the participants judge it on the merits of its justification; and a 
view must be reached on whether there is agreement on the Issue, or, if not, how a 
decision is to be made in the light of disagreement. But applying this in practice is itself a 
matter for political judgement, subject to the same process of legitimate decision- 
making. Thus the process of legitimate decision-making is potentially regressive, as 
questions can be asked as to whether the process met the criteria of legitimacy, 
requiring a further collective political judgement, and then the same question can be 
asked about that judgement, and so on. In practice, however, there are limits of 
feasibility to the number of levels at which this question could be asked. 
In other words, then, while a democratic polity does rest on criteria which are not 
themselves matters for democratic decision-making - the decision what criteria constitute 
political legitimacy is not itself a political one - there is no single constitutional 
embodiment which can be made of these criteria. Does this mean that just anything can 
be a legitimate political decision? No, because the criteria for legitimacy will rule out 
some decisions, as we will see in a moment. But this limitation cannot be written into a 
pre-democratic constitution as a right for individuals and groups. The only limitation on 
democratic decision making can be if a decision is not legitimate by the criteria of 
democracy itself. Determining whether a decision is legitimate by those criteria is itself a 
matter for democratic decision. Allowing for such challenges has to be written into the 
procedures for the democratic process. But again it is not a matter of appealing to some 
charter or agency which stands outside the democratic system as a limitation upon it. 
This does not mean that there may not be room for a statement of legal rights which 
citizens have within a particular legal system. But that statement itself -a bill of rights, if 
you like - is itself a democratic product, revisable in the same way, and does not thus 
ultimately limit democracy in the way a basic constitution was meant to do. 
The move from an argument for democracy to one for a democratic constitution 
as the institutionalisation of the essential procedural requirements of a democratic 
system seems a natural one. But it goes wrong because it mistakes how political 
legitimacy is arrived at in a democratic system. The right operation of the democratic 
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process is necessary for political legitimacy. But it is not sufficient. For political 
legitimacy the process also has to result in a decision, which at some level is founded 
upon agreement. There is no simple procedure which if always followed will result in a 
legitimate outcome. Exactly what constitutes a legitimate outcome in the circumstances 
has to be constructed by agents through the political process. The process can be 
followed but if there is no unanimity on how to resolve an issue then the state cannot 
legitimately act. 
In other words, a moral community is not created by fixing in place a democratic 
constitution. It has to be created anew every time a social decision needs to be taken. It 
Is this sense of legitimacy as a continuing process of collective creation which Is lost 
when a pre-political constitution is proposed. That implies that as long as there are the 
right procedures in place the system is legitimate. But that returns us to the liberal 
understanding of democracy, when political authority is legitimately exercised on the 
basis of decisions made within a basic framework which confers legitimacy. The 
democratic conception of legitimacy, however, is that it is itself a political act, a project of 
construction which has to be undertaken separately every time there is an issue of the 
right use of political authority to be settled. 
So rather than a constitution at the most basic level setting the limits of 
legitimacy, each time legitimacy is claimed for a political decision it is open for individuals 
or groups to cry foul, to protest that their views have not been taken into account, and 
that because they have not consented at some level to the decision - even if only that the 
majority will should prevail - then legitimacy has not in fact been constructed. The basis 
for making such a protest can only be the basic criteria which have to be applied if 
political legitimacy is to result - basically, allowing all views to be heard and searching for 
a decision point which at some level can command unanimous agreement. 
This means that no political decision can ever legitimately exclude some from 
political participation. This arises from the criterion of non-exclusion, which, it will be 
recalled, is the notion that no individual can exclude the views of any other person from 
consideration, because to do so is to potentially weaken the justification of their own 
views. You cannot know in advance what others are going to say. Even if you doubt 
their rational capacities exclusion is self-defeating - after all, even children sometimes 
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say insightful and thought-provoking things. So any decision which excluded some 
people from participation would fall foul of this condition and hence would be illegitimate. 
Thus if no-one can be excluded from the political community all must be engaged in 
assenting at some level to the uses made of political authority. Minorities have some 
power in a deliberative democracy, and it is a power of veto. If they do not consent to a 
decision being made in some way then no legitimate decision can be made. In such 
cases the public discussion must look for more acceptable grounds on which to proceed. 
Thus clear-cut cases of exclusion and discriminatory laws and policies can never 
be the legitimate result of deliberative democratic decision-making. Excluding a group 
from political participation on the same basis as everyone else, perhaps on grounds of 
sex or race, can never be legitimate. Thus one of the traditional liberal fears of 
democracy can be allayed without resort to a liberal constitutional conception. Of course, 
a polity can take such a decision, but that is true regardless of its supposed basis. 
Liberal constitutions can be broken. The point is that the decision lacks moral legitimacy, 
and thus given that the breach is a serious one, as it would be in such a case, then 
possibilities of dissent and opposition to the prevailing regime would be opened up. 
Of course, not all cases of exclusion are clear-cut. There will be disputed 
instances. Some will claim that positive measures are needed if they are not to be 
excluded, because of their materially inferior position or the operation of social prejudice. 
I will say more about this in the next section. But even considering the question of 
exclusion as the absence of impediments to participation, there can be disputed issues: 
for example, whether non-exclusion demands unrestricted free speech or restrictions, 
say on what can be published or publicly said about figures sacred to religious traditions, 
or about the characteristics of ethnic groups. But these issues are troublesome for the 
liberal tradition, too, and are certainly hard to settle in societies where not everyone has 
thoroughgoing liberal intuitions, even assuming counter-factually that liberals only go one 
way on such issues. So that issues like this are not clearly settled by the criteria of a 
deliberative democracy does not constitute an objection. 
One consequence of this conception of how legitimacy is constructed is that 
legitimacy is a goal which may not be achieved, or achieved only partially. Partial 
legitimacy may arise if a small minority remains unreconciled to a decision which is 
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generally agreed, or if assent is given grudgingly so that it is unclear whether some 
people are really reconciled to the decision. The moral community may never be 
complete and its maintenance always has to be worked at. Legitimacy is never a final 
achievement but is always a continuing process. And while we know how to construct 
political legitimacy it does not follow that we always can do it. 
8.4 DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND JUSTICE 
If there is to be no fundamental constitution for a deliberative democracy then of 
course there is no basic constitutional framework of justice. The basic Institutions and 
procedures, however, are to be based upon what constitutes basic political justice for a 
deliberative democracy. The criterion of non-exclusion and the need to base political 
decision-making upon a deliberative process open to all amount to a conception of how 
political entitlements are to be distributed among agents. There is an entitlement for 
each agent to have an equal share in the political process and an equal share in the 
decisions. The actual share will however depend upon the role each decides to play in 
the process. 
Questions of social justice, however, are a political issue to be settled by the 
operation by the process of deliberative democracy. As we have seen above, the 
temptation is to move from an account of political entitlements into substantive principles 
of distributive justice: thus, how can there be participation, say, without ensuring 
education of individuals and without ensuring a well-regulated public debate. 
" But there 
are two points to be made here about how the conception of deliberative democracy 
works in this regard. Firstly, the distinction between the basic institutions and processes 
of a deliberative democracy (on which more shortly) and the content of what decisions 
are arrived at is not identical with that between procedure and substance. A deliberative 
democracy is obviously not just about purely formal entitlements of voice and vote. It is 
about substantial matters: it does require, for example, a well-regulated public debate. 
But, and this is the second point, that does not mean that deliberative democracy 
involves a substantive conception of distributive justice. All that follows is that some 
14 See Cohen, 'Pluralism and Proceduralism, ' p. 603, for one example. 
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decisions about distribution must be made. These will inevitably be on the political 
agenda. They will need to be resolved in a way consistent with the underlying 
requirements of a deliberative democracy. But there is no reason why those 
requirements should dictate that any particular conception of distributive justice must be 
adopted. 
Take the suggestion that a democracy cannot be indifferent to the education of 
its citizenry. That is surely right. But there is room for a wide range of disagreement 
about what follows in terms of the actual distribution of educational opportunities. 
Someone might contest this, on the grounds that in a democracy all must receive 
education in certain basics necessary for citizenship, such as in literacy and numeracy, in 
the civic virtues, in the political culture, and so on. But does that mean a basic level 
which everyone must receive regardless of what other education they get, or that 
inequalities of educational resources are always to benefit the worst off, or that all should 
get equal educational resources, or that educational outcomes must be made equal by 
unequal distribution of resources? Not only is there room for dispute over such matters, 
but the key point is that a legitimate policy on such matters requires that there be room 
for these and other options to be publicly debated. So questions of distributive justice 
must be settled through the deliberative democratic process, they are political and not 
pre-political issues. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to lay down some basic principles. The key 
requirement of a deliberative democracy is that all members of society are engaged to a 
degree in the political process and that a consensus at some level can be achieved 
which gives legitimacy to eventual decisions. Any conception of social justice, therefore, 
must provide as a minimum to all citizens those conditions which they need to ensure 
they are able to participate in the debate. 15 These conditions will include what their 
society determines to be the minimum necessary goods for a decent standard of living. 
It means ensuring that no section of society is excluded on social or economic grounds: 
and thus, if work is a major measure of respect and esteem, including self-respect and 
self-esteem, in society, then justice requires that work be shared around, and that a pool 
1° This notion of the need to provide the social minimum for citizenship, the content of which will be deliberatively specified, can 
be found In James Fishkin, The Dialogue of Justice (Yale, 1992), pp. 137-9. 
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of excluded unemployed is not created. It also involves putting a very high priority on 
education in its widest sense throughout life, with everyone educated to the level 
necessary for basic citizenship - literacy, reasoning ability, basic social knowledge, 
education in virtues and morality. This will mean distributing more resources to those for 
whom such learning is harder. But it also implies that resources are put into providing 
plentiful educational and cultural opportunities for all above this minimum. It implies 
treating the fostering of an intelligent, humane public culture as a requirement of justice. 
8.5 THE INSTITUTIONS OF A DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
As I have said, the requirements of a deliberative democracy are not just 
procedural, but neither do they determine a full and substantive conception of justice. 
Not just any substantive arrangements are compatible with a deliberative democracy, 
however. In this section I will say something about the institutional implications of the 
requirements for an open debate and for decision making which is to be based upon 
unanimity at some level. The next section will turn to implications for individual citizens. 
The institutional issues to be considered are: 
(i) what sort of democracy is a deliberative democracy? What sort of institutions 
are required? 
(ii) how is the public debate to be conducted? 
(iii) how are decisions to be made? 
Turning first to the question of the sort of democracy which deliberative 
democracy is. At first sight it seems like a conception of direct participative democracy, 
where everyone is involved in the process of decision-making and in the business of 
government. But nothing in the idea of deliberative democracy as I have outlined it 
implies that conclusion. While decisions are to be based upon a process of public 
deliberation, and individuals with views have reason to participate in such debate, 
nothing compels such participation by every individual on every issue of public policy. 
The process must be open to such participation and the greater the participation by 
people with views on the issue the greater the degree of legitimacy which attaches to the 
outcome, but participation as such is not intrinsically of value to every individual. 
To live 
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In a moral community is doubtless a very great good but nothing has been said about 
how it compares to other goods, and the balance will vary between individuals. The 
basic conception was that agents had political views, even if they only have one - e. g. the 
state should leave me alone - and therefore every agent has a reason to participate so 
that their view is reflected in the political community. Living in a moral community is part 
of the good of every individual and a degree of participation is required if such a 
community is to be constructed. But it does not follow from that that participation as 
such is a good in itself for every individual, nor that participation is required on every 
issue, not even every major issue. Even less is deliberative democracy a conception 
whereby everybody must be involved in the business of government. In so far as 
participation features in the conception it does so in the making of decisions, in the 
legislative process and not the executive. 
So a deliberative democracy not only does not require the institutions of a direct 
participative democracy, it is not consistent with them either. Direct democracy rests 
upon a view that either political activity constitutes the good life, or that it is required in 
order to allow individuals to live the good life as they conceive it. These two views are 
often distinguished as being those of civic humanism and civic republicanism 
respectively. 1e As I have outlined it, however, deliberative democracy does stress the 
virtue of some political participation as required if agents with views are to maintain their 
own status. But a full-blown version of direct democracy is not required on those 
grounds, and to require it would be to go beyond what is needed to maintain this 
conception of agency. Deliberative democracy does contain elements of a civic 
republican conception, since it makes the condition of individuals depend upon the 
conditions of public life. But it does not require strong civic republican conceptions such 
as "The sole route to individual liberty is by way of public service" and "... if we wish to 
maximise our liberty, we must devote ourselves wholeheartedly to a life of public service, 
placing the ideal of the common good above all considerations of individual 
16 This distinction can be found in a number of places. Rawls outlines it in Political 
Liberalism (New York, 1993), pp. 205-208. 
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advantage". '7 To adopt positions like these would be to go beyond what our 
maintenance as agents with views requires. The conditions of public life are important to 
each of us because we rely upon them to be the agents we are, but through participation 
we create those conditions upon which we rely, but to say we must devote ourselves fully 
to public service would imply that we must change our character as agents. And that is 
not part of the conception of deliberative democracy. 
The political arrangements that deliberative democracy does require are that 
there be an open forum of public debate; that there be the means whereby that debate 
can be brought to a point of practical decision-making, within the constraint of unanimity 
at some level; that there be institutions for working out the details of policy in line with the 
decisions of public debate, and for implementing and administering the decisions; and 
that, given that the point of the process is to secure the legitimacy which is necessary for 
a moral community, there be institutional responsibility for the conduct of the process 
itself. 
These requirements indicate the need for a balance between representative and 
participative institutions. 18 Representative institutions may be more hospitable to a 
deliberative political process than arrangements based on direct participation alone. One 
reason for this may be the objection commonly cited to direct democracy that it is 
unfeasible in large-scale modern societies. Some are optimistic that new technology can 
overcome this problem19 but it is questionable whether it can overcome another, perhaps 
deeper, problem, that rational debate requires the opportunity for calm and prolonged 
reflection which direct democracy can serve to exclude in several ways: through the 
intimidatory scale of the assembly; the pressure on time in such a forum to make ones 
views heard, leading to a coarsening of views; and the pressure on time in another way, 
as the demands for participation squeeze out room for digestion of material and 
arguments and for reflection on the issues. 20 Representative institutions, dedicated 
"These quotes are from Quentin Skinner, 'On Justice, the Common Good, and Liberty', Dimensions of Radical Democracy, ed. 
Chantal Mouffe (London, 1992), pp. 221 and 217 respectively. Skinner himself acknowledges that the direct democracy which 
the view he endorses indicates is ruled out on grounds of feasibility, and so accepts that we must look to improve public 
participation within representative institutions (ibid., p. 222). The difference with my view is that I think direct democracy is not 
even Ideally required. 
"The relationship between a conception of politics as public dialogue and representative institutions is urged by David Miller, 
Market: State and Community (Oxford, 1989), pp. 271-272. 
"See, for example, Barber, op. cit, p. 247. 
20 Anyone who has been involved in a computer conference discussion will know that the process of reading contributions to the 
debate and composing one's own is surprisingly time-consuming. 
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solely to debate of the issues, can remove these difficulties. But the can only be part of a 
legitimate political process if they base their deliberations upon a public deliberative 
process. 
The public debate must be fostered and regulated. Forums for debate need to 
be developed, and new ones established. The aim is the formation of a public opinion on 
each topic, and the channels by which that opinion is formed are many and various and 
very often informal. Nevertheless since the public debate is crucial to the moral 
legitimacy of any eventual decision there is a public responsibility to generate the best 
and most wide-ranging debate possible. The better the debate and the wider the options 
considered the more individuals are tied into the eventual decision. Thus the political 
process is to be animated by the objective of generating the greatest possible degree of 
moral community. 
The key to generating the sort of public debate needed is to get facts and 
opinions in front of the public and to promote, partly by example, rational discussion of 
them. This could be done by the establishment of a body whose purpose is solely to 
facilitate the public debate by ensuring all the material needed is widely disseminated, 
umpiring the debate to ensure all views are being heard, and to try to move it on by 
venturing summaries and putting forward proposals which might form the basis of 
eventual decision-making. 21 Obviously the press, TV and radio will continue to be major 
channels of getting information to the public and of leading opinion forming. As a 
deliberative culture developed the responsibility of these in promoting rational debate 
may become better discharged than at present. Meanwhile it would be the responsibility 
of the facilitating commission to take initiatives to ensure that financial power did not 
prevent all views from gaining a platform, and that reflective deliberation was promoted. 
One instrument for this might be the notion of deliberative opinion polling which has been 
developed by James Fishkin and tried out on British television22, where representative 
groups of citizens engage in intensive discussion of an issue for a few days with the 
chance to listen to and question experts and interest groups, and the resultant shifts in 
The idea of a neutral third party facilitator to foster and regulate the public debate is put forward by John Dryzek, Discursive 
Democracy (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 44ff. 
"See James Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation (New Haven, 1991), pp. 81-99. The televised experiment, Power and the 
People, focused on the issue of crime and was shown on Channel 4 In 1994. 
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their opinions on the issues are measured (often with reassuring results for those who 
fear the possible illiberal results of democracy). 
The representative bodies will also play a role in shaping the public debate. But 
ultimately the representatives must base their own deliberations upon the way the public 
debate has gone. It is the representative body which must reach whatever decisions 
need to be taken. Possible instruments of direct popular decision-making, such as 
referenda, are not indicated unless the issue and the options are clear-cut. Otherwise 
simply the act of framing a question to be asked in a poll and conducting a debate 
around it acts to limit rather than to foster or reflect an adequate process of deliberation. 
Representatives have therefore to reach decisions but unless the people as a whole feel 
the decision is a reasonable reflection of their views as they have emerged from the 
process of deliberation the decision will not be regarded as legitimate. 
Thus the public debate needs to have two very important characteristics. Firstly, 
it needs to be a genuine process of deliberation. That means that it is not to be regarded 
as simply an arena for pre-formed interests or views to fight it out, culminating in a 
majority vote. Remember that the point of the process is to construct a morally 
legitimate decision, and that means an expectation that while the discussion may (but 
need not necessarily, or not in all cases) start from existing views, these may well to 
some degree be modified during the course of discussion. This connects with what I 
said in discussing the concept of agents with views earlier, that that concept does not 
imply that the views of individuals are unchanged by engagement in political association 
and public debate, and that such openness to change was an unavoidable characteristic 
of having views. Moreover, and this is the second characteristic of the public debate, the 
point of it is to reach an agreement on what political decision should be made on the 
issue in question. Thus the discussion has to shift (and the facilitative body may have to 
help here) from the question of what is the truth or right about any issue, to one of what 
to do in the light of disagreement, with the aim of fostering a general assent either to let 
the majority decide, or to adopt some position which synthesises elements from the 
conflicting viewpoints or compromises between them, or to leave it to individuals with 
whatever consequences that might have for the general character of society. Thus the 
discussion moves from the advancing of general views and the epistemic search for the 
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truth to trying to work out a general will, focused on achieving a collective decision on 
what to do. 23 
The role of the representative body is to try and capture a general will in the 
decision it takes. That is a process of art, not science, informed though it might be by 
techniques such as opinion polling. The art involves knowing when to take the decision 
as well as what decision to take. Individual citizens have a right to know why the 
decision has been taken, and it is always open to any one to protest that the decision 
does not truly reflect the general will. Thus decisions can be tentative, transient, and 
fluid, and to that extent so will be political legitimacy. 
8.6 THE SCOPE OF THE COMMUNITY 
(i) Size 
One important consequence of this process of public deliberation and decision- 
making is on the scope of the community involved in the process. The sort of talk which 
is required between citizens if there is to be a legitimate process indicates that the 
participants must be united by a common language and have at least some elements of 
a shared culture. That is why in a multi-ethnic society a political community cannot be 
built upon notions of separate development. It also puts in doubt the viability of 
establishing valid trans-national political structures such as some envisage for the 
European Community. While co-operation between nations is of course highly desirable 
joint political structures cannot be legitimate if the populations cannot talk to each other 
to the depth political dialogue requires. To some extent this can be ameliorated by 
having an international representative body which can sum up and bring into relation with 
each other national debates, but this can never achieve the same degree of moral 
legitimacy in its decision-making as purely national processes. In that sense those who 
used to think that international political unity first required an international language had a 
valid point. 
23 David Miller stresses that the aim of deliberation is to reach agreement, not to discover an objectively correct answer, In 
'Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice' Prospects /or Democracy, ed. David Held (Cambridge, 1993) pp. 76-77. 
180 
This consideration about being able to talk to each other in a sense sufficient for 
a legitimising discussion does not only constrain the size of the polity through the need 
for a common language, though. It affects it more directly, too. The smaller the scale of 
the discussion the deeper it is likely to be and hence the greater the legitimising weight it 
carries. This implies that the more local the process of discussion and decision-making 
is, the better. If the representative bodies and executive powers are too remote than the 
degree of democratic legitimacy of government becomes attenuated, because the sense 
is lost that the discussion in which one participates is really entering into the decisions 
made. Another issue enters, too, in large-scale political structures, which Is that the 
range of issues which are then on the agenda becomes so large that the forums of public 
discussions can no longer cope. Any public discussion will inevitably, and rightly, focus 
on the principles at stake in an issue and not on the fine detail. Part of the function of a 
representative legislature is to deal with the latter. However the larger the area covered 
by the political institutions, the more broad-brush the discussion must inevitably become. 
The danger is that with institutions that are too large the ability of the public dialogue to 
cope with the range of even basic issues of policy becomes doubtful. 
Taken together, these considerations point to the scope of the political 
association being largely determined by the existence of common language and culture. 
Within that, however, the basic rule should always be that decisions are taken at the 
lowest possible level. Taking a decision at a higher level than it needs to be can itself 
undermine legitimacy. Political associations which are too large risk losing legitimacy by 
rendering public discussion impossible or impotent. Thus while an association like the 
European Union can at least ameliorate cultural and linguistic barriers by bringing 
together different national discussions in international representative institutions, it also 
has to take steps to overcome the sheer problem of size which is raises issues of moral 
principle and not just practical difficulties. This points to not attempting to do too much at 
this high level, beyond joint policies on certain key issues perhaps like defence and 
currency. The push should be to devolve decision-making to lower levels, not to raise it. 
(ii) Age 
A further consideration about the scope of the community is the question of the 
age at which individuals become citizens. The difficulty here is that the thrust of my 
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argument would make the answer to this indeterminate. I said that no-one can exclude 
others from the public debate, because doing so is self-defeating In that it calls Into 
question whether the grounds for one's views are really justified. This means that 
participation is entirely open to anyone capable of engaging in rational discussion. But 
there is no clear age at which people gain this capacity. The implication would be that 
we should leave the question of age open, and allow young people to come forward as 
political citizens when they are ready. But such a solution seems impractical. How, for 
example, would we decide who was eligible to vote? We should avoid imposing age 
restrictions where these are unnecessary: there would be no need to restrict the forums 
of public debate to those above a certain age. When it comes to voting and other 
matters of citizenship, however, a minimum age must be set. This can only ever be 
based at best upon a rough average of people's capabilities. It may be, however, that in 
a more deliberative system this minimum age might be lower than it is now. 
8.7 DELIBERATIVE CITIZENSHIP 
If the nature of the public debate is a matter of public interest and action, so too 
are the deliberative capacities of citizens. Those capacities need to be developed if the 
debate is to achieve its goal of constructing legitimacy through the formation of a 
collective will about what to do. The public dialogue itself will to a considerable degree 
be an educational force. But people need to be prepared for their participation in the 
debate, which will have implications for the school and college curriculum. In particular 
an understanding of the sort of questions involved in political issues needs to be 
developed, as well as education in the different traditions and currents of views found 
within the society. 
Moreover, the understanding that people have of their own identity as both 
individual agents who are also inevitably part of a community needs to be fostered, if 
they are to be able to appreciate the way that politics is not just an arena for competing 
interests, but a process whereby a moral community is constructed. This is, perhaps, 
where the idea of a constitution may have a role, not as a foundational document but as 
a revisable statement of the rights and responsibilities of state and citizens within the 
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actual existing system. The idea of participation in community also needs to be fostered 
and maintained, with community service of various sorts perhaps being expected from 
individuals at different times through their lives. This could include service in the 
representative bodies themselves, as one option at least for service, so that political 
activity was seen no longer as a career but as an aspect of citizenship. 
The notion of promoting deliberative citizens should also be an aspect taken into 
consideration when political decisions are made. If decisions also serve to promote the 
deliberative capacities of citizens, so much the better. This indicates a devolution of 
power to the lowest possible level, with tiers of regional and local government In which a 
wider range of people can get involved, with local decisions, based upon consultation 
with local residents, over the distribution of resources where possible. It may also Imply 
that providing people with choices, wherever possible, should be an important aspect of 
policy making. It must always be better to provide people with the means to buy a 
service, than to directly provide them with the service itself. That does not mean creating 
pseudo-markets where none are appropriate. But it does mean less central specification 
of services and allowing people more say, either through direct control or through 
purchasing power, over the types of services provided. 
8.8 CONCLUSION 
It may seem surprising, and even a little troubling, that the argument for a form 
of deliberative democracy as the foundational value for political association has not led to 
more radical proposals for institutional change. We are left with a perspective which, if 
adopted, would licence reforms of existing established democratic systems rather than 
revolution. However, the extent of change required should not be underestimated. 
Working towards a deliberative democracy, and creating the deliberative citizens 
necessary for its successful functioning, would not be simple matters easily 
accomplished. They would require significant changes of attitude, and the reversal of 
trends towards ever lower levels of public debate which may be too deeply rooted, 
especially in considerations of economic advantage, but also In notions of political 
careers, to be brought about. It would need a mobilisation of public interest In politics 
and in the need to make political institutions and representatives accountable and 
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responsive, and a realisation of the relevance of this to individual lives in very deep ways, 
all seemingly a long way off. 
Still, there is no need for complete pessimism. There is a resonance even today 
for the idea of a deliberative public culture, which can be discerned in mistrust for a 
political debate dominated by television sound-bites, and in politicians generally. That is 
certainly not a healthy situation, but a perception that something is amiss is a 
precondition for change. 
Moreover, that the argument for a deliberative democracy does not imply a 
complete upheaval of existing political systems, and can find roots within actual political 
attitudes, is to be seen as a vindication of the project. One of the intuitions with which 
the argument began was that actual democratic political systems had the value of 
democracy itself as part of their foundation which arguments for liberalism as the 
foundation of political association overlooked or, indeed, sought to oppose. In that light it 
is philosophies of liberalism as the right foundation for the basic structure of society 
which seem more radical and, given the conditions necessary for their realisation, even 
utopian. That liberal ideas are important in actual political debate is undoubted. But the 
argument for deliberative democracy, if it is in any respect correct, vindicates the 
common sense thought of democratic societies that democracy itself is a foundational 
value, and that in the contest between liberal, conservative, socialist, green, or whatever 
ideas it is in the democratic political process that the possibility of the moral legitimacy of 
political decision-making, and therefore the hope of the reconciliation of individuals with 
the community which they help create and to which they are bound. 
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